---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/agentiqa/v/1.1.56"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/agentiqa/v/1.1.56.md"
package: "agentiqa"
report_status: "published"
title: "agentiqa@1.1.56 npm security report"
verdict: "clean"
version: "1.1.56"
---

# agentiqa@1.1.56 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 17 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed.

- **Verdict:** Clean
- **Product-default install policy:** Allow
- **Firewall policy:** No policy match
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** None published
- **Selected version:** 1.1.56
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The preinstall hook is a transparent Node-version gate, not an attack chain. Runtime execution, network access, credentials, and mobile tooling are explicit, package-aligned QA features with no concrete unconsented mutation or exfiltration behavior found.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Clean
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0%
- **Started:** 2026-08-09T20:30:06.422Z
- **Finished:** 2026-08-09T20:30:53.074Z
- **Download time:** 502 ms
- **Static scan time:** 4892 ms
- **AI review time:** 41257 ms
- **Total time:** 46652 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** No confirmed malicious install-time or import-time attack surface. The CLI performs user-invoked AI-driven web/mobile testing and stores its own configuration.

- **Trigger:** Explicit agentiqa CLI commands, including test and mobile workflows

- **Impact:** The user-selected target, supplied credentials, and test artifacts may be handled by the configured testing service; this is the stated product function.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/preinstall.cjs, dist/cli.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-08-09T20:30:53.074Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Remote-assisted browser/mobile test automation

- **Rationale:** The preinstall hook is a transparent Node-version gate, not an attack chain. Runtime execution, network access, credentials, and mobile tooling are explicit, package-aligned QA features with no concrete unconsented mutation or exfiltration behavior found.

- **Files touched:** scripts/preinstall.cjs, dist/cli.js, ~/.agentiqa/config.json, ~/.agentiqa/credentials.json, ~/.agentiqa/analytics.json, ~/.agentiqa/events-queue.ndjson

- **Network endpoints:** https://agentiqa.com, https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Agentiqa/agentiqa-plugin/main/README.md, https://api.openai.com/v1, https://api.anthropic.com/v1, https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Clean

- **Confidence:** 94.0%

- **Recommended action:** mark\_clean

- **Intent class:** Benign

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for AI clean decision:** dist/cli.js provides a user-invoked remote AI testing workflow with browser/mobile automation., dist/cli.js can install mobile MCP support globally only when an explicit mobile CLI workflow needs it.

- **Evidence against:** scripts/preinstall.cjs only enforces Node.js \>=18 and exits on older versions., No install-time network, shell, file-harvesting, or agent-control-surface mutation found., dist/cli.js network calls target Agentiqa APIs, model providers, and explicitly requested test targets., Local writes are package-owned ~/.agentiqa config, credentials, analytics, and queued telemetry files., No foreign AI-agent configuration paths or hidden persistence behavior found.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to agentiqa@1.1.56.

- Review the evidence and your use of agentiqa@1.1.56 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/agentiqa@1.1.56/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.preinstall = node scripts/preinstall.cjs
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/agentiqa@1.1.56/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.preinstall = node scripts/preinstall.cjs
```

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/agentiqa@1.1.56/dist/cli.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L5: `)+`
L6: `}import{spawn as loe}from"node:child_process";import{mkdirSync as coe,writeFileSync as doe,existsSync as uoe,statSync as poe}from"node:fs";import{tmpdir as hoe}from"node:os";impor...
L7: `);for(let[n,r]of Tj)if(n.test(e))return r}function Aj(t){let e=t.map(s=>s.text).join(`
```

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/agentiqa@1.1.56/dist/cli.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: var ZU=Object.create;var f_=Object.defineProperty;var ej=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var tj=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var nj=Object.getPrototypeOf,rj=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L3: ${n.message}`),r?new lV.VercelOidcTokenError(r):n}return t}function am(){let t=(0,oV.getContext)().headers?.["x-vercel-oidc-token"]??process.env.VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN;if(!t)throw new E...
...
L5: `)+`
L6: `}import{spawn as loe}from"node:child_process";import{mkdirSync as coe,writeFileSync as doe,existsSync as uoe,statSync as poe}from"node:fs";import{tmpdir as hoe}from"node:os";impor...
L7: `);for(let[n,r]of Tj)if(n.test(e))return r}function Aj(t){let e=t.map(s=>s.text).join(`
```

### 9. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/agentiqa@1.1.56/dist/cli.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: var ZU=Object.create;var f_=Object.defineProperty;var ej=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var tj=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var nj=Object.getPrototypeOf,rj=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L3: ${n.message}`),r?new lV.VercelOidcTokenError(r):n}return t}function am(){let t=(0,oV.getContext)().headers?.["x-vercel-oidc-token"]??process.env.VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN;if(!t)throw new E...
L4: `)}}}var ij={program:"Agentiqa CLI",tagline:"AI-powered testing for web apps.",commands:[{name:"explore",summary:"Test a web app with an AI agent",usage:'agentiqa explore "<prompt>...
L5: `)+`
L6: `}import{spawn as loe}from"node:child_process";import{mkdirSync as coe,writeFileSync as doe,existsSync as uoe,statSync as poe}from"node:fs";import{tmpdir as hoe}from"node:os";impor...
L7: `);for(let[
```

