registry / Malware / agentic-awesome-skills / 18.9.0

agentic-awesome-skills@18.9.0

OpenSSF/OSV Malicious Advisory

imported 8h ago · by OpenSSF/OSV

OpenSSF/OSV advisory MAL-2026-18192 confirms this npm version as malicious.

Advisory

MAL-2026-18192

Source

OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV

Summary

Malicious code in agentic-awesome-skills (npm)

Details

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

References

OpenSSF/OSV advisory ADVISORY

Independent LPM AI assessment

Suspicious

Independent AI assessment: suspicious. LPM AI assessed this version as suspicious; the assessments disagree.

Source proves explicit-user-command mutation of an AI-agent skill surface, which the supplied policy classifies as a warning. No automatic install-hook mutation or other concrete malicious chain was established.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Running the installer CLI with an agent target and installation selection.

Impact

Changes agent skill content and can overwrite existing managed skills; dry-run prevents these writes.

Mechanism

Copies selected repository skills into the target and replaces managed entries through staged filesystem operations.

AI rationale

Evidence

tools/bin/install.js.claude/skills

Network endpoints2

github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.gitregistry.npmjs.org

Independent scan evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 93.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI warning decision

package.json exposes tools/bin/install.js as a user-invoked installer.
The installer selects agent skill directories, including .claude/skills.
Selected skills are copied into target directories and replace existing managed entries.
The CLI activates installation explicitly; dry-run returns before target writes.

Evidence against

No npm preinstall, install, or postinstall hook or runtime self-dependency appears in package.json.
Destination safety checks and staged replacement constrain installer writes.
Inspected API examples authenticate to their intended services.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 221 file(s), 1.50 MB of source, external domains: amazon.com, api.apify.com, api.expo.dev, browserbase.com, console.apify.com, developers.notion.com, docs.anthropic.com, docs.stripe.com, fonts.googleapis.com, github.com, graph.facebook.com, huggingface.co, kit.svelte.dev, nextjs.org, platform.openai.com, prod.spline.design, registry.npmjs.org, turborepo.dev, vercel.com, web.dev, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

13 flagged

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView file

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

Secret Pattern

Stripe test secret key in skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

tools/bin/install.jsView file

2L3: const { spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L4: const path = require("path");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

tools/bin/install.jsView on unpkg · L2

skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjsView file

133console.log(`Building (${config.build})...`) L134: const built = spawnSync(config.build, { cwd: PROJECT_ROOT, stdio: 'inherit', shell: true }) L135: if (built.status !== 0) fail(`'${config.build}' failed.`)

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjsView on unpkg · L133

7Cross-file remote execution chain: skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjs spawns skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/daemon.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L7: */ L8: import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process' L9: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync } from 'node:fs' L10: import http from 'node:http' L11: import path from 'node:path' ... L73: try { L74: const parsed = JSON.parse(data) L75: if (parsed.ok) resolve(parsed.result) ... L83: request.on('error', reject) L84: request.end(body) L85: }) ... L111: if (!existsSync(resolved) || !statSync(resolved).isDirectory()) return resolved

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjsView on unpkg · L7

tools/bin/aas.jsView file

3L4: const { main } = require("../lib/aas-v1/cli/main"); L5:

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

tools/bin/aas.jsView on unpkg · L3

skills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.jsView file

98const apiActorId = actorId.replace('/', '~'); L99: const url = `https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/${apiActorId}/runs?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`; L100: ... L102: try { L103: data = JSON.parse(inputJson); L104: } catch (e) { ... L114: }, L115: body: JSON.stringify(data), L116: }); ... L321: // Check for APIFY_TOKEN L322: const token = process.env.APIFY_TOKEN; L323: if (!token) {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

skills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.jsView on unpkg · L98

skills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsxView file

39L40: const token = process.env.HF_TOKEN; L41: const headers: Record<string, string> = token ... L44: L45: const url = `https://huggingface.co/api/models?limit=${limit}`; L46: ... L54: L55: const text = await res.text(); L56: process.stdout.write(text); L57: })();

High

Credential Exfiltration

Source combines credential-like environment material and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

skills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsxView on unpkg · L39

skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.pyView file

•path = skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 24204 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.pyView on unpkg

skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gzView file

•path = skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gz kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 19967 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Compressed Blob

Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs.

skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gzView on unpkg

skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdfView file

•path = skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdf kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 124310 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Ships High Entropy Blob

Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.

skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdfView on unpkg

skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.shView file

•path = skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 1740 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.shView on unpkg

node_modules/ajv/dist/runtime/parseJson.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 8

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

node_modules/ajv/dist/runtime/parseJson.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

13 flagged · loading source

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView file

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

Secret Pattern

Stripe test secret key in skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

tools/bin/install.jsView file

2L3: const { spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L4: const path = require("path");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

tools/bin/install.jsView on unpkg · L2

Findings

1 Critical9 High6 Medium4 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationskills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.js

HighHigh Secretskills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

HighChild Processtools/bin/install.js

HighShellskills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjs

HighCredential Exfiltrationskills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsx

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextskills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjs

HighShips High Entropy Blobskills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdf

HighPayload In Excluded Dirskills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.sh

HighSemantic Analysis Limitednode_modules/ajv/dist/runtime/parseJson.js#virtual:normalized:round1

High

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to agentic-awesome-skills@18.9.0.

See all versions of agentic-awesome-skills for other recorded verdicts.

Avoid installing agentic-awesome-skills@18.9.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-22 19:33:07.711Z (UTC).

Source advisory published: 2026-10-22 18:34:45.000Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

OpenSSF/OSV Malicious Advisory

Independent LPM AI assessment

Independent scan evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

Other malware packages

Source & flagged code

Related packages

Other malware packages