---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/aims-workstation/v/0.1.24"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/aims-workstation/v/0.1.24.md"
package: "aims-workstation"
report_status: "published"
title: "aims-workstation@0.1.24 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.1.24"
---

# aims-workstation@0.1.24 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 15 finding(s) warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution
- **Selected version:** 0.1.24
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

This is a serious default network exposure: the server listens on all interfaces while API authentication is disabled unless the user configures a token. The agent shell tool makes unauthenticated chat control a critical vulnerability, though the server must first be explicitly started.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 96.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-30T20:26:09.874Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-30T20:27:15.526Z
- **Download time:** 513 ms
- **Static scan time:** 719 ms
- **AI review time:** 64420 ms
- **Total time:** 65652 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** When the workstation server is running, unauthenticated users on reachable networks can access its agent chat API by default.

- **Trigger:** The user starts the server, then a network peer sends a request to POST /api/chat while no access token has been configured.

- **Impact:** A network peer may direct deployed agents to access workspace or other readable data and receive results through the chat response. Write commands have a confirmation flow, which limits but does not remove the exposure.

- **Evidence paths:** server.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-30T20:27:15.526Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The server binds to 0.0.0.0, its access token defaults to empty, and the authentication check allows requests when the token is unset. The chat endpoint invokes an agent loop that has a shell execution tool.

- **Rationale:** This is a serious default network exposure: the server listens on all interfaces while API authentication is disabled unless the user configures a token. The agent shell tool makes unauthenticated chat control a critical vulnerability, though the server must first be explicitly started.

- **Files touched:** server.js, AIMS\_HOME/workspace/\<agent\>

- **Network endpoints:** 0.0.0.0:5600, POST /api/chat

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 96.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Critical Vulnerability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default, making it reachable from the local network., The access token defaults to an empty string, and authOk allows requests when no token is configured., The API chat handler accepts a caller-supplied agent and message, then runs the agent loop., The agent exec tool passes commands to cpExec through a shell.

- **Evidence against:** The server starts only when the user explicitly runs the package command; there is no install hook., The package is described as a workstation intended for team sharing, and its README documents the LAN-accessible default., Write commands are subject to an L2 human-confirmation flow.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to aims-workstation@0.1.24.

- Review the evidence and your use of aims-workstation@0.1.24 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. Low: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 45.0%

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

### 3. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 4. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 5. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 6. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/aims-workstation@0.1.24/server.js>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L6: // 覆盖所有出站 fetch（ARM REST、LLM、面板代理）。本工具面向内网/本机使用。
L7: process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = '0';
L8: const http = require('http');
L9: const fs = require('fs');
...
L23: // ── 代码与数据分离：包目录只放代码与只读资产；全部运行时状态在 AIMS_HOME（缺省 ~/.aims-workstation）──
L24: const PKG_ROOT = __dirname;
L25: const AIMS_HOME = process.env.AIMS_HOME ? path.resolve(process.env.AIMS_HOME) : path.join(os.homedir(), '.aims-workstation');
...
L81: // ro=只读白名单命令名（免确认直行）；sudo_u_l2=true 时 `sudo -u <用户>` 降权形式不再永久拒绝、按写命令走 L2 人工确认（裸 sudo 仍拒绝）
L82: // 默认清单按平台合成：POSIX 为主；Windows（cmd/PowerShell 命令与毁灭性命令）仅在 win32 追加——非 Windows 平台不引入 "format" 等词的误杀
L83: const WIN = process.platform === 'win32';
L84: const GUARD_POSIX = {
...
L127: function loadCfg() {
```

### 7. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/aims-workstation@0.1.24/server.js>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
server.js:
if (s.includes(oldP)) fs.writeFileSync(reg, s.split(oldP).join(newP));
function saveCfg() { fs.writeFileSync(CFG_FILE, JSON.stringify(cfg, null, 2)); }
// LLM：OpenAI 兼容端点（baseUrl/模型/密钥），缺省公司内网 bifrost 网关（内网可达即可用，无需配置）
const llmBaseUrl = () => cfg.llm_base_url || env.LLM_BASE_URL || LLM_DEFAULT_BASE;
return req.headers.authorization === `Bearer ${accessToken()}`;
const base = llmBaseUrl(), key = llmApiKey(), name = llmModelName();
// 官方模型条目为模板（compat/thinkingLevelMap 等字段不自行猜测）；任意模型名按 glm-5.3 克隆；条目 baseUrl 一并改写
const entries = zaiCodingCnProvider().getModels().map((m) => ({ ...m, provider: 'platform-llm', baseUrl: base }));
```

