registry / AI-agent capability abuse / anyray-connect / 0.11.197

anyray-connect@0.11.197

Anyray connect — points local coding tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, SDKs) at the Anyray gateway through supported configuration and enrolled personal authentication.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source implements explicit-user AI-client routing rather than install-time malware, but the resulting persistent gateway redirection is a dangerous capability deserving a warning.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user runs the anyray-connect CLI and confirms configuration or supplies --yes.

Impact

Future AI prompts and authentication metadata may be sent through the configured gateway.

Mechanism

AI client configuration rewrite and gateway credential/header routing.

AI rationale

The source implements explicit-user AI-client routing rather than install-time malware, but the resulting persistent gateway redirection is a dangerous capability deserving a warning.

Evidence

dist/index.js~/.codex/config.toml~/.codex/hooks.json~/.anyray/connect.json

Network endpoints2

localhost:8787chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The CLI changes Codex's default model provider to Anyray and sets a gateway base URL.
It configures forwarding of Codex account headers through the selected gateway.
This is a broad AI-tool routing capability that can redirect future model traffic after the user runs the command.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
The entrypoint is a user-invoked CLI, and non-interactive configuration requires --yes.
No hidden install-time execution, self-dependency, or unrelated credential harvesting was confirmed.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 826 KB of source, external domains: api.github.com, api.githubcopilot.com, app.anyray.ai, github.com, gw.acme.com, opencode.ai, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var pT="http://localhost:8787",Ws="anyray-placeholder",rb=/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,fT="ark_svc_",mT=/^ark_svc_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,Te=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&rb.tes... L3: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await cb(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${fb()}`;try{await cb(o,`${JSON.stringify(t,null,2)} ... L5: `,{mode:384})}catch(c){throw await wa(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),c}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await Gs(o,"utf-8")).nonce===s&&await wa(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0})... L6: `,{mode:384}),await Xp(r,384);try{await Ce(r,n)}catch(o){throw await wa(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},de=async e=>{if(Jc.getStore

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

103`).map(FM).join(" + [Environment]::NewLine + "),UM=(e={})=>{let t={...BM,...e},n=()=>t.platform()==="win32",r=async()=>{let i=(await ii(Ct(),Nn))?.find(c=>c.startsWith("export COPI... L104: `)):G&&ee&&await Oi(P,{force:!0}),await Ml(c,V,Nn)}catch(we){try{X!==void 0&&ee?await ke(P,X):ee&&await Oi(P,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("Copilot CLI environment update faile... L105: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L103

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: var pT="http://localhost:8787",Ws="anyray-placeholder",rb=/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,fT="ark_svc_",mT=/^ark_svc_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,Te=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&rb.tes... `),await Ce(o,e),await ST(e,384),await RT(e)}finally{await on(o,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{})}},hb=1,lb=3e4,OT=5e3,_T=/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/,yb=e=>`${e}.pending`,TT=e=>`${e}.lock`,Wp=e=>{if(... `)},kn=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&ae(e,"anthropic"),o=be({...e.metadata,tool:e.metadata.tool??"claude-code"}),a=t.includeClientKey!==!1,s=t.includeAuthToken!==!1,{context... `:"";return{text:a,outcome:a===e?"unchanged":"changed"}};var zn=()=>yl(hl(),

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

49WantedBy=timers.target L50: `,oD=(e=vl())=>[e.command,...e.args].map(t=>/\s/.test(t)?`"${t}"`:t).join(" "),qs=e=>["Auto-refresh scheduling is not wired for this OS. To keep your gateway","key from expiring mi... L51: ${t.stderr??""}`}},fD=async e=>{try{return(await cD(e)).isDirectory()}catch{return!1}},mD=e=>{if(/^Signature=adhoc$/m.test(e))return;let n=/^TeamIdentifier=(.+)$/m.exec(e)?.[1]?.tr... L52: `).some(r=>{let o=r.trim();if(!o.startsWith(n))return!1;let a=o.slice(n.length).trimStart();return a===""||a.startsWith("#")})},Uf=(e,t)=>PA(_l(e),t),Hf=e=>{let t=e.indexOf(Eo);if(...

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

49Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L49: WantedBy=timers.target L50: `,oD=(e=vl())=>[e.command,...e.args].map(t=>/\s/.test(t)?`"${t}"`:t).join(" "),qs=e=>["Auto-refresh scheduling is not wired for this OS. To keep your gateway","key from expiring mi... L51: ${t.stderr??""}`}},fD=async e=>{try{return(await cD(e)).isDirectory()}catch{return!1}},mD=e=>{if(/^Signature=adhoc$/m.test(e))return;let n=/^TeamIdentifier=(.+)$/m.exec(e)?.[1]?.tr... L52: `).some(r=>{let o=r.trim();if(!o.startsWith(n))return!1;let a=o.slice(n.length).trimStart();return a===""||a.startsWith("#")})},Uf=(e,t)=>PA(_l(e),t),Hf=e=>{let t=e.indexOf(Eo);if(...

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: var pT="http://localhost:8787",Ws="anyray-placeholder",rb=/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,fT="ark_svc_",mT=/^ark_svc_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,Te=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&rb.tes... L3: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await cb(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${fb()}`;try{await cb(o,`${JSON.stringify(t,null,2)} ... L5: `,{mode:384})}catch(c){throw await wa(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),c}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await Gs(o,"utf-8")).nonce===s&&await wa(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0})... L6: `,{mode:384}),await Xp(r,384);try{await Ce(r,n)}catch(o){throw await wa(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},de=async e=>{if(Jc.getStore()===!0){await Zp(e);return}let t=await Qp();try{... L7: `)},kn=(e,t={})=>{let

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L103

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

Findings

1 Critical7 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShelldist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighBase64 Obscured Urldist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to anyray-connect@0.11.197.

See all versions of anyray-connect for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of anyray-connect@0.11.197 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-03 20:49:49.117Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.