aethel-autapon@1.0.6
Compilador DAG para coordinación de agentes autónomos en Monad
AI Security Review
scanned 20h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package main entry executes a payment workflow at top level, sending repeated fixed-amount transactions to a hard-coded address using keys read from a local file. This automatic spending is malicious under the review rules.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Importing or otherwise loading the package main entry point.
Impact
Funds may be transferred from the configured agent wallets without an explicit payment request.
Mechanism
Top-level code reads private keys from mandatos-agentes.json, creates three 0.05 MON intents per agent for a fixed address, and submits payment transactions through the SDK.
Attack narrative
Loading the package main entry point immediately reads configured wallet keys and starts a payment workflow. It creates three 0.05 MON intents per agent for a hard-coded recipient, then calls the SDK to submit transactions carrying those amounts. This causes automatic spending without a user-issued payment request.
AI rationale
The package main entry executes a payment workflow at top level, sending repeated fixed-amount transactions to a hard-coded address using keys read from a local file. This automatic spending is malicious under the review rules.
Evidence
package.jsondag-compiler.mjs.lpm-dependency-evidence-9d503188-61db-44da-b7cc-1b095f4aa0f3/0/npm-linux/src/MandateSDK.jsmandatos-agentes.json/home/usuariochan/agent-yarbox/explorer/web/dashboard-status.json
Network endpoints1
rpc.monad.xyz
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- package.json sets dag-compiler.mjs as the package main entry point.
- The entry point reads mandatos-agentes.json and loads each agent's private key.
- At top level, the entry point creates three 0.05 MON payment intents per agent, all for a fixed recipient, then immediately validates and executes them.
- The payment loop calls the SDK pay method with the preset amount and recipient.
- The SDK submits authorizePayment with the payment amount as transaction value.
Evidence against
- The package is described as a Monad agent-payment DAG compiler, so blockchain RPC and payment operations relate to its stated purpose.
- The SDK uses the Monad RPC endpoint and checks the configured chain ID.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggeddag-compiler-stress.mjsView file
•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature
signature = f6bef5d1c8470e1c
signatureType = suspicious_hashes
sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious
matchedPackage = aethel-autapon@1.0.5
matchedPath = dag-compiler-stress.mjs
matchedIdentity = npm:YWV0aGVsLWF1dGFwb24:1.0.5
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 28
summary = package final verdict is malicious
High
Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature
Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.
dag-compiler-stress.mjsView on unpkgpackage.jsonView file
5"main": "dag-compiler.mjs",
"type": "module",
"keywords": [
"monad",
"dag",
High
Ai Review Evidence
package.json sets dag-compiler.mjs as the package main entry point.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L5dag-compiler.mjsView file
Findings
5 High3 Medium3 Low
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturedag-compiler-stress.mjs
HighAi Review Evidencepackage.json
HighAi Review Evidencedag-compiler.mjs
HighAi Review Evidencedag-compiler.mjs
HighAi Review Evidencedag-compiler.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStripped Provenance Metadata.lpm-dependency-evidence-9d503188-61db-44da-b7cc-1b095f4aa0f3/0/npm-linux/src/MandateSDK.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aethel-autapon@1.0.6.
See all versions of aethel-autapon for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing aethel-autapon@1.0.6. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.