agentic-awesome-skills@17.7.0
AAS Core: complete local skill discovery, agent-owned selection, stack validation, and planning, backed by 2,141+ agentic skills.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo malicious install hook, covert exfiltration, remote payload execution, or reviewer manipulation was found. The remaining risk is the explicit installer changing AI-agent skill directories.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The user runs the package's installer executable, such as with --codex or another target option.
Impact
Installed skill content can influence an AI agent's available instructions and capabilities.
Mechanism
Explicit CLI mutation of selected agent skill directories after cloning a repository.
AI rationale
No malicious install hook, covert exfiltration, remote payload execution, or reviewer manipulation was found. The remaining risk is the explicit installer changing AI-agent skill directories.
Evidence
tools/bin/install.js.codex/skills.agents/skills.antigravity-install-manifest.json
Network endpoints2
github.comregistry.npmjs.org
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The package exposes a user-invoked installer executable and targets Codex's skills directory when --codex is supplied.
- That installer clones a repository, then copies, removes, and records managed skill entries in the selected AI-agent skills directory.
- The manifest has no npm preinstall, install, or postinstall hook, so this behavior is not activated during package installation.
Evidence against
- The Apify example sends its explicitly supplied APIFY_TOKEN only to api.apify.com when the example script is run.
- The Hugging Face example uses HF_TOKEN only as authentication for huggingface.co.
- The Fedora shell file is an isolated, non-destructive test that replaces HOME with a temporary directory.
- The PDF is a normal ReportLab-generated document; no executable payload was established.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourceskills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView file
165patternName = stripe_test_secret
severity = high
line = 165
High
High Secret
Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.
skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165165patternName = stripe_test_secret
severity = high
line = 165
High
Secret Pattern
Stripe test secret key in skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md
skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165tools/bin/aas.jsView file
3L4: const { main } = require("../lib/aas-v1/cli/main");
L5:
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
tools/bin/aas.jsView on unpkg · L3Findings
1 Critical6 High6 Medium4 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationskills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.js
HighHigh Secretskills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md
HighCredential Exfiltrationskills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsx
HighShips High Entropy Blobskills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdf
HighPayload In Excluded Dirskills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.sh
HighSemantic Analysis Limitednode_modules/ajv/dist/runtime/parseJson.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighSecret Patternskills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md
MediumDynamic Requiretools/bin/aas.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helper
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to agentic-awesome-skills@17.7.0.
See all versions of agentic-awesome-skills for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of agentic-awesome-skills@17.7.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.