### 10. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/agentiqa@1.1.56/dist/cli.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: var ZU=Object.create;var f_=Object.defineProperty;var ej=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var tj=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var nj=Object.getPrototypeOf,rj=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L3: ${n.message}`),r?new lV.VercelOidcTokenError(r):n}return t}function am(){let t=(0,oV.getContext)().headers?.["x-vercel-oidc-token"]??process.env.VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN;if(!t)throw new E...
L4: `)}}}var ij={program:"Agentiqa CLI",tagline:"AI-powered testing for web apps.",commands:[{name:"explore",summary:"Test a web app with an AI agent",usage:'agentiqa explore "<prompt>...
L5: `)+`
L6: `}import{spawn as loe}from"node:child_process";import{mkdirSync as coe,writeFileSync as doe,existsSync as uoe,statSync as poe}from"node:fs";import{tmpdir as hoe}from"node:os";impor...
L7: `);for(let[
```

### 11. High: Remote Agent Bridge
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/agentiqa@1.1.56/dist/cli.js>)

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: var ZU=Object.create;var f_=Object.defineProperty;var ej=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var tj=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var nj=Object.getPrototypeOf,rj=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L3: ${n.message}`),r?new lV.VercelOidcTokenError(r):n}return t}function am(){let t=(0,oV.getContext)().headers?.["x-vercel-oidc-token"]??process.env.VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN;if(!t)throw new E...
...
L5: `)+`
L6: `}import{spawn as loe}from"node:child_process";import{mkdirSync as coe,writeFileSync as doe,existsSync as uoe,statSync as poe}from"node:fs";import{tmpdir as hoe}from"node:os";impor...
L7: `);for(let[n,r]of Tj)if(n.test(e))return r}function Aj(t){let e=t.map(s=>s.text).join(`
...
L433: 
L434: This is a client-side timeout. To resolve this, increase your timeout configuration: https
```

### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/agentiqa@1.1.56/dist/cli.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: var ZU=Object.create;var f_=Object.defineProperty;var ej=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var tj=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var nj=Object.getPrototypeOf,rj=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L3: ${n.message}`),r?new lV.VercelOidcTokenError(r):n}return t}function am(){let t=(0,oV.getContext)().headers?.["x-vercel-oidc-token"]??process.env.VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN;if(!t)throw new E...
L4: `)}}}var ij={program:"Agentiqa CLI",tagline:"AI-powered testing for web apps.",commands:[{name:"explore",summary:"Test a web app with an AI agent",usage:'agentiqa explore "<prompt>...
L5: `)+`
L6: `}import{spawn as loe}from"node:child_process";import{mkdirSync as coe,writeFileSync as doe,existsSync as uoe,statSync
```

### 13. Low: Obfuscated
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 40.0%

Package source has low-confidence obfuscation-like patterns.

### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 15. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 17. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall
- **Dependencies:** 8
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 7
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 8

### Published dependency entries
- @google/genai ^1.7.0 (Dependency)
- @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.12.1 (Dependency)
- express ^4.21.0 (Dependency)
- express-rate-limit ^8.2.1 (Dependency)
- playwright ^1.58.0 (Dependency)
- pngjs ^7.0.0 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.18.0 (Dependency)
- zod ^4.3.6 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** agentiqa
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.1.56
- **Version published:** 2026-08-05T05:59:28.734Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-06-30T23:32:03.512Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T14:06:08.477Z
- **Known versions:** 56
- **Latest version:** 1.1.103
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** AI-powered testing for web and mobile apps
- **Maintainers:** agentiqa-a, l3x1p
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18
- **Artifact files:** 3
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,189,335 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/agentiqa/v/1.1.56>)
