--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/aicodeman/v/1.24.2" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/aicodeman/v/1.24.2.md" package: "aicodeman" report_status: "published" title: "aicodeman@1.24.2 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "1.24.2" --- # aicodeman@1.24.2 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. Foreign project .claude settings gain hook commands that route Claude agent events to the package server. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Warn by default - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface - **Selected version:** 1.24.2 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installing the package automatically starts a background server. That server can alter recovered external Claude workspaces by adding Codeman hook configuration. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-01T00:36:40.155Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-01T00:38:04.678Z - **Download time:** 1288 ms - **Static scan time:** 10189 ms - **AI review time:** 73043 ms - **Total time:** 84523 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installing the package automatically starts a background server. That server can alter recovered external Claude workspaces by adding Codeman hook configuration. - **Trigger:** npm postinstall, when CI and CODEMAN\_NO\_AUTOSTART are absent - **Impact:** Foreign project .claude settings gain hook commands that route Claude agent events to the package server. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, dist/web/server.js, dist/hooks-config.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-01T00:38:04.678Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Automatic server launch followed by default-enabled Claude workspace hook installation - **Attack narrative:** A normal npm installation invokes postinstall, which launches the package's web server without an explicit command. On startup, the server enumerates recovered Claude sessions and, unless a setting has been disabled, installs Codeman hooks in each local workspace. The hook generator writes each project's .claude/settings.local.json and configures Claude hooks to post events to the Codeman API. This is automatic mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface through an install lifecycle. - **Rationale:** The lifecycle path automatically launches runtime code that defaults to installing package-controlled hooks into external Claude workspaces. This is an unconsented postinstall AI-agent control-surface mutation, so it meets the publish-block policy. - **Files touched:** .claude/settings.local.json, scripts/postinstall.js, dist/web/server.js, dist/hooks-config.js ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** The manifest runs a postinstall script automatically., Postinstall starts a detached Codeman web server unless CI or an opt-out variable is set., Server startup installs hooks into recovered Claude workspaces when the setting is not disabled., The hook writer modifies .claude/settings.local.json to add commands that post Claude hook events to Codeman. - **Evidence against:** The automatic server is loopback-oriented and can be disabled with CODEMAN\_NO\_AUTOSTART., Voice credential use is separately gated off by default; no unconditional credential exfiltration was found. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/ai-checker-base.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L24: */ L25: import { execSync, spawn as childSpawn } from 'node:child_process'; L26: import { existsSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; ``` ### 5. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/remote-hosts.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L6: import { promisify } from 'node:util'; L7: const execAsync = promisify(exec); L8: const REMOTE_HOSTS_FILE = 'remote-hosts.json'; ``` ### 6. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/web/repo-status.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L43: import { getInstallInfo } from './self-update.js'; L44: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L45: const { version: APP_VERSION } = require('../../package.json'); ``` ### 7. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 8. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 9. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/service-installer.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L26: * The file writers are pure string builders so they can be unit-tested without L27: * touching launchctl/systemctl. L28: * ... L30: */ L31: import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L32: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L168: export function detectServiceKind() { L169: if (process.platform === 'darwin') L170: return 'launchd'; ... L176: return kind === 'launchd' L177: ? join(homedir(), 'Library', 'LaunchAgents', `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`) L178: : join(homedir(), '.config', 'systemd', 'user', SYSTEMD_UNIT); ``` ### 10. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 11. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/deepseek-web-server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L167: if (current.authority === authority && (await answersHttp(current.port))) { L168: return { ok: true, port: current.port, url: `http://127.0.0.1:${current.port}`, reused: true }; L169: } ... L177: try { L178: child = spawn(join(dshDir, 'dsh'), ['web', '--no-open', '--host', '127.0.0.1', '--port', String(port), '--trusted-host', authority], { L179: stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], ... L181: detached: true, L182: env: process.env, L183: }); ``` ### 12. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L23: join(home, '.local/bin/claude'), L24: join(home, '.claude/local/claude'), L25: '/usr/local/bin/claude', ... L256: L257: const { mkdirSync, copyFileSync } = await import('fs'); L258: mkdirSync(vendorDir, { recursive: true }); L259: copyFileSync(join(xtermDir, 'css', 'xterm.css'), join(vendorDir, 'xterm.css')); L260: ... L269: // Fallback: copy unminified L270: copyFileSync(join(xtermDir, 'lib', 'xterm.js'), join(vendorDir, 'xterm.min.js')); L271: copyFileSync(join(fitDir, 'lib', 'addon-fit.js'), join(vendorDir, 'xterm-addon-fit.min.js')); L272: copyFileSync(join(serializeDir, 'lib', 'addon-serialize.js'), join(vendorDir, 'xterm-addon-serialize.min.js')); ``` ### 13. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: scripts/postinstall.js spawns dist/web/public/vendor/xterm-addon-webgl.min.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L7: L8: import { execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; L9: import { existsSync } from 'fs'; ... L20: // Claude CLI search paths (must match src/session.ts) L21: const home = homedir(); L22: const CLAUDE_SEARCH_PATHS = [ ... L33: L34: const useColor = process.stdout.isTTY && !process.env.NO_COLOR; L35: ... L83: const ok = await new Promise((resolve) => { L84: const conn = net.createConnection({ port, host: '127.0.0.1' }); L85: conn.once('connect', () => { conn.destroy(); resolve(true); }); ``` ### 14. