aethel-autapon@1.0.4
Compilador DAG para coordinación de agentes autónomos en Monad
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe main entry automatically reads agent signing keys and submits repeated payments of a fixed amount to a hard-coded address. This is unrequested spending of user-controlled funds, so the package is malicious.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package main entry is dag-compiler.mjs, which contains top-level code that runs a payment workflow.
- The script reads mandatos-agentes.json and loads each agent's private key and passkey.
- It creates three 0.05 MON payment intents per agent for a hard-coded recipient, then calls the mandate SDK payment method.
- The main flow invokes execution without an explicit user request.
- The RPC URL can be overridden with RPC_URL, and the payment operation uses the mandate SDK.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedThe package main entry is dag-compiler.mjs, which contains top-level code that runs a payment workflow.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L5The script reads mandatos-agentes.json and loads each agent's private key and passkey.
dag-compiler.mjsView on unpkg · L76Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aethel-autapon@1.0.4.
See all versions of aethel-autapon for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing aethel-autapon@1.0.4. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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