registry / agentic-awesome-skills / 16.9.1

agentic-awesome-skills@16.9.1

AAS Core: complete local skill discovery, agent-owned selection, stack validation, and planning, backed by 2,113+ agentic skills.

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No automatic install-time execution, secret harvesting, or unrelated exfiltration was found. The remaining risk is the intentional, user-invoked installation of agent skills into control-surface directories.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The user invokes the installer CLI with skill selections or an explicit full install.

Impact

It changes the selected agent skill directory and can remove previously managed entries there.

Mechanism

Clone and copy selected skills into agent skill directories.

AI rationale

Evidence

tools/bin/install.js~/.agents/skills~/.cursor/skills~/.claude/skills~/.gemini/skills~/.codex/skills~/.kiro/skills

Network endpoints2

registry.npmjs.orggithub.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package exposes a user-invoked installer CLI.
The installer copies selected skill directories into AI-agent skill locations and manages prior entries.
The installer contacts the npm registry and GitHub only after the user runs that CLI.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The installer requires an explicit selection for the default Antigravity target.
The Apify and Hugging Face examples send user-provided tokens only to their corresponding service APIs.
The Fedora script is an isolated non-destructive test, and the PDF is a normal ReportLab document.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

Source & flagged code

11 flagged

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView file

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

Secret Pattern

Stripe test secret key in skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

node_modules/ajv/dist/compile/jtd/serialize.jsView file

49sourceCode = `${gen.scopeRefs(names_1.default.scope)}return ${serializeFuncCode}`; L50: const makeSerialize = new Function(`${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); L51: const serialize = makeSerialize(this.scope.get());

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

node_modules/ajv/dist/compile/jtd/serialize.jsView on unpkg · L49

tools/bin/aas.jsView file

3L4: const { main } = require("../lib/aas-v1/cli/main"); L5:

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

tools/bin/aas.jsView on unpkg · L3

skills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.jsView file

98const apiActorId = actorId.replace('/', '~'); L99: const url = `https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/${apiActorId}/runs?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`; L100: ... L102: try { L103: data = JSON.parse(inputJson); L104: } catch (e) { ... L114: }, L115: body: JSON.stringify(data), L116: }); ... L321: // Check for APIFY_TOKEN L322: const token = process.env.APIFY_TOKEN; L323: if (!token) {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

skills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.jsView on unpkg · L98

skills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsxView file

39L40: const token = process.env.HF_TOKEN; L41: const headers: Record<string, string> = token ... L44: L45: const url = `https://huggingface.co/api/models?limit=${limit}`; L46: ... L54: L55: const text = await res.text(); L56: process.stdout.write(text); L57: })();

High

Credential Exfiltration

Source combines credential-like environment material and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

skills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsxView on unpkg · L39

skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.pyView file

•path = skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 24204 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.pyView on unpkg

skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gzView file

•path = skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gz kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 19967 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Compressed Blob

Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs.

skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gzView on unpkg

skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdfView file

•path = skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdf kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 124310 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Ships High Entropy Blob

Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.

skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdfView on unpkg

skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.shView file

•path = skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 1740 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.shView on unpkg

node_modules/ajv/dist/refs/data.jsonView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 20

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

node_modules/ajv/dist/refs/data.jsonView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

11 flagged · loading source

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView file

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

Secret Pattern

Stripe test secret key in skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

node_modules/ajv/dist/compile/jtd/serialize.jsView file

Low

Findings

1 Critical6 High6 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationskills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.js

HighHigh Secretskills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

HighCredential Exfiltrationskills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsx

HighShips High Entropy Blobskills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdf

HighPayload In Excluded Dirskills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.sh

HighSemantic Analysis Limitednode_modules/ajv/dist/refs/data.json

HighSecret Patternskills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

MediumDynamic Requiretools/bin/aas.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperskills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.py

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to agentic-awesome-skills@16.9.1.

See all versions of agentic-awesome-skills for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of agentic-awesome-skills@16.9.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-13 08:40:21.543Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code