agenthub-multiagent-mcp@1.56.0
MCP server for AgentHub multi-agent communication
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource shows no concrete malicious install chain, credential theft, remote payload execution, or stealth persistence. However, default-on runtime modification of a foreign Claude Code hook surface is a real agent-extension lifecycle risk.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/index.js installs Claude hooks on MCP startup.
- dist/activityHookInstall.js writes ~/.claude/settings.json unless disabled.
- dist/inboxHookInstall.js adds a SessionStart command hook by default.
- dist/setup.js can create login startup services after interactive confirmation.
- package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle hook.
- Hook commands reference package-local JS files, not downloaded code.
- dist/captureHookInstall.js requires server-confirmed consent and removes capture on failure/revocation.
- dist/session-capture.sh sends only to configured AgentHub endpoint and redacts secret-like values.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
native/agenthub-memvid/index.jsView on unpkg · L19A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
dist/commands/setup-shell.jsView on unpkg · L25Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to agenthub-multiagent-mcp@1.56.0.
See all versions of agenthub-multiagent-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of agenthub-multiagent-mcp@1.56.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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