agentic-awesome-skills@18.15.0
AAS Core: complete local skill discovery, agent-owned selection, stack validation, and planning, backed by 2,652+ agentic skills.
AI Security Review
scanned 18d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource supports an explicit-command agent skill mutation capability, warranting a warning under the supplied policy. The inspected source does not support the scanner's malicious exfiltration conclusion or a publication block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Explicit execution of the installer CLI with installation options.
Impact
Changes the instructions and capabilities available to an agent; no credential theft or covert execution was established.
Mechanism
Copies skill content into selected agent directories and updates previously managed entries.
AI rationale
Source supports an explicit-command agent skill mutation capability, warranting a warning under the supplied policy. The inspected source does not support the scanner's malicious exfiltration conclusion or a publication block.
Evidence
tools/bin/install.js~/.gemini/skills.antigravity-install-manifest.json
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The installer selects agent skill directories, including ~/.gemini/skills.
- Installation copies selected skills, prunes previously managed entries, and writes an installation manifest.
- The installer runs through an explicit CLI entrypoint.
- The default Antigravity target requires skill selectors or explicit --all.
Evidence against
- package.json has no automatic npm install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- The inspected Apify and Hugging Face examples authenticate to their intended services.
- The flagged Fedora test script uses a temporary home directory and tests dry-run installation.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
13 flagged · loading sourceskills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView file
165patternName = stripe_test_secret
severity = high
line = 165
High
High Secret
Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.
skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165165patternName = stripe_test_secret
severity = high
line = 165
High
Secret Pattern
Stripe test secret key in skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md
skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165tools/bin/install.jsView file
2L3: const { spawnSync } = require("child_process");
L4: const path = require("path");
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
tools/bin/install.jsView on unpkg · L2Findings
1 Critical9 High6 Medium4 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationskills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.js
HighHigh Secretskills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md
HighChild Processtools/bin/install.js
HighShellskills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjs
HighCredential Exfiltrationskills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsx
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextskills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjs
HighShips High Entropy Blobskills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdf
HighPayload In Excluded Dirskills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.sh
HighSemantic Analysis Limitednode_modules/ajv/dist/runtime/parseJson.js#virtual:normalized:round1
High
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to agentic-awesome-skills@18.15.0.
See all versions of agentic-awesome-skills for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of agentic-awesome-skills@18.15.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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