aethel-autapon@1.0.7
Compilador DAG para coordinación de agentes autónomos en Monad
AI Security Review
scanned 19h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis package is malicious because its declared main entrypoint runs payment logic at module load, using wallet credentials from a local file to send funds to a hard-coded recipient. The default behavior can spend users’ funds without an explicit request.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json sets dag-compiler.mjs as the package main entrypoint.
- The entrypoint reads mandatos-agentes.json and loads each agent's privateKey and passkey.
- At module top level, it creates three 0.05 MON intents per agent for a hard-coded recipient, then validates and executes them.
- The execution path calls MandateSDK.pay; that method submits authorizePayment with the requested amount as transaction value.
- Execution also writes dashboard status to /home/usuariochan/agent-yarbox/explorer/web/dashboard-status.json.
- The manifest has no lifecycle scripts.
- The configured RPC endpoint is the Monad RPC used by the package's blockchain payment functionality.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedSource fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.
dag-compiler-stress.mjsView on unpkgpackage.json sets dag-compiler.mjs as the package main entrypoint.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L5Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aethel-autapon@1.0.7.
See all versions of aethel-autapon for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing aethel-autapon@1.0.7. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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