aethel-autapon@1.0.5
Compilador DAG para coordinación de agentes autónomos en Monad
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package's main module automatically uses local agent credentials to send repeated payments to a fixed address without an explicit user request. This is concrete unauthorized spending behavior, so the package is malicious.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package main is dag-compiler.mjs, which executes its workflow at module top level.
- The entry reads mandatos-agentes.json and loads each agent's privateKey.
- It creates three 0.05 payment intents per agent for the same hard-coded recipient.
- The top-level workflow validates and executes those intents without an explicit user request; the payment call uses each agent's passkey and key-backed SDK.
- Execution also attempts to write dashboard status to a fixed absolute path.
- The manifest has no install lifecycle scripts.
- The configured RPC endpoint supports the package's stated Monad payment coordination purpose.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedThe package main is dag-compiler.mjs, which executes its workflow at module top level.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L2The entry reads mandatos-agentes.json and loads each agent's privateKey.
dag-compiler.mjsView on unpkg · L69Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aethel-autapon@1.0.5.
See all versions of aethel-autapon for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing aethel-autapon@1.0.5. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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