### 8. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/aims-workstation@0.1.24/server.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> server.js
L6: // 覆盖所有出站 fetch（ARM REST、LLM、面板代理）。本工具面向内网/本机使用。
L7: process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = '0';
L8: const http = require('http');
L9: const fs = require('fs');
...
L23: // ── 代码与数据分离：包目录只放代码与只读资产；全部运行时状态在 AIMS_HOME（缺省 ~/.aims-workstation）──
L24: const PKG_ROOT = __dirname;
L25: const AIMS_HOME = process.env.AIMS_HOME ? path.resolve(process.env.AIMS_HOME) : path.join(os.homedir(), '.aims-workstation');
...
L81: // ro=只读白名单命令名（免确认直行）；sudo_u_l2=true 时 `sudo -u <用户>` 降权形式不再永久拒绝、按写命令走 L2 人工确认（裸 sudo 仍拒绝）
L82: // 默认清单按平台合成：POSIX 为主；Windows（cmd/PowerShell 命令与毁灭性命令）仅在 win32 追加——非 Windows 平台不引入 "format" 等词的误杀
L83: const WIN = process.platform === 'win32';
L84: const GUARD_POSIX = {
...
L127: function loadCfg() {
```

### 9. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/aims-workstation@0.1.24/server.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> server.js
L6: // 覆盖所有出站 fetch（ARM REST、LLM、面板代理）。本工具面向内网/本机使用。
L7: process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = '0';
L8: const http = require('http');
L9: const fs = require('fs');
...
L23: // ── 代码与数据分离：包目录只放代码与只读资产；全部运行时状态在 AIMS_HOME（缺省 ~/.aims-workstation）──
L24: const PKG_ROOT = __dirname;
L25: const AIMS_HOME = process.env.AIMS_HOME ? path.resolve(process.env.AIMS_HOME) : path.join(os.homedir(), '.aims-workstation');
...
L81: // ro=只读白名单命令名（免确认直行）；sudo_u_l2=true 时 `sudo -u <用户>` 降权形式不再永久拒绝、按写命令走 L2 人工确认（裸 sudo 仍拒绝）
L82: // 默认清单按平台合成：POSIX 为主；Windows（cmd/PowerShell 命令与毁灭性命令）仅在 win32 追加——非 Windows 平台不引入 "format" 等词的误杀
L83: const WIN = process.platform === 'win32';
L84: const GUARD_POSIX = {
...
L127: function loadCfg() {
```

### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 11. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** scripts/publish-npm.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/aims-workstation@0.1.24/scripts/publish-npm.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = scripts/publish-npm.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 2409
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 13. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 14. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

### 15. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/aims-workstation@0.1.24/server.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = aims-workstation@0.1.12
matchedIdentity = npm:YWltcy13b3Jrc3RhdGlvbg:0.1.12
similarity = 0.833
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 1
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1

### Published dependency entries
- @earendil-works/pi-ai ^1.2.0 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** aims-workstation
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.1.24
- **Version published:** 2026-10-28T11:10:17.648Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-10-16T00:05:55.177Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-03T07:36:56.916Z
- **Known versions:** 24
- **Latest version:** 0.1.29
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** AIMS 工作站：本地智能体工作站——ARM 助手本地化（下载/离线/升级）、工作台对话式定制、多工作区隔离、分级自主与审计
- **Maintainers:** aio-lowcode
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.5.0
- **Artifact files:** 22
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,309,300 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/aims-workstation/v/0.1.24>)