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/service-installer.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js -> dist/cli.js -> dist/service-installer.js L26: * The file writers are pure string builders so they can be unit-tested without L27: * touching launchctl/systemctl. L28: * ... L30: */ L31: import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L32: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L168: export function detectServiceKind() { L169: if (process.platform === 'darwin') L170: return 'launchd'; ... L176: return kind === 'launchd' L177: ? join(homedir(), 'Library', 'LaunchAgents', `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`) L178: : join(homedir(), '.config', 'systemd', 'user', SYSTEMD_UNIT); ``` ### 15. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L262: try { L263: execSync(`npx esbuild "${join(xtermDir, 'lib', 'xterm.js')}" --minify --outfile="${join(vendorDir, 'xterm.min.js')}"`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); L264: execSync(`npx esbuild "${join(fitDir, 'lib', 'addon-fit.js')}" --minify --outfile="${join(vendorDir, 'xterm-addon-fit.min.js')}"`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); ``` ### 16. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 17. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 18. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 19. Medium: Ships Wasm Module - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** dist/web/public/gesture/wasm/vision\_wasm\_nosimd\_internal.wasm - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships WebAssembly modules. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/web/public/gesture/wasm/vision_wasm_nosimd_internal.wasm kind = wasm_module sizeBytes = 9448638 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 20. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** skills/codeman/preamble.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = skills/codeman/preamble.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 16664 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 21. Medium: Ships Compressed Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** dist/web/public/upload.html.br - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/web/public/upload.html.br kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 1836 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 22. High: Ships High Entropy Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/web/public/mobile.87674154.css.gz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/web/public/mobile.87674154.css.gz kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 9796 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 23. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 24. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/deepseek-transcript.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 10 ``` ### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/web/self-update.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = dist/web/self-update.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/web/server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = dist/web/server.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/fix-node-pty.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = scripts/fix-node-pty.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 29. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/claude-credentials.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = dist/claude-credentials.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 30. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/daemon-control.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = dist/daemon-control.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 31. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/git-clone.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = dist/git-clone.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 32. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/service-installer.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = dist/service-installer.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 33. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/tui/tui-client.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = dist/tui/tui-client.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 34. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/web/repo-status.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = dist/web/repo-status.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 35. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 36. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/deepseek-web-server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = aicodeman@1.23.2 matchedPath = dist/deepseek-web-server.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWljb2RlbWFu:1.23.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 22 - **Optional dependencies:** 2 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 26 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 24 ### Published dependency entries - @fastify/compress ^8.3.1 (Dependency) - @fastify/cookie ^11.0.2 (Dependency) - @fastify/multipart ^10.0.0 (Dependency) - @fastify/static ^10.1.3 (Dependency) - @fastify/websocket ^11.2.0 (Dependency) - @xterm/addon-fit ^0.11.0 (Dependency) - @xterm/addon-serialize ^0.14.0 (Dependency) - @xterm/addon-unicode11 ^0.9.0 (Dependency) - @xterm/addon-webgl ^0.19.0 (Dependency) - @xterm/xterm ^6.0.0 (Dependency) - chalk ^5.3.0 (Dependency) - chokidar ^3.6.0 (Dependency) - commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency) - fastify ^5.8.5 (Dependency) - heic-decode ^2.1.0 (Dependency) - jpeg-js ^0.4.4 (Dependency) - node-pty ^1.1.0 (Dependency) - qrcode ^1.5.4 (Dependency) - uuid ^14.0.0 (Dependency) - web-push ^3.6.7 (Dependency) - ws ^8.21.0 (Dependency) - zod ^4.3.6 (Dependency) - @remotion/compositor-linux-x64-gnu ^4.0.432 (OptionalDependency) - @rspack/binding-linux-x64-gnu ^1.7.7 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** aicodeman - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.24.2 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-01T00:32:39.770Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T07:10:18.931Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-01T00:38:04.678Z - **Known versions:** 40 - **Latest version:** 1.24.2 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Mission control for AI coding agents - run 20 autonomous agents with real-time monitoring and session persistence - **Author:** arkon - **Keywords:** claude-code, claude-ai, claude, anthropic, opencode, codex, antigravity, pi, grok, deepseek, gemini-cli, ai-agents - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 1150 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 40,623,348 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()