registry / anon-pi / 0.10.0

anon-pi@0.10.0

Launch pi inside a netcage: anonymized web egress through a socks5h proxy, one direct hole for a local model, seeded pi config on the host.

AI Security Review

scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. The package is a user-invoked CLI for launching pi inside netcage and onboarding local proxy/model configuration.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

User runs anon-pi or anon-pi init CLI

Impact

Creates and updates anon-pi workspace state; can run netcage/podman and contact user-specified local endpoints during init.

Mechanism

container launcher and interactive configuration writer

Rationale

Static inspection shows suspicious primitives are aligned with the documented CLI purpose and are user-invoked, with no lifecycle execution, credential exfiltration, hidden remote endpoint, persistence, or unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation. The Dockerfiles document optional first-party pi staging/trust behavior for images the user explicitly builds.

Evidence

package.jsonsrc/cli.tssrc/anon-pi.tssrc/index.tsDockerfile.piexamples/Dockerfile.pi-webveilREADME.md

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 93.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

Evidence against

package.json has no npm lifecycle hooks; only bin ./dist/cli.js.
src/cli.ts child_process use is user-invoked CLI flow for netcage/podman/ps and Node helper probes, not install/import execution.
src/cli.ts init requires TTY and writes package-owned ~/.anon-pi config/models/settings; destructive rm paths require confirmation or --yes.
src/anon-pi.ts composes netcage args with explicit proxy and one local-model allow-direct; no hidden remote endpoint or exfiltration target found.
Dockerfile.pi and examples/Dockerfile.pi-webveil stage pi trust/extensions only in user-built images, not npm install hooks or foreign home control surfaces.
Host ~/.pi/agent/models.json read is scoped to provider matching the user-entered local model endpoint and refuses real-looking API keys unless forced.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

CopyleftLicense

scanned 6 file(s), 361 KB of source, external domains: github.com

Source & flagged code

3 flagged

dist/cli.jsView file

Lines 1-34javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// anon-pi CLI: the THIN impure launch path. Parses grammar A (pure

3// parseLaunchArgs), reads config.json / machine.json + resolves the machine,

4// composes the LaunchIntent, resolves the RunPlan (pure resolveRunPlan), decides

5// run-vs-start against real netcage for `--keep`, and spawns netcage with

6// inherited stdio (so -it is a real interactive TTY), propagating the exit code.

7//

8// All the DECISIONS live in the pure module (anon-pi.ts); this file only does

9// I/O: fs reads/mkdirs, the netcage query, the spawn, and the TTY discipline.

10// The forced-egress invariant is the RunPlan's guarantee: the composed argv

11// ALWAYS carries --proxy + the one --allow-direct; the CLI never strips or adds

12// egress.

13import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync, } from 'node:fs';

14import { readSync } from 'node:fs';

15import { spawnSync, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';

16import { join, dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L14

17import { AnonPiError, HELP, MODELS_FILE, SETTINGS_FILE, SETTINGS_SEED_FILE, SEED_MARKER, DEFAULT_MACHINE, envFromProcess, buildMenuChoiceList, buildMenuEntries, builtinProjectsRoot, deriveProjectUsage, expandTilde, findingsFromNetcageDetect, processNoteFromNetcageDetect, resolveNetcageGraphroot, globalModelsSeedPath, globalSettingsSeedPath, machineAgentDir, machineDir, machineHomeDir, machineJsonPath, machineModelsSeedPath, machineSessionsDir, mergeModelSelection, resolveModelsSeedPath, resolveSettingsSeedPath, validateName, resolveDeleteHome, resolveDeleteProject, parseConfigJson, parseLaunch ...

18// The netcage label anon-pi stamps its launch-identity key onto (keptContainerKey)

19// so a `--keep` re-entry can find and `netcage start` the same kept container.

20// netcage's `netcage.managed` label marks it a managed container; this adds the

21// anon-pi identity ON TOP (netcage's label IS the registry; anon-pi adds no file).

22const ANON_PI_KEY_LABEL = 'anon-pi.key';

23function main(argv) {

24 const args = argv.slice(2);

25 // `--version`/`-V` prints anon-pi's own version and exits (before the launch

26 // grammar, so it is never parsed as a project/flag). For pi's version inside

27 // the jail, forward it: `anon-pi pi --version`.

