registry / anyray-connect / 0.11.154

anyray-connect@0.11.154

Anyray connect — points local coding tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, SDKs) at the Anyray gateway through supported configuration and enrolled personal authentication.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

This is not malicious install-time behavior, but its explicit setup changes AI-agent control surfaces and persists helper services. Warn so users receive visibility into the high-impact configuration and lifecycle behavior.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

User runs anyray-connect enrollment/setup commands.

Impact

Routes configured coding-tool traffic through the selected Anyray gateway and creates persistent local helper/service state.

Mechanism

AI-tool configuration, MCP/hook registration, and per-user refresh scheduling.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonREADME.mddist/index.js~/.anyray/bin~/.codex/config.toml~/.claude/settings.json~/.jetbrains/acp.json~/Library/LaunchAgents~/.config/systemd/user

Network endpoints3

chatgpt.com/backend-api/codexgithub.com/login/device/codeapi.github.com/copilot_internal/user

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

Explicit CLI setup persists a durable runtime and points hooks, MCP registrations, and login services at it.
It configures Codex's user config to make an Anyray provider the default.
It installs user-level Shell/MCP hooks and retrieval infrastructure for AI coding tools.
Compiled entrypoint implements per-user launchd/systemd/Task Scheduler key-refresh scheduling.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; prepublishOnly is publisher-time testing.
The package is a declared CLI bin, and documented mutation follows explicit enrollment/setup commands.
No concrete hidden exfiltration, remote payload execution, or unconsented install-time control-surface mutation was confirmed.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 747 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.github.com, api.githubcopilot.com, github.com, opencode.ai, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var TR="http://localhost:8787",rs="anyray-placeholder",xe=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/.test(t))},Je=e=>{let t=e.trim().replace(/\/+$/,"");return t=... L3: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await bg(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${Sg()}`;try{await bg(o,`${JSON.stringify(t,null,2)} ... L5: `,{mode:384})}catch(a){throw await Br(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),a}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await ss(t,"utf-8")).nonce===r&&await Br(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0})... L6: `,{mode:384}),await Mu(r,384);try{await he(r,n)}catch(o){throw await Br(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},oe=async e=>{let t=await Lg

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

119`).map(EL).join(" + [Environment]::NewLine + "),IL=(e={})=>{let t={...SL,...e},n=()=>t.platform()==="win32",r=async()=>{let i=(await tl(vt(),An))?.find(c=>c.startsWith("export COPI... L120: `)):Z&&z&&await zs($,{force:!0}),await el(c,Y,An)}catch(De){try{W!==void 0&&z?await pe($,W):z&&await zs($,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("Copilot CLI environment update failed a... L121: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L119

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: var TR="http://localhost:8787",rs="anyray-placeholder",xe=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/.test(t))},Je=e=>{let t=e.trim().replace(/\/+$/,"");return t=... `),await he(o,e),await FR(e,384),await KR(e)}finally{await qt(o,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{})}},xg=1,kg=3e4,GR=5e3,jR=/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/,Ig=e=>`${e}.pending`,VR=e=>`${e}.lock`,_u=e=>{if(... `)},fn=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&X(e,"anthropic"),o=de({...e.metadata,tool:e.metadata.tool??"claude-code"}),a=t.includeClientKey!==!1&&!((r||n)&&e.viaLocalProxy),s=t.inc... `)){let u=d.indexOf(":");if(u>0&&d.slice(0,u).trim().toLowerCase()===l)retur

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

97`),!0):!1};var Mt=e=>{if(e.length<=4)return"\u2026";let t=/^([a-z0-9]{2,6}_)/i.exec(e)?.[1]??"";return e.length>t.length+4?`${t}\u2026${e.slice(-4)}`:`\u2026${e.slice(-4)}`};var ve... L98: `)):w&&y&&await $p(d,{force:!0}),await el(n,f)}catch(b){try{g!==void 0&&y?await pe(d,g):y&&await $p(d,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("shell environment update failed and credent... L99: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(` ... L104: `);ol("sqlite3",[e],{input:o,encoding:"utf-8",maxBuffer:Wp,stdio:["pipe","ignore","pipe"]})}finally{try{sP(n,{recursive:!0,force:!0})}catch{}}},hP={kind:"sqlite3-cli",readItem:(e,t... L105: `,{mode:384}),await he(n,t)},OP=(e,t)=>e.generation||t.generation?!!(e.generation&&e.generation===t.generation):e.op===t.op&&e.requestedAt===t.requestedAt&&e.watcherPid===t.watcher... L10

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L97

97Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L97: `),!0):!1};var Mt=e=>{if(e.length<=4)return"\u2026";let t=/^([a-z0-9]{2,6}_)/i.exec(e)?.[1]??"";return e.length>t.length+4?`${t}\u2026${e.slice(-4)}`:`\u2026${e.slice(-4)}`};var ve... L98: `)):w&&y&&await $p(d,{force:!0}),await el(n,f)}catch(b){try{g!==void 0&&y?await pe(d,g):y&&await $p(d,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("shell environment update failed and credent... L99: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(` ... L104: `);ol("sqlite3",[e],{input:o,encoding:"utf-8",maxBuffer:Wp,stdio:["pipe","ignore","pipe"]})}finally{try{sP(n,{recursive:!0,force:!0})}catch{}}},hP={kind:"sqlite3-cli",readItem:(e,t... L105: `,{mode:384}),await he(n,t)},OP=(e,t)=>e.generation||t.generation?!!(e.generation&&e.generation===t.gen

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L97

1Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var TR="http://localhost:8787",rs="anyray-placeholder",xe=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/.test(t))},Je=e=>{let t=e.trim().replace(/\/+$/,"");return t=... L3: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await bg(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${Sg()}`;try{await bg(o,`${JSON.stringify(t,null,2)} ... L5: `,{mode:384})}catch(a){throw await Br(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),a}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await ss(t,"utf-8")).nonce===r&&await Br(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0})... L6: `,{mode:384}),await Mu(r,384);try{await he(r,n)}catch(o){throw await Br(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},oe=async e=>{let t=await Lg();try{awa

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: var TR="http://localhost:8787",rs="anyray-placeholder",xe=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/.test(t))},Je=e=>{let t=e.trim().replace(/\/+$/,"");return t=... L3: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await bg(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${Sg()}`;try{await bg(o,`${JSON.stringify(t,null,2)} ... L5: `,{mode:384})}catch(a){throw await Br(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),a}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await ss(t,"utf-8")).nonce===r&&await Br(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0})... L6: `,{mode:384}),await Mu(r,384);try{await he(r,n)}catch(o){throw await Br(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},oe=async e=>{let t=await Lg();try{await Ng(e)}finally{await t()}},$g=async e... L7: `)},fn=(e,t={})=>{let

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L119

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L97

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L97

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

Findings

1 Critical8 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShelldist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/index.js

HighBase64 Obscured Urldist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/index.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to anyray-connect@0.11.154.

See all versions of anyray-connect for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of anyray-connect@0.11.154 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-08-16 22:42:43.402Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.