registry / aicall-cli-x / 0.0.11

aicall-cli-x@0.0.11

AI 外呼 CLI

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface is established. The user-invoked CLI stores its supplied configuration, calls declared telephony APIs, and runs `localcrm` CRM operations.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

Explicit execution of the `aicall` CLI and its commands.

Impact

Can read and tag CRM records, persist supplied credentials, and initiate configured telephony requests.

Mechanism

User-invoked CRM and outbound-call automation.

Rationale

Source inspection shows an obfuscated but user-invoked outbound-call CLI, not install-time or covert compromise behavior. Its sensitive operations are aligned with the package's declared CRM/telephony function.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/aicall.jsdist/bundle.cjs~/.aicallrc/config.json

Network endpoints3

cfs-ms.pa18.comcallbot.duofangtongxin.comcx.shouji.360.cn/phonearea.php

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 83.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

`dist/bundle.cjs` is heavily obfuscated and exits under inspector/debug conditions.
`dist/bundle.cjs` invokes `localcrm` commands and writes user-supplied tokens/passwords to a home-directory config.

Evidence against

`package.json` has no preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare lifecycle hook.
`bin/aicall.js` only loads the bundle when the user explicitly invokes the CLI.
Bundle behavior is consistent with an outbound-call/CRM CLI: configured APIs, local CRM queries, and explicit call commands.
No source evidence of credential harvesting beyond CLI-supplied configuration, hidden payload loading, destructive commands, or AI-agent control-surface writes.

Behavioral surface

Source

DynamicRequireFilesystem

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedProtestware

Manifest

NoLicense

scanned 2 file(s), 351 KB of source

Source & flagged code

2 flagged

bin/aicall.jsView file

Lines 1-24javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3/**

4 * AI 外呼 CLI 入口（shim）

5 *

6 * 优先加载混淆后的 dist/bundle.cjs（构建产物），

7 * 不存在时降级到原始源码（开发模式）。

8 */

10import { existsSync } from 'fs';

11import { createRequire } from 'module';

12import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';

13import { dirname, resolve } from 'path';

15const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));

16const distBundle = resolve(__dirname, '../dist/bundle.cjs');

18if (existsSync(distBundle)) {

19 const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);

20 require(distBundle);

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/aicall.jsView on unpkg · L18

21} else {

22 await import('../src/cli.js');

23}

dist/bundle.cjsView file

Lines 1-2javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2(function(){try{var jxFQJYaQdX=typeof process!=='undefined'&&process;if(jxFQJYaQdX&&(jxFQJYaQdX.argv.join(' ').match(/inspect|debug|--dev/

Source & flagged code

2 flagged · loading source

bin/aicall.jsView file

18if (existsSync(distBundle)) { L19: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L20: require(distBundle);

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/aicall.jsView on unpkg · L18

dist/bundle.cjsView file

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: (function(){try{var jxFQJYaQdX=typeof process!=='undefined'&&process;if(jxFQJYaQdX&&(jxFQJYaQdX.argv.join(' ').match(/inspect|debug|--dev/)||(jxFQJYaQdX.env.NODE_OPTIONS||'').match...

High

Obfuscated Payload Loader

Source contains an obfuscator-style string-array loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.

dist/bundle.cjsView on unpkg · L1

Findings

1 High3 Medium4 Low

HighObfuscated Payload Loaderdist/bundle.cjs

MediumDynamic Requirebin/aicall.js

MediumProtestware

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowNo License