ai4kanban@0.9.6
AI4Kanban's `akb` command — scaffold the Markdown board under docs/kanban/, put an agent on a card, and carry the flows the agent works by.
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo automatic credential theft or other clear attack behavior was identified. The Codex runner nevertheless disables approval and sandbox protections by default, a risky capability that merits a warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The Codex harness adds --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox unless the user supplies a sandbox-related flag.
- The shipped Codex agent configuration also includes that bypass flag by default.
- Usage telemetry sends app and runtime fields such as OS and architecture; the CLI describes it as anonymous and provides a way to turn it off.
- No automatic credential exfiltration was identified in the reviewed request paths.
- The bypass is used when a user runs a Codex agent through the CLI; no install-time execution hook is declared.
- The telemetry description discloses that reporting is on by default and points users to the telemetry command to change it.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
bin/ai4kanban.mjsView on unpkg · L85Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/kanban.mjsView on unpkg · L59Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to ai4kanban@0.9.6.
See all versions of ai4kanban for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of ai4kanban@0.9.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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