aethel-autapon@1.0.2
Compilador DAG para coordinación de agentes autónomos en Monad
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package's main entry automatically uses locally configured private keys to submit repeated payments to a hard-coded recipient without per-payment confirmation. Automatic spending of wallet funds is malicious under the review rules.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json sets dag-compiler.mjs as the package main entry.
- The entry reads mandatos-agentes.json and maps each agent's private key into runtime state.
- The entry creates three 0.05 MON payment intents per agent for a fixed recipient.
- The top-level workflow validates intents and then executes the payment layers without an explicit per-payment confirmation.
- Payments use the loaded agent keys through the SDK's pay method.
- The manifest has no install or lifecycle scripts.
- The package describes itself as a Monad agent coordination tool, where on-chain payments can be part of its stated purpose.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedpackage.json sets dag-compiler.mjs as the package main entry.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L2The entry reads mandatos-agentes.json and maps each agent's private key into runtime state.
dag-compiler.mjsView on unpkg · L52Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aethel-autapon@1.0.2.
See all versions of aethel-autapon for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing aethel-autapon@1.0.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.