28 if (args[0] === '--version' || args[0] === '-V') {

29 process.stdout.write(`anon-pi ${anonPiVersion() ?? '(unknown)'}\n`);

30 return 0;

31 }

32 // The global `--help`/`-h` prints the top-level HELP, EXCEPT when the first

33 // token is a subcommand that owns its own `--help` (so `anon-pi init --help`

34 // and `anon-pi machine --help` show THEIR help, not the global one). Those

Long lines were clipped for display.

Lines 1002-1042javascript

1002 const ans = promptLine(`Choose a number, or enter host:port${prefill}: `);

1003 if (ans === undefined) {

1004 process.stderr.write('anon-pi: aborted; nothing written.\n');

1005 return undefined;

1006 }

1007

Lines 1541-1581javascript

1541 * `netcage build`/`load` verbs remove this dance). Returns true on success.

1542 */

1543function loadImageIntoNetcageStore(tag) {

1544 const graphroot = resolveNetcageGraphroot(process.env);

1545 process.stdout.write(` Loading ${tag} into netcage's store (${graphroot}) so

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source

dist/cli.jsView file

14import { readSync } from 'node:fs'; L15: import { spawnSync, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L16: import { join, dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L14

1561} L1562: /** Minimal POSIX single-quote shell-quoting for a token embedded in `sh -c`. */ L1563: function shQuote(s) {

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L1561

1022if (chosen === undefined || chosen === '') { L1023: process.stdout.write(' Please pick a listed number or enter a host:port.\n'); L1024: continue; ... L1032: process.stderr.write('anon-pi: `netcage` not found on PATH, cannot verify the exit IP. Install\n' + L1033: 'it first (https://github.com/wighawag/netcage). Linux only.\n'); L1034: return undefined; L1035: } L1036: const verify = spawnSync('netcage', ['verify', '--proxy', url], { L1037: encoding: 'utf8',

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L1022

Findings

3 High2 Medium5 Low

HighChild Processdist/cli.js

HighShelldist/cli.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowCopyleft License

Source & flagged code

3 flagged

dist/cli.jsView file

Lines 1-34javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// anon-pi CLI: the THIN impure launch path. Parses grammar A (pure

3// parseLaunchArgs), reads config.json / machine.json + resolves the machine,

4// composes the LaunchIntent, resolves the RunPlan (pure resolveRunPlan), decides

5// run-vs-start against real netcage for `--keep`, and spawns netcage with

6// inherited stdio (so -it is a real interactive TTY), propagating the exit code.

7//

8// All the DECISIONS live in the pure module (anon-pi.ts); this file only does

9// I/O: fs reads/mkdirs, the netcage query, the spawn, and the TTY discipline.

10// The forced-egress invariant is the RunPlan's guarantee: the composed argv

11// ALWAYS carries --proxy + the one --allow-direct; the CLI never strips or adds

12// egress.

13import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync, } from 'node:fs';

14import { readSync } from 'node:fs';

15import { spawnSync, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';

16import { join, dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L14

18// The netcage label anon-pi stamps its launch-identity key onto (keptContainerKey)

19// so a `--keep` re-entry can find and `netcage start` the same kept container.

20// netcage's `netcage.managed` label marks it a managed container; this adds the

21// anon-pi identity ON TOP (netcage's label IS the registry; anon-pi adds no file).

22const ANON_PI_KEY_LABEL = 'anon-pi.key';

23function main(argv) {

24 const args = argv.slice(2);

25 // `--version`/`-V` prints anon-pi's own version and exits (before the launch

26 // grammar, so it is never parsed as a project/flag). For pi's version inside

27 // the jail, forward it: `anon-pi pi --version`.

28 if (args[0] === '--version' || args[0] === '-V') {

29 process.stdout.write(`anon-pi ${anonPiVersion() ?? '(unknown)'}\n`);

30 return 0;

31 }

32 // The global `--help`/`-h` prints the top-level HELP, EXCEPT when the first

33 // token is a subcommand that owns its own `--help` (so `anon-pi init --help`

34 // and `anon-pi machine --help` show THEIR help, not the global one). Those

Long lines were clipped for display.

Lines 1002-1042javascript

1002 const ans = promptLine(`Choose a number, or enter host:port${prefill}: `);

1003 if (ans === undefined) {

1004 process.stderr.write('anon-pi: aborted; nothing written.\n');

1005 return undefined;

1006 }

1007

Lines 1541-1581javascript

1541 * `netcage build`/`load` verbs remove this dance). Returns true on success.

1542 */

1543function loadImageIntoNetcageStore(tag) {

1544 const graphroot = resolveNetcageGraphroot(process.env);

1545 process.stdout.write(` Loading ${tag} into netcage's store (${graphroot}) so