registry / AI-agent capability abuse / agentix-cli / 0.110.1

agentix-cli@0.110.1

AI operations layer for small and medium businesses. Routes Telegram, WhatsApp, GitLab, GitHub, crons, webhooks, and mesh tasks to AI agents. Web wizard for operators, CLI for engineers. Self-hosted.

AI Security Review

scanned 18d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Inspected source supports a warning for explicit user-command mutation of an AI agent's configuration. The automatic install hook and flagged Anthropic request do not establish malicious behavior.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The user runs agentx attach install.

Impact

Configured hooks affect later Claude sessions and expose event input to the local daemon until removed.

Mechanism

The command writes hooks into .claude/settings.json; those hooks invoke curl to deliver event input to the local daemon.

AI rationale

Inspected source supports a warning for explicit user-command mutation of an AI agent's configuration. The automatic install hook and flagged Anthropic request do not establish malicious behavior.

Evidence

dist/program-RMGWJHT6.js.claude/settings.json

Network endpoints1

127.0.0.1

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

An explicit attach install command configures hooks for all Claude sessions.
The command defaults to the user's .claude/settings.json and writes modified settings.
Session and prompt hooks send their input to the local daemon through curl.
The npm postinstall hook exits unless SQLite needs an ABI rebuild.
The flagged API request sends an Anthropic credential to api.anthropic.com.

Evidence against

No covert credential export or malicious install-time agent configuration mutation was established.
Hook setup requires an explicit CLI command; its destination is loopback.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 176 file(s), 4.49 MB of source, external domains: 100.64.0.11, 100.x.x.x, 127.0.0.1, 192.168.1.50, api.anthropic.com, api.context7.com, api.deepseek.com, api.elevenlabs.io, api.example.com, api.github.com, api.openai.com, api.telegram.org, api.typesafe.ai, claude.ai, console.anthropic.com, docs.anthropic.com, docs.claude.com, example.com, fonts.googleapis.com, fonts.gstatic.com, github.com, gitlab.com, gitlab.example.com, host.example.ts.net, my-mac.tailnet-name.ts.net, ntfy.sh, opencode.ai, openrouter.ai, peer.example.com, pro.reactflow.dev, raw.githubusercontent.com, reactflow.dev, reactjs.org, status.anthropic.com, t.me, unpkg.com, wacli.sh, www.apple.com, www.w3.org, x.com, x.tld

Source & flagged code

19 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 59-99json

59 "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",

60 "bench:context": "tsx bench/context-size.ts",

61 "bench:profiles": "tsx bench/context-profiles.ts",

62 "bench:compare": "tsx bench/compare-claude-code.ts",

63 "test": "vitest run",

64 "clean": "rimraf dist",

65 "format:write": "prettier --write \"src/**/*.{ts,tsx,mdx}\" --cache",

66 "format:check": "prettier --check \"src/**/*.{ts,tsx,mdx}\" --cache",

67 "eval": "vitest run test/eval/",

68 "eval:track": "TRACK_SCORES=1 vitest run test/eval/real-data-eval.test.ts",

69 "usage:track": "tsx src/scripts/track-usage.ts",

70 "docs:dev": "vitepress dev docs",

71 "docs:build": "vitepress build docs",

72 "docs:check": "node docs/.scripts/check-sidebar.mjs && node docs/.scripts/diagrams.mjs --check && vitepress build docs",

73 "docs:diagrams": "node docs/.scripts/diagrams.mjs",

74 "docs:demo": "node dist/cli.js demo --no-open --keep",

75 "docs:seed": "node docs/.scripts/seed-demo.mjs",

76 "docs:shots": "node docs/.scripts/capture.mjs",

77 "docs:preview": "vitepress preview docs",

78 "prepublishOnly": "npm run build",

79 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.mjs"

