OpenSSF/OSV advisory MAL-2026-10943 confirms this npm version as malicious. The aftermathfi package was published to the npm registry by user 'jet0010001' (maintainer email bremagml0002@gmail.com) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign impersonating the Aftermath Finance SDK (Aftermath Finance is a DeFi protocol on the Sui blockchain). The package was published at version 99.0.0 - an inflated version number characteristic of dependency-confusion attacks, intended to...
Source
OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV
Summary
Malicious code in aftermathfi (npm)
Details
The aftermathfi package was published to the npm registry by user 'jet0010001' (maintainer email bremagml0002@gmail.com) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign impersonating the Aftermath Finance SDK (Aftermath Finance is a DeFi protocol on the Sui blockchain). The package was published at version 99.0.0 - an inflated version number characteristic of dependency-confusion attacks, intended to cause a misconfigured resolver to prefer this public lookalike over the intended private/internal dependency of the same name.
The package declares a preinstall hook ("node setup.js || true") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled setup.js performs host reconnaissance and credential harvesting: it collects the machine hostname, the current OS username, the current working directory, the contents of /etc/hostname, and the output of 'git remote -v', and it enumerates process environment variables whose names match the pattern /key|secret|token|pass|auth|private|drone|gitea|sui|admin|deploy/i - capturing API keys, secrets, tokens, passwords, and Sui/deploy/CI credentials. The collected data is serialized to JSON and exfiltrated via an HTTPS POST to the hardcoded attacker-controlled endpoint https://2.25.140.71:8443/aftermath/npm-dep-conf, with TLS certificate verification disabled (rejectUnauthorized: false) so a self-signed listener is accepted. Errors are silently swallowed so the install appears to succeed. The published module code (index.js) is a benign stub exporting only { version: "99.0.0" }, consistent with a package built solely to deliver the install-time beacon.
The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across the campaign's packages (aftermath-finance, aftermath-sui, aftermathfi), all published by the same maintainer within seconds of each other and all beaconing to the same collector.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (556ad9b21010fc9541cf77cae90893323621b194137c16ea6e3bd67744366a51) The package's preinstall script (setup.js) runs automatically during `npm install` and harvests installer-side data. It iterates process.env and filters keys matching credential-shaped patterns (key/secret/token/pass/auth/private/drone/gitea/sui/admin/deploy), and via execSync collects hostname, /etc/hostname, username, current working directory, and `git remote -v` output. The collected data is POSTed over HTTPS to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint https://2.25.140.71:8443/aftermath/npm-dep-conf with TLS certificate validation disabled (rejectUnauthorized:false). The destination is not a documented first-party service, and the behavior fires unconditionally on install with no opt-in.