--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/agenticros/v/0.6.9" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/agenticros/v/0.6.9.md" package: "agenticros" report_status: "published" title: "agenticros@0.6.9 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "0.6.9" --- # agenticros@0.6.9 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Remote code execution on the connected robot host; associated channel can command motion and exfiltrate camera images. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution - **Selected version:** 0.6.9 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) A user who runs agenticros connect starts a persistent cloud-connected process with a remote shell-command handler. No inbound authentication or command validation is present before execution. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 98.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-09T11:04:06.169Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-09T11:05:03.151Z - **Download time:** 1001 ms - **Static scan time:** 2483 ms - **AI review time:** 53497 ms - **Total time:** 56982 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** A user who runs agenticros connect starts a persistent cloud-connected process with a remote shell-command handler. No inbound authentication or command validation is present before execution. - **Trigger:** Explicit agenticros connect command or menu Connect action. - **Impact:** Remote code execution on the connected robot host; associated channel can command motion and exfiltrate camera images. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, dist/commands/robot-hw.js, runtime/packages/agenticros-robot/comms.js, runtime/packages/agenticros-robot/ros-topics.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-09T11:05:03.151Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Socket event data passed directly to child\_process.exec. - **Attack narrative:** After an explicit connect action, the CLI detaches the shipped comms.js process. That process authenticates to the AgenticROS cloud signaling endpoint, then registers a bash-script event handler that executes its received data as a shell command without validation or authorization checks. A controlling signaling service or an attacker able to emit that event can execute arbitrary commands on the robot host; the same connection also handles robot motion and camera responses. - **Rationale:** The shipped runtime contains a concrete remote-command execution path, not merely a risky primitive. Its explicit-user trigger does not remove the arbitrary server-supplied shell execution. - **Files touched:** dist/commands/robot-hw.js, runtime/packages/agenticros-robot/comms.js - **Network endpoints:** wss://cloud.agenticros.com, https://cloud.agenticros.com ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 98.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** runtime/packages/agenticros-robot/comms.js accepts remote "bash-script" socket events and passes data to exec(data)., comms.js connects to wss://cloud.agenticros.com and sends the stored API token in its connection query., dist/commands/robot-hw.js launches comms.js detached for the explicit agenticros connect command., The same remote channel can publish ROS velocity commands and return camera images. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall hook; prepublishOnly is publisher-side., The main CLI only dispatches commands; cloud connection is user-invoked., The bundled .tgz is a normal source package archive, not an opaque executable payload. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/util/mcp-discovery.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L16: */ L17: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L18: import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; ``` ### 4. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/util/workspace.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L11: import { join } from "node:path"; L12: import { execa } from "execa"; L13: import { info, ok, warn, withSpinner } from "./logger.js"; ``` ### 5. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/skills-dev.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L89: }; L90: const require = createRequire(pathToFileURL(entryPath).href); L91: const mod = require(entryPath); ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/util/marketplace.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3: * L4: * The marketplace itself is at https://sk[redacted] — this CLI L5: * talks to the REST endpoints exposed under /api/ (rewritten by Firebase ... L12: import { dirname, basename, join, resolve } from "node:path"; L13: import { execa } from "execa"; L14: import { discoveryRoots } from "./skills.js"; ... L16: export function apiBase() { L17: return (process.env.AGENTICROS_SKILLS_API || DEFAULT_API_BASE).replace(/\/+$/, ""); L18: } ``` ### 10. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** runtime/scripts/check-cli-tarball-install.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L197: L198: // 6. pnpm install with the same flags init.ts uses L199: step("Running pnpm install with init.ts flags (this can take a minute)..."); L200: const installResult = spawnSync( L201: "pnpm", ``` ### 11. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 12. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 13. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** runtime/scripts/start\_demo.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = runtime/scripts/start_demo.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3490 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 14. Medium: Ships Compressed Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** runtime/packages/agenticros/agenticros-agenticros-0.0.1.tgz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = [redacted]-agenticros-0.0.1.tgz kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 115903 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 15. High: Ships High Entropy Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** runtime/packages/agenticros/agenticros-agenticros-0.0.1.tgz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = [redacted]-agenticros-0.0.1.tgz kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 115903 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 16. Low: Nested Archive Needs Inspection - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** runtime/packages/agenticros/agenticros-agenticros-0.0.1.tgz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships a nested archive or MCP bundle that was inventoried but not recursively analyzed. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = [redacted]-agenticros-0.0.1.tgz kind = nested_archive_needs_inspection sizeBytes = 115903 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 17. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 18. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** runtime/packages/core/src/memory/local/provider.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1 ``` ### 19. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** runtime/packages/agenticros-robot/comms.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = agenticros@0.5.8 matchedIdentity = npm:YWdlbnRpY3Jvcw:0.5.8 similarity = 0.708 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 7 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 3 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 7 ### Published dependency entries - @agenticros/core ^0.8.1 (Dependency) - @inquirer/prompts ^7.0.0 (Dependency) - commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency) - configstore ^7.0.0 (Dependency) - execa ^9.5.0 (Dependency) - ora ^8.1.1 (Dependency) - picocolors ^1.1.1 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** agenticros - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.6.9 - **License:** Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-08-04T22:49:54.903Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-04T16:57:04.309Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-14T18:29:09.072Z - **Known versions:** 19 - **Latest version:** 0.7.11 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** AgenticROS - agentic AI for ROS-powered robots. Single CLI to launch real-robot or simulated demos, manage configuration, and inspect status. - **Author:** Chris Matthieu - **Keywords:** ros, ros2, robotics, ai, agent, claude, codex, hermes, openai, openclaw, gazebo, simulation - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 626 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 3,583,340 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()