agenthub-multiagent-mcp@1.76.0
MCP server for AgentHub multi-agent communication
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe reviewed network and credential use is for the configured AgentHub service, while Claude execution is the worker's stated function. No install hook, unrelated credential transfer, or unrequested persistence was identified; shell-profile edits require an explicit setup command.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest describes an AgentHub multi-agent MCP server and declares its runtime entry point; it has no install lifecycle script.
- The worker connects to the configured AgentHub server and sends its API key in the WebSocket authentication header.
- The worker handles server dispatch messages by running Claude for the configured agent workflow; the session capture settings are passed to that child process.
- Shell-profile changes are performed only by the explicit install-shell or uninstall-shell setup command.
- The worker invokes Claude with --dangerously-skip-permissions and can act on dispatches received from the configured AgentHub server; this is a powerful capability consistent with the worker's stated purpose.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
native/agenthub-memvid/index.jsView on unpkg · L6A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
dist/commands/setup-shell.jsView on unpkg · L25Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to agenthub-multiagent-mcp@1.76.0.
See all versions of agenthub-multiagent-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of agenthub-multiagent-mcp@1.76.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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