AI Security Review
scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious attack surface. The package is a user-invoked CLI for launching pi inside netcage, with package-aligned filesystem writes and local network probes during onboarding.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
User runs anon-pi, anon-pi init, anon-pi machine, or explicit delete commands.
Impact
Can create/update/delete anon-pi workspace data and launch netcage/podman according to user commands; no unconsented install-time behavior found.
Mechanism
user-invoked container/agent launcher with local onboarding probes
Rationale
Static source inspection shows suspicious primitives are tied to the documented CLI launcher/onboarding flow, not npm install or hidden import-time behavior. The network, process execution, and filesystem writes are user-invoked and package-aligned, with explicit guards around destructive and credential-sensitive paths.
Evidence
package.jsonsrc/cli.tssrc/anon-pi.tsDockerfile.piexamples/Dockerfile.pi-webveil~/.anon-pi/config.json~/.anon-pi/models.json~/.anon-pi/settings-seed.json~/.anon-pi/machines/<name>/machine.json~/.anon-pi/machines/<name>/home/.pi/agent/models.json<projects-root>/<project>
Network endpoints3
127.0.0.1<user-supplied-local-model>/v1/modelssocks5h://<user-supplied-proxy>
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- src/cli.ts imports spawnSync/execFileSync and can run netcage, podman, ps, and node workers from user-invoked CLI paths.
- src/cli.ts init probes 127.0.0.1 SOCKS ports and fetches /v1/models from the user-supplied local model endpoint.
- src/cli.ts writes anon-pi workspace config, machine files, model seeds, and can delete machine/project data only through explicit CLI verbs with confirmation/--yes.
Evidence against
- package.json has no npm lifecycle scripts; execution is through bin anon-pi only.
- src/anon-pi.ts composes netcage args requiring --proxy and one --allow-direct local model target; behavior matches package purpose.
- src/cli.ts refuses non-TTY interactive init/destructive deletes and prompts before proxy/model/image setup.
- src/cli.ts reads host pi models.json only to match the configured local endpoint and refuses real-looking API keys unless an explicit force flag is passed.
- Dockerfile.pi installs pi with --ignore-scripts and stages package-owned pi config inside an image, not during npm install.
- No credential exfiltration, remote payload download/execute, install-time mutation, or foreign AI-agent control-surface writes found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
CopyleftLicense
Source & flagged code
2 flagged · loading sourcedist/cli.jsView file
14import { readSync } from 'node:fs';
L15: import { spawnSync, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
L16: import { join, dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
High
1003if (chosen === undefined || chosen === '') {
L1004: process.stdout.write(' Please pick a listed number or enter a host:port.\n');
L1005: continue;
...
L1013: process.stderr.write('anon-pi: `netcage` not found on PATH, cannot verify the exit IP. Install\n' +
L1014: 'it first (https://github.com/wighawag/netcage). Linux only.\n');
L1015: return undefined;
L1016: }
L1017: const verify = spawnSync('netcage', ['verify', '--proxy', url], {
L1018: encoding: 'utf8',
High
Command Output Exfiltration
Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L1003Findings
3 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighShell
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowCopyleft License