AI Security Review
scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious attack surface. The package is a CLI launcher for running pi inside netcage and performs network probing, local model discovery, file writes, and process spawning only from user-invoked commands.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
user runs anon-pi CLI, especially init/launch/machine/delete commands
Impact
Creates and updates anon-pi machine workspace files; may run netcage/podman and query local SOCKS/model endpoints as part of documented setup.
Mechanism
user-invoked netcage/pi launcher and workspace manager
Rationale
Static inspection found suspicious primitives, but they are package-aligned and user-invoked: a CLI for launching an AI agent in a netcage container, not lifecycle malware or unconsented control-surface mutation. No credential harvesting, exfiltration endpoint, persistence hook, or install/import-time behavior was found.
Evidence
package.jsonsrc/cli.tssrc/anon-pi.tsDockerfile.piexamples/Dockerfile.pi-webveil~/.anon-pi/config.json~/.anon-pi/models.json~/.anon-pi/settings-seed.json~/.anon-pi/machines/<name>/machine.json~/.anon-pi/machines/<name>/home~/.pi/agent/models.json
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
Evidence against
- package.json declares bin ./dist/cli.js and no npm lifecycle install hooks.
- src/cli.ts child_process use is user-invoked CLI spawning netcage/podman/ps or node helpers, not install/import-time execution.
- src/anon-pi.ts composes netcage args with required --proxy and one --allow-direct local model target.
- src/cli.ts writes only anon-pi workspace/machine config and model seed files under resolved ~/.anon-pi paths.
- src/cli.ts reads host ~/.pi/agent/models.json only during interactive init and refuses real-looking apiKey unless explicit force flag.
- Destructive rm paths are explicit user commands with validation and confirmation or --yes.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
CopyleftLicense
Source & flagged code
3 flagged · loading sourcedist/cli.jsView file
14import { readSync } from 'node:fs';
L15: import { spawnSync, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
L16: import { join, dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
High
1552}
L1553: /** Minimal POSIX single-quote shell-quoting for a token embedded in `sh -c`. */
L1554: function shQuote(s) {
High
1013if (chosen === undefined || chosen === '') {
L1014: process.stdout.write(' Please pick a listed number or enter a host:port.\n');
L1015: continue;
...
L1023: process.stderr.write('anon-pi: `netcage` not found on PATH, cannot verify the exit IP. Install\n' +
L1024: 'it first (https://github.com/wighawag/netcage). Linux only.\n');
L1025: return undefined;
L1026: }
L1027: const verify = spawnSync('netcage', ['verify', '--proxy', url], {
L1028: encoding: 'utf8',
High
Command Output Exfiltration
Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L1013Findings
3 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighShelldist/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowCopyleft License