registry / agentic-awesome-skills / 18.3.0

agentic-awesome-skills@18.3.0

AAS Core: complete local skill discovery, agent-owned selection, stack validation, and planning, backed by 2,451+ agentic skills.

AI Security Review

scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected manifest exposes CLI commands without an automatic lifecycle hook, and the required high-risk paths were either instructional, isolated test, static document, or service-aligned examples. No concrete malicious behavior was found.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

No automatic install-time trigger was identified in the manifest.

Impact

No confirmed malicious effect or unconsented control-surface mutation was established.

Mechanism

The inspected executable examples are caller-invoked tools and send credentials only to their named service APIs.

AI rationale

Network endpoints2

api.apify.com/v2/acts/${apiActorId}/runs?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}huggingface.co/api/models?limit=${limit}

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest declares command-line entry points and ordinary bundled dependencies.
The developer signup file is instructional material about OAuth and onboarding.
The Apify reference sends its supplied token only to the Apify API while running a caller-selected actor.
The Hugging Face example sends an optional environment token to the Hugging Face API.
The Fedora installer test creates an isolated temporary home and labels itself non-destructive.
The PDF is a generated document and the bundled AJV file implements JSON parsing.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 217 file(s), 1.48 MB of source, external domains: amazon.com, api.apify.com, api.expo.dev, browserbase.com, console.apify.com, developers.notion.com, docs.anthropic.com, docs.stripe.com, fonts.googleapis.com, github.com, graph.facebook.com, huggingface.co, kit.svelte.dev, nextjs.org, platform.openai.com, prod.spline.design, registry.npmjs.org, turborepo.dev, vercel.com, web.dev, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView file

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

Secret Pattern

Stripe test secret key in skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

tools/bin/aas.jsView file

3L4: const { main } = require("../lib/aas-v1/cli/main"); L5:

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

tools/bin/aas.jsView on unpkg · L3

skills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.jsView file

98const apiActorId = actorId.replace('/', '~'); L99: const url = `https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/${apiActorId}/runs?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`; L100: ... L102: try { L103: data = JSON.parse(inputJson); L104: } catch (e) { ... L114: }, L115: body: JSON.stringify(data), L116: }); ... L321: // Check for APIFY_TOKEN L322: const token = process.env.APIFY_TOKEN; L323: if (!token) {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

skills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.jsView on unpkg · L98

skills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsxView file

39L40: const token = process.env.HF_TOKEN; L41: const headers: Record<string, string> = token ... L44: L45: const url = `https://huggingface.co/api/models?limit=${limit}`; L46: ... L54: L55: const text = await res.text(); L56: process.stdout.write(text); L57: })();

High

Credential Exfiltration

Source combines credential-like environment material and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

skills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsxView on unpkg · L39

skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.pyView file

•path = skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 24204 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.pyView on unpkg

skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gzView file

•path = skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gz kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 19967 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Compressed Blob

Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs.

skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gzView on unpkg

skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdfView file

•path = skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdf kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 124310 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Ships High Entropy Blob

Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.

skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdfView on unpkg

skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.shView file

•path = skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 1740 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.shView on unpkg

node_modules/ajv/dist/runtime/parseJson.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 8

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

node_modules/ajv/dist/runtime/parseJson.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView file

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

Secret Pattern

Stripe test secret key in skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

tools/bin/aas.jsView file

3L4: const { main } = require("../lib/aas-v1/cli/main"); L5:

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

tools/bin/aas.jsView on unpkg · L3

Findings

1 Critical6 High6 Medium4 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationskills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.js

HighHigh Secretskills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

HighCredential Exfiltrationskills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsx

HighShips High Entropy Blobskills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdf

HighPayload In Excluded Dirskills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.sh

HighSemantic Analysis Limitednode_modules/ajv/dist/runtime/parseJson.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighSecret Patternskills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

MediumDynamic Requiretools/bin/aas.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helper

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to agentic-awesome-skills@18.3.0.

See all versions of agentic-awesome-skills for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of agentic-awesome-skills@18.3.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-28 02:32:10.431Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.