registry / Remote code execution / alink-cli / 0.12.1

alink-cli@0.12.1

一条命令把工作机接入 AgentLink，随时随地遥控本机的编码 agent。One command to link your machine to AgentLink and control your coding agents from anywhere.

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No automatic lifecycle execution or hidden decoded payload was found in the inspected entrypoint. The package nevertheless implements a high-impact remote shell and coding-agent control plane with default account-linked telemetry.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A user runs the CLI and completes pairing or supplies a machine credential.

Impact

A holder of valid tunnel credentials can operate local coding-agent and shell capabilities; telemetry discloses a stable derived identifier and host metadata.

Mechanism

Authenticated encrypted remote RPC plus default account-linked telemetry.

AI rationale

Evidence

bin/agentlink.jsdist/bin.mjs~/.codex/auth.json~/.claude.json~/.t3/telemetry/anonymous-id~/.agentlink/status.json

Network endpoints2

wss://link.harmopath.comus.i.posthog.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Unknown with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The user-run daemon creates an authenticated remote tunnel that exposes orchestration, terminal, and port-proxy scopes.
The daemon starts an interactive shell with the inherited environment for terminal sessions.
Telemetry is enabled by default, reads account identifiers from Codex or Claude configuration, hashes one, and sends event data to PostHog.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
The networked daemon is reached only after the user invokes the CLI and supplies or creates pairing credentials.
The tunnel encrypts RPC frames with the configured encryption key before sending them.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNativeBindingsNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

11 flagged

dist/NodeSocket-CLfrrutd.mjsView file

Lines 4844-4884javascript

4844 parent: getOrUndefined(fromHeaders(request.headers)),

4845 kind: "server"

4846 });

4847 const prevServices = fiber.context;

4848 fiber.setContext(add(fiber.context, ParentSpan, span));

4849 return onExitPrimitive(httpApp, (exit) => {

4850 fiber.setContext(prevServices);

4851 const endTime = fiber.getRef(Clock).currentTimeNanosUnsafe();

4852 fiber.currentDispatcher.scheduleTask(() => {

4853 let response;

4854 let spanExit = exit;

4855 if (isFailure(exit)) {

4856 const [failureResponse, cause] = causeResponseStripped(exit.cause);

4857 response = failureResponse;

4858 spanExit = isSome(cause) ? failCause(cause.value) : succeed$4(response);

4859 } else response = exit.value;

4860 if (span.sampled) {

4861 const url = toURL(request);

4862 if (isSome(url) && (url.value.username !== "" || url.value.password !== "")) {

4863 url.value.username = "REDACTED";

4864 url.value.password = "REDACTED";

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/NodeSocket-CLfrrutd.mjsView on unpkg · L4864

4865 }

4866 const redactedHeaderNames = fiber.getRef(CurrentRedactedNames);

4867 const requestHeaders = redact(request.headers, redactedHeaderNames);

4868 span.attribute("http.request.method", request.method);

4869 if (isSome(url)) {

4870 span.attribute("url.full", url.value.toString());

4871 span.attribute("url.path", url.value.pathname);

4872 if (url.value.search.slice(1) !== "") span.attribute("url.query", url.value.search.slice(1));

4873 span.attribute("url.scheme", url.value.protocol.slice(0, -1));

4874 }

4875 if (request.headers["user-agent"] !== void 0) span.attribute("user_agent.original", request.headers["user-agent"]);

4876 for (const name in requestHeaders) span.attribute(`http.request.header.${name}`, String(requestHeaders[name]));

4877 if (isSome(request.remoteAddress)) span.attribute("client.address", request.remoteAddress.value);

4878 span.attribute("http.response.status_code", response.status);

4879 const responseHeaders = redact(response.headers, redactedHeaderNames);

4880 for (const name in responseHeaders) span.attribute(`http.response.header.${name}`, String(responseHeaders[name]));

4881 }

4882 span.end(endTime, spanExit);

4883 }, 0);

4884 }, true);

bin/agentlink.jsView file

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; L4: import { createServer } from "node:http"; L5: import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; ... L28: } L29: const saved = JSON.parse(raw); L30: return saved.hub === normalizeHub(hub) && typeof saved.jwt === "string" ? saved.jwt : undefined; ... L59: L60: const OFFICIAL_HUB = process.env.AGENTLINK_DEFAULT_HUB || "wss://link.harmopath.com"; L61: const STATE_DIR = process.env.AGENTLINK_STATE_DIR || join(homedir(), ".agentlink"); L62: const CREDENTIAL_FILE = join(STATE_DIR, "credential");

Critical

Remote Asset Decode Execute

Source fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload.

bin/agentlink.jsView on unpkg · L1

•Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bin/agentlink.js Reachable file contains a blocking source-risk pattern.

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

bin/agentlink.jsView on unpkg

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/agentlink.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/ui.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = alink-cli@0.10.0 matchedPath = dist/ui.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWxpbmstY2xp:0.10.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/ui.jsView on unpkg

317"use strict"; L318: if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production") { L319: (function() { ... L545: isMounted: ["isMounted", "Instead, make sure to clean up subscriptions and pending requests in componentWillUnmount to prevent memory leaks."], L546: replaceState: ["replaceState", "Refactor your code to use setState instead (see https://github.com/facebook/react/issues/3236)."] L547: }; ... L2209: ]; L2210: if (process.platform !== "win32") { L2211: module.exports.push( ... L2357: } L2358: process13.exitCode = code || /* istanbul ignore next */ L2359: 0;

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/ui.jsView on unpkg · L317

dist/NodeServices-BtcL7AtO.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = alink-cli@0.10.0 matchedPath = dist/NodeServices-BtcL7AtO.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:YWxpbmstY2xp:0.10.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/NodeServices-BtcL7AtO.mjsView on unpkg

dist/daemon.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = alink-cli@0.10.0 matchedPath = dist/daemon.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWxpbmstY2xp:0.10.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/daemon.jsView on unpkg

dist/bin.mjsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = alink-cli@0.12.6 matchedIdentity = npm:YWxpbmstY2xp:0.12.6 similarity = 0.933 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/bin.mjsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

11 flagged · loading source

dist/NodeSocket-CLfrrutd.mjsView file

4864patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 4864

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/NodeSocket-CLfrrutd.mjsView on unpkg · L4864

bin/agentlink.jsView file

Critical

Remote Asset Decode Execute

Source fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload.

bin/agentlink.jsView on unpkg · L1

•

Findings

3 Critical6 High6 Medium4 Low

CriticalRemote Asset Decode Executebin/agentlink.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitybin/agentlink.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/bin.mjs

HighChild Processbin/agentlink.js

HighShell

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextbin/agentlink.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/ui.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/NodeServices-BtcL7AtO.mjs

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/daemon.js

MediumSecret Patterndist/NodeSocket-CLfrrutd.mjs

MediumDynamic Requirebin/agentlink.js

MediumNetwork

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to alink-cli@0.12.1.

See all versions of alink-cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of alink-cli@0.12.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-14 13:21:15.782Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code