alvin-bot@5.101.2
Open-source, self-hosted autonomous AI agent on Telegram, Slack, Discord, WhatsApp, Signal, terminal & web. Claude Agent SDK + multi-provider engine with auto-failover, detached sub-agents, zero-config memory. Local-first, telemetry-free.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe direct shell interpolation is a concrete command-injection risk in an agent-facing plugin. There is no evidence of an automatic lifecycle attack, so blocking publication is not supported.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The email plugin interpolates an argument string into a command passed to execSync.
- Plugin handlers build that argument string directly from caller-supplied parameters.
- A shipped obfuscated tool-executor bundle also invokes execSync, limiting auditability of additional execution paths.
- The manifest has no install lifecycle hook or runtime dependency on alvin-bot itself.
- The bootstrap path is reached through the explicit alvin-bot setup command.
Source & flagged code
21 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
claude-bridge/src/claude.jsView on unpkg · L2Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
claude-bridge/src/claude.jsView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
claude-bridge/src/claude.jsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to alvin-bot@5.101.2.
See all versions of alvin-bot for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of alvin-bot@5.101.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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