anhn-cli@1.1.4

bin/install/install.js appends a heavily obfuscated top-level IIFE (obfuscator.io-style rotated string array `_0x240a`/`_0x4963` with arithmetic index decoding) after the benign install() helper. The payload queries public Ethereum RPCs and etherscan.io for transactions from the hardcoded sender address 0xa322E5f3..., decodes the transaction `to` field as an IPv4 address, fetches an XOR-encrypted body from that host, and executes it via `eval(prefix+xor(body))` and a detached `spawn('node', ['-e',...], {detached:true}).unref()`. The package's main entry (bin/index.js) unconditionally requires./install/install, so the IIFE runs whenever the package is required or the CLI is invoked. The attacker controls the fetched payload by publishing new Ethereum transactions from the sender address; there is no version pinning, no signature check, and the destination host rotates on-chain. Decoded strings inside the string array include `eth_getBlockByNumber`, `etherscan.io`, `eval`, and `spawn`.