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L79

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L79

80 },

81 "dependencies": {

82 "@roamhq/wrtc": "^0.10.0",

83 "@types/better-sqlite3": "^7.6.13",

84 "@types/js-yaml": "^4.0.9",

85 "@whiskeysockets/baileys": "7.0.0-rc14",

86 "@xyflow/react": "^12.10.2",

87 "better-sqlite3": "^12.9.0",

88 "chalk": "5.2.0",

89 "cli-highlight": "^2.1.11",

90 "commander": "^10.0.0",

91 "cosmiconfig": "^8.1.3",

92 "cronstrue": "^3.14.0",

93 "execa": "^7.0.0",

94 "fast-glob": "^3.3.2",

95 "fs-extra": "^11.2.0",

96 "ink": "^5.0.1",

97 "js-yaml": "^4.1.1",

98 "jsqr": "^1.4.0",

99 "marked": "^15.0.12",

dist/chunk-GTJIKXDB.jsView file

Lines 1-2javascript

1import{execFile as a}from"child_process";function i(e,t,n={}){return new Promise(r=>{a(e,t,{timeout:n.timeoutMs

dist/chunk-GI4RYX4G.jsView file

30L31: No landscape: pass agentId to say whose to return.`}]}}case"agentx_voice_queue":{let n=await fetch(`${V()}/voice/queue`);return n.ok?{content:[{type:"text",text:Id(await n.json())}... L32: ${o.path} ... L40: Citations (${w} article${w===1?"":"s"} walked): L41: ${f}`}]}}case"agentx_wiki_patch":{let n=String(e.agent||"").trim(),s=String(e.title_or_path||"").trim(),i=String(e.instruction||"").trim();if(!n||!s||!i)return{content:[{type:"text... L42: ${[d.stdout,d.stderr,d.message].filter(Boolean).map(g=>rt(String(g))).join(` L43: `).trim().slice(0,2e3)}`}]}}}case"agentx_wiki_interview":{let n=String(e.agent||"").trim(),s=String(e.topic||"").trim(),i=String(e.type||"").trim().toLowerCase(),o=Array.isArray(e....

Critical

Command Output Exfiltration

Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.

dist/chunk-GI4RYX4G.jsView on unpkg · L30

30Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-GI4RYX4G.js L30: L31: No landscape: pass agentId to say whose to return.`}]}}case"agentx_voice_queue":{let n=await fetch(`${V()}/voice/queue`);return n.ok?{content:[{type:"text",text:Id(await n.json())}... L32: ${o.path} ... L40: Citations (${w} article${w===1?"":"s"} walked): L41: ${f}`}]}}case"agentx_wiki_patch":{let n=String(e.agent||"").trim(),s=String(e.title_or_path||"").trim(),i=String(e.instruction||"").trim();if(!n||!s||!i)return{content:[{type:"text... L42: ${[d.stdout,d.stderr,d.message].filter(Boolean).map(g=>rt(String(g))).join(` L43: `).trim().slice(0,2e3)}`}]}}}case"agentx_wiki_interview":{let n=String(e.agent||"").trim(),s=String(e.topic||"").trim(),i=String(e.type||"").trim().toLowerCase(),o=Array.isArr

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/chunk-GI4RYX4G.jsView on unpkg · L30

dist/chunk-KA2UIZXG.jsView file

Lines 1-3javascript

1import{b as F,c as S,d as $,f as x}from"./chunk-GQ76J72O.js";import{a as B,b as j,c as v}from"./chunk-ILEC3IAV.js";import{createHash as X}from

dist/program-RMGWJHT6.jsView file

1import{a as rd,b as Ds,g as ad}from"./chunk-CJR26JUI.js";import{a as Jl,c as Hl}from"./chunk-NIW75USA.js";import{A as id,a as so,b as Bl,f as Ut,g as Gl,h as zl,i as Yl,j as Vl,l a... L2: Computer-use helper \u2192 ${qe(r,ks)} ... L5: Starts at login \u2192 ${a.file}${c.map(d=>` L6: Removes duplicate login item \u2192 ${d.file}`).join("")}`),e.dryRun)return;try{ao("xcrun",["--find","swiftc"],{stdio:"pipe"})}catch{throw new Error("Apple command-line tools are r... L7: Allow Microphone for the app and Accessibility / Screen Recording for the helper when macOS asks.

