registry / alink-cli / 0.12.5

alink-cli@0.12.5

一条命令把工作机接入 AgentLink，随时随地遥控本机的编码 agent。One command to link your machine to AgentLink and control your coding agents from anywhere.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

This is not concrete install-time malware: no npm lifecycle hook runs and the risky functionality is user-invoked. It remains a dangerous remote agent-control and session-access capability with optional persistence, so it should be warned rather than blocked.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

The user runs the CLI and starts the service or selects Start in its interactive UI.

Impact

A holder of the paired hub credential could direct coding-agent work and view available session history on the enrolled machine.

Mechanism

Remote hub requests launch coding agents and retrieve local session history.

AI rationale

Evidence

bin/agentlink.jsdist/daemon.jsdist/ui.jsdist/NodeServices-Brptf0fr.mjs~/.agentlink~/.codex/sessions~/.claude/projects~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.harmopath.agentlink.daemon.plist

Network endpoints1

wss://link.harmopath.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The CLI starts a local daemon that connects to a remote hub and supplies it with a machine credential.
The daemon accepts remote run requests and launches installed coding-agent adapters with the received prompt.
The daemon reads Codex and Claude session archives, including prompts, messages, and tool results.
The interactive UI can create a persistent macOS LaunchAgent after the user selects Start.
The bundled Node service helper includes generic child-process spawning code.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The remote-control daemon is activated through the user-invoked CLI or UI, not during package installation.
The LaunchAgent is restricted to the package's own daemon and is created only through the UI start path.
No source evidence shows decoded remote code execution, secret harvesting, or exfiltration to an unrelated endpoint.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVars

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

dist/NodeSocket-H2hJzAlR.mjsView file

Lines 4844-4884javascript

4844 parent: getOrUndefined(fromHeaders(request.headers)),

4845 kind: "server"

4846 });

4847 const prevServices = fiber.context;

4848 fiber.setContext(add(fiber.context, ParentSpan, span));

4849 return onExitPrimitive(httpApp, (exit) => {

4850 fiber.setContext(prevServices);

4851 const endTime = fiber.getRef(Clock).currentTimeNanosUnsafe();

4852 fiber.currentDispatcher.scheduleTask(() => {

4853 let response;

4854 let spanExit = exit;

4855 if (isFailure(exit)) {

4856 const [failureResponse, cause] = causeResponseStripped(exit.cause);

4857 response = failureResponse;

4858 spanExit = isSome(cause) ? failCause(cause.value) : succeed$4(response);

4859 } else response = exit.value;

4860 if (span.sampled) {

4861 const url = toURL(request);

4862 if (isSome(url) && (url.value.username !== "" || url.value.password !== "")) {

4863 url.value.username = "REDACTED";

4864 url.value.password = "REDACTED";

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/NodeSocket-H2hJzAlR.mjsView on unpkg · L4864

4865 }

4866 const redactedHeaderNames = fiber.getRef(CurrentRedactedNames);

4867 const requestHeaders = redact(request.headers, redactedHeaderNames);

4868 span.attribute("http.request.method", request.method);

4869 if (isSome(url)) {

4870 span.attribute("url.full", url.value.toString());

4871 span.attribute("url.path", url.value.pathname);

4872 if (url.value.search.slice(1) !== "") span.attribute("url.query", url.value.search.slice(1));

4873 span.attribute("url.scheme", url.value.protocol.slice(0, -1));

4874 }

4875 if (request.headers["user-agent"] !== void 0) span.attribute("user_agent.original", request.headers["user-agent"]);

4876 for (const name in requestHeaders) span.attribute(`http.request.header.${name}`, String(requestHeaders[name]));

4877 if (isSome(request.remoteAddress)) span.attribute("client.address", request.remoteAddress.value);

4878 span.attribute("http.response.status_code", response.status);

4879 const responseHeaders = redact(response.headers, redactedHeaderNames);

4880 for (const name in responseHeaders) span.attribute(`http.response.header.${name}`, String(responseHeaders[name]));

4881 }

4882 span.end(endTime, spanExit);

4883 }, 0);

4884 }, true);

bin/agentlink.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2import { spawn } from "node:child_process";

3import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/agentlink.jsView on unpkg · L1

4import { createServer } from "node:http";

dist/ui.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = alink-cli@0.10.0 matchedPath = dist/ui.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWxpbmstY2xp:0.10.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/ui.jsView on unpkg

317"use strict"; L318: if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production") { L319: (function() { ... L545: isMounted: ["isMounted", "Instead, make sure to clean up subscriptions and pending requests in componentWillUnmount to prevent memory leaks."], L546: replaceState: ["replaceState", "Refactor your code to use setState instead (see https://github.com/facebook/react/issues/3236)."] L547: }; ... L2209: ]; L2210: if (process.platform !== "win32") { L2211: module.exports.push( ... L2357: } L2358: process13.exitCode = code || /* istanbul ignore next */ L2359: 0;

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/ui.jsView on unpkg · L317

dist/NodeServices-Brptf0fr.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = alink-cli@0.10.0 matchedPath = dist/NodeServices-BtcL7AtO.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:YWxpbmstY2xp:0.10.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/NodeServices-Brptf0fr.mjsView on unpkg

dist/daemon.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = alink-cli@0.10.0 matchedPath = dist/daemon.js matchedIdentity = npm:YWxpbmstY2xp:0.10.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/daemon.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

dist/NodeSocket-H2hJzAlR.mjsView file

4864patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 4864

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/NodeSocket-H2hJzAlR.mjsView on unpkg · L4864

bin/agentlink.jsView file

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; L4: import { createServer } from "node:http"; L5: import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; ... L28: } L29: const saved = JSON.parse(raw); L30: return saved.hub === normalizeHub(hub) && typeof saved.jwt === "string" ? saved.jwt : undefined; ... L59: L60: const OFFICIAL_HUB = process.env.AGENTLINK_DEFAULT_HUB || "wss://link.harmopath.com"; L61: const STATE_DIR = process.env.AGENTLINK_STATE_DIR || join(homedir(), ".agentlink"); L62: const CREDENTIAL_FILE = join(STATE_DIR, "credential");

Critical

Remote Asset Decode Execute

Source fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload.

bin/agentlink.jsView on unpkg · L1

•

Findings

2 Critical6 High6 Medium4 Low

CriticalRemote Asset Decode Executebin/agentlink.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitybin/agentlink.js

HighChild Processbin/agentlink.js

HighShell

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextbin/agentlink.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/ui.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/NodeServices-Brptf0fr.mjs

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/daemon.js

MediumSecret Patterndist/NodeSocket-H2hJzAlR.mjs

MediumDynamic Requirebin/agentlink.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistence

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to alink-cli@0.12.5.

See all versions of alink-cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of alink-cli@0.12.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-07 09:15:11.026Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code