registry / AI-agent capability abuse / alink-cli / 0.12.4

alink-cli@0.12.4

一条命令把工作机接入 AgentLink，随时随地遥控本机的编码 agent。One command to link your machine to AgentLink and control your coding agents from anywhere.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source establishes a real high-impact remote agent-control surface, including access to local agent sessions and default automatic tool approval. It is user-invoked and lacks lifecycle execution or concealed payload behavior, so it is a dangerous capability rather than confirmed malware.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

A user runs the CLI and pairs or logs in to a hub.

Impact

A party controlling a paired account or hub credential could direct local coding agents and retrieve selected session data.

Mechanism

Hub-delivered prompts are passed to local ACP coding agents with approval disabled by default.

AI rationale

Evidence

bin/agentlink.jsdist/daemon.js~/.agentlink/credential~/.agentlink/session~/.claude/projects~/.codex/sessions

Network endpoints1

wss://link.harmopath.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The CLI defaults to the AgentLink WebSocket service and starts a local daemon only after a user invokes it.
The daemon accepts hub-supplied run requests, including an agent, prompt, and working directory.
Unless the user enables approval mode, requested agent tool actions are automatically allowed.
The daemon scans local Claude and Codex session archives and can return session history over its hub connection.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The remote-control behavior is exposed through declared CLI commands and includes encrypted message handling.
No remote payload download-and-execute path or credential harvesting outside the product's own login flow was found.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNativeBindingsNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

dist/NodeSocket-H2hJzAlR.mjsView file

Lines 4844-4884javascript

4844 parent: getOrUndefined(fromHeaders(request.headers)),

4845 kind: "server"

4846 });

4847 const prevServices = fiber.context;

4848 fiber.setContext(add(fiber.context, ParentSpan, span));

4849 return onExitPrimitive(httpApp, (exit) => {

4850 fiber.setContext(prevServices);

4851 const endTime = fiber.getRef(Clock).currentTimeNanosUnsafe();

4852 fiber.currentDispatcher.scheduleTask(() => {

4853 let response;

4854 let spanExit = exit;

4855 if (isFailure(exit)) {

4856 const [failureResponse, cause] = causeResponseStripped(exit.cause);

4857 response = failureResponse;

4858 spanExit = isSome(cause) ? failCause(cause.value) : succeed$4(response);

4859 } else response = exit.value;

4860 if (span.sampled) {

4861 const url = toURL(request);

4862 if (isSome(url) && (url.value.username !== "" || url.value.password !== "")) {

4863 url.value.username = "REDACTED";

4864 url.value.password = "REDACTED";

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/NodeSocket-H2hJzAlR.mjsView on unpkg · L4864

4865 }

4866 const redactedHeaderNames = fiber.getRef(CurrentRedactedNames);

4867 const requestHeaders = redact(request.headers, redactedHeaderNames);

4868 span.attribute("http.request.method", request.method);

4869 if (isSome(url)) {

4870 span.attribute("url.full", url.value.toString());

4871 span.attribute("url.path", url.value.pathname);

4872 if (url.value.search.slice(1) !== "") span.attribute("url.query", url.value.search.slice(1));

4873 span.attribute("url.scheme", url.value.protocol.slice(0, -1));

4874 }

4875 if (request.headers["user-agent"] !== void 0) span.attribute("user_agent.original", request.headers["user-agent"]);

4876 for (const name in requestHeaders) span.attribute(`http.request.header.${name}`, String(requestHeaders[name]));

4877 if (isSome(request.remoteAddress)) span.attribute("client.address", request.remoteAddress.value);

4878 span.attribute("http.response.status_code", response.status);

4879 const responseHeaders = redact(response.headers, redactedHeaderNames);

4880 for (const name in responseHeaders) span.attribute(`http.response.header.${name}`, String(responseHeaders[name]));

4881 }

4882 span.end(endTime, spanExit);

4883 }, 0);

4884 }, true);

bin/agentlink.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2import { spawn } from "node:child_process";

3import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/agentlink.jsView on unpkg · L1

4import { createServer } from "node:http";

dist/ui.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = alink-cli@0.10.0 matchedPath = dist/ui.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWxpbmstY2xp:0.10.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/ui.jsView on unpkg

317"use strict"; L318: if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production") { L319: (function() { ... L545: isMounted: ["isMounted", "Instead, make sure to clean up subscriptions and pending requests in componentWillUnmount to prevent memory leaks."], L546: replaceState: ["replaceState", "Refactor your code to use setState instead (see https://github.com/facebook/react/issues/3236)."] L547: }; ... L2209: ]; L2210: if (process.platform !== "win32") { L2211: module.exports.push( ... L2357: } L2358: process13.exitCode = code || /* istanbul ignore next */ L2359: 0;

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/ui.jsView on unpkg · L317

dist/NodeServices-Brptf0fr.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = alink-cli@0.10.0 matchedPath = dist/NodeServices-BtcL7AtO.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:YWxpbmstY2xp:0.10.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/NodeServices-Brptf0fr.mjsView on unpkg

dist/daemon.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = alink-cli@0.10.0 matchedPath = dist/daemon.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWxpbmstY2xp:0.10.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/daemon.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

dist/NodeSocket-H2hJzAlR.mjsView file

4864patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 4864

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/NodeSocket-H2hJzAlR.mjsView on unpkg · L4864

bin/agentlink.jsView file

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; L4: import { createServer } from "node:http"; L5: import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; ... L28: } L29: const saved = JSON.parse(raw); L30: return saved.hub === normalizeHub(hub) && typeof saved.jwt === "string" ? saved.jwt : undefined; ... L59: L60: const OFFICIAL_HUB = process.env.AGENTLINK_DEFAULT_HUB || "wss://link.harmopath.com"; L61: const STATE_DIR = process.env.AGENTLINK_STATE_DIR || join(homedir(), ".agentlink"); L62: const CREDENTIAL_FILE = join(STATE_DIR, "credential");

Critical

Remote Asset Decode Execute

Source fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload.

bin/agentlink.jsView on unpkg · L1

•

Findings

2 Critical6 High6 Medium4 Low

CriticalRemote Asset Decode Executebin/agentlink.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitybin/agentlink.js

HighChild Processbin/agentlink.js

HighShell

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextbin/agentlink.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/ui.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/NodeServices-Brptf0fr.mjs

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/daemon.js

MediumSecret Patterndist/NodeSocket-H2hJzAlR.mjs

MediumDynamic Requirebin/agentlink.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistence

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to alink-cli@0.12.4.

See all versions of alink-cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of alink-cli@0.12.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-05 07:51:34.616Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code