agent-qa@0.2.3
⚠ Under reviewThe self-improving Agentic QA harness with Memory
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe static hints for shell execution and runtime installation are consistent with explicit CLI features such as browser installation. However, the CLI calls a first-party agent dependency whose source is unavailable, leaving a material runtime path unresolved; manual review is appropriate without inferring an attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json declares multiple first-party runtime dependencies whose source is unavailable in this snapshot.
- The CLI imports an agent invocation function from one of those dependencies, so its behavior is part of the package’s runtime path.
- The flagged browser installer launches the package’s own installer with selected browser arguments.
- The inspected browser-install code forwards explicit selection arguments to the package’s installer; this does not establish hidden payload execution.
- The manifest exposes a CLI entry point and runtime API exports, but the inspected sources do not establish a concrete attack.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/cli-main.jsView on unpkg · L8744Source silently spawns a Node process to execute an inline dependency payload.
dist/cli-main.jsView on unpkg · L33Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to agent-qa@0.2.3.
See all versions of agent-qa for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of agent-qa@0.2.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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