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

dist/program-RMGWJHT6.jsView on unpkg · L1

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/program-RMGWJHT6.js: import{a as rd,b as Ds,g as ad}from"./chunk-CJR26JUI.js";import{a as Jl,c as Hl}from"./chunk-NIW75USA.js";import{A as id,a as so,b as Bl,f as Ut,g as Gl,h as zl,i as Yl,j as Vl,l a... The AgentX daemon and a speech transcription backend must also be available. Run agentx desktop status to inspect the login service.`)}finally{dd(g,{recursive:!0,force:!0})}});Ft.c... `),{path:o,changed:r,events:i,guardInstalled:!1}}function Pn(e=Dn()){if(!Fs(e))return!1;try{return!!JSON.parse(Ws(e,"utf-8"))?.hooks?.Stop?.some?.(t=>Us(t,dr))}catch{return!1}}var ... `:"")+i.subarray(0,r).toString("utf8")}finally{await o.close()}aw

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/program-RMGWJHT6.jsView on unpkg

dist/chunk-5MUJZODV.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1import{a as G,b as _e}from"./chunk-7I7IEX4S.js";import{a as N}from"./chunk-QIJLFPWE.js";import{existsSync as oe,readFileSync as de,writeFileSync as ke,mkdirSync as Ae}from"fs"

dist/board-dashboard-SAYBNLZW.jsView file

5350package = agentix-cli; repositoryIdentity = agentx; dependency = cronstrue L5350: ${s||"You are "+a+"."} L5351: `)}catch{}return{summary:l}}function Bc(t){let e=String(t?.id||"").trim();if(!e)throw new Error("Agent id is required.");let a=t?.patch||{},{summary:n}=A(r=>{if(!r.agents?.[e])thro... L5352: `,"utf-8");try{let s=X().dashboard.daemonUrl?.replace(/\/+$/,"")||"http://127.0.0.1:18800";fetch(`${s}/reload`,{method:"POST"}).catch(()=>null)}catch{}return{summary:"agentx.json r...

High

Copied Package Dependency Bridge

Package metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.

dist/board-dashboard-SAYBNLZW.jsView on unpkg · L5350

dist/chunk-4UCDWEC4.jsView file

12Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-4UCDWEC4.js L12: L13: `)}import Je from"node-fetch";var Ke="https://api.context7.com/v1";async function vt(r,e){try{let t={"Content-Type":"application/json"};e&&(t.Authorization=`Bearer ${e}`);let o=awa... L14: ${a}`)}}return s.length?`# Relevant Library Documentation (via Context7) ... L19: L20: `)}`:""}var Ye={component:{type:"component",baseDir:"src/components",filePatterns:["*.tsx","*.vue","*.svelte","*.jsx","*.ts"],description:"UI component"},page:{type:"page",baseDir:... L21: `)}ke();var oe=class{hooks=new Map;register(e,t){if(!t.enabled)return;let o=this.createHandler(t),n={event:e,definition:t,handler:o},s=this.hooks.get(e)||[];s.push(n),s.sort((i,c)=... L22:

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/chunk-4UCDWEC4.jsView on unpkg · L12

apps/mac-helper/build.shView file

•path = apps/mac-helper/build.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 2875 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

apps/mac-helper/build.shView on unpkg

dist/chunk-BG6SOGKT.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 4

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chunk-BG6SOGKT.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

19 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/chunk-GTJIKXDB.jsView file

1import{execFile as a}from"child_process";function i(e,t,n={}){return new Promise(r=>{a(e,t,{timeout:n.timeoutMs??15e3,signal:n.signal,maxBuffer:4*1024*1024,env:{...process.env,PATH... L2: //# sourceMappingURL=chunk-GTJIKXDB.js.map

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/chunk-GTJIKXDB.jsView on unpkg · L1

Findings

5 Critical10 High7 Medium6 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/program-RMGWJHT6.js

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/chunk-5MUJZODV.js

CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/chunk-GI4RYX4G.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-GI4RYX4G.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/chunk-GI4RYX4G.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processdist/chunk-GTJIKXDB.js

HighShell

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/program-RMGWJHT6.js

HighCopied Package Dependency Bridgedist/board-dashboard-SAYBNLZW.js

HighExternal Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/program-RMGWJHT6.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to agentix-cli@0.110.1.

See all versions of agentix-cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of agentix-cli@0.110.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-04 23:56:47.250Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code