registry / AI-agent capability abuse / anyray-connect / 0.11.198

anyray-connect@0.11.198

Anyray connect — points local coding tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, SDKs) at the Anyray gateway through supported configuration and enrolled personal authentication.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package has a concrete, user-invoked capability to alter AI-agent control surfaces and route traffic through a gateway. It lacks consumer install-time execution, so the evidence does not establish malicious automatic behavior.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user runs the anyray-connect CLI and confirms configuration, or supplies --yes.

Impact

Configured tools may send their supported gateway traffic and personal gateway key to the selected gateway; hooks and MCP registrations persist until reverted.

Mechanism

Persists AI-tool configuration and routes supported traffic through a configured gateway.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/index.jsREADME.md~/.anyray/bin~/.claude/settings.json~/.codex/config.toml~/.cursor/hooks.json~/.cursor/mcp.json

Network endpoints2

localhost:8787app.anyray.ai

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The user-invoked CLI persists a durable runtime for hooks, MCP registrations, and login services.
It configures several AI coding tools, including agent hooks, MCP entries, provider routing, and shell environment settings.
The tool can enroll a personal gateway key and route supported tool traffic through a gateway.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; prepublishOnly does not run for consumers.
Configuration is activated by an explicit CLI invocation, with dry-run and interactive confirmation unless --yes is supplied.
The gateway origin is configurable and defaults to localhost; no fixed package-controlled exfiltration endpoint was confirmed in executable source.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var O_="http://localhost:8787",Ks="anyray-placeholder",pb=/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,T_="ark_svc_",__=/^ark_svc_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,Pe=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&pb.tes... L3: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await gb(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${kb()}`;try{await gb(o,`${JSON.stringify(t,null,2)} ... L5: `,{mode:384})}catch(c){throw await Aa(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),c}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await Ys(o,"utf-8")).nonce===s&&await Aa(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0})... L6: `,{mode:384}),await nf(r,384);try{await Ae(r,n)}catch(o){throw await Aa(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},de=async e=>{if(tl.getStore

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

103`).map(nB).join(" + [Environment]::NewLine + "),oB=(e={})=>{let t={...tB,...e},n=()=>t.platform()==="win32",r=async()=>{let i=(await ui(At(),Nn))?.find(c=>c.startsWith("export COPI... L104: `)):G&&ee&&await Di(P,{force:!0}),await Gl(c,V,Nn)}catch(we){try{X!==void 0&&ee?await ke(P,X):ee&&await Di(P,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("Copilot CLI environment update faile... L105: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L103

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: var O_="http://localhost:8787",Ks="anyray-placeholder",pb=/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,T_="ark_svc_",__=/^ark_svc_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,Pe=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&pb.tes... `),await Ae(o,e),await U_(e,384),await V_(e)}finally{await on(o,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{})}},Sb=1,wb=3e4,j_=5e3,Y_=/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/,Ib=e=>`${e}.pending`,Z_=e=>`${e}.lock`,jp=e=>{if(... `)},kn=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&ae(e,"anthropic"),o=be({...e.metadata,tool:e.metadata.tool??"claude-code"}),a=t.includeClientKey!==!1,s=t.includeAuthToken!==!1,{context... `:"";return{text:a,outcome:a===e?"unchanged":"changed"}};var Qn=()=>kl(Al(),

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

49WantedBy=timers.target L50: `,AD=(e=Ol())=>[e.command,...e.args].map(t=>/\s/.test(t)?`"${t}"`:t).join(" "),ni=e=>["Auto-refresh scheduling is not wired for this OS. To keep your gateway","key from expiring mi... L51: ${t.stderr??""}`}},TD=async e=>{try{return(await ID(e)).isDirectory()}catch{return!1}},_D=e=>{if(/^Signature=adhoc$/m.test(e))return;let n=/^TeamIdentifier=(.+)$/m.exec(e)?.[1]?.tr... L52: `).some(r=>{let o=r.trim();if(!o.startsWith(n))return!1;let a=o.slice(n.length).trimStart();return a===""||a.startsWith("#")})},Yf=(e,t)=>UC($l(e),t),Zf=e=>{let t=e.indexOf(Oo);if(...

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

49Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L49: WantedBy=timers.target L50: `,AD=(e=Ol())=>[e.command,...e.args].map(t=>/\s/.test(t)?`"${t}"`:t).join(" "),ni=e=>["Auto-refresh scheduling is not wired for this OS. To keep your gateway","key from expiring mi... L51: ${t.stderr??""}`}},TD=async e=>{try{return(await ID(e)).isDirectory()}catch{return!1}},_D=e=>{if(/^Signature=adhoc$/m.test(e))return;let n=/^TeamIdentifier=(.+)$/m.exec(e)?.[1]?.tr... L52: `).some(r=>{let o=r.trim();if(!o.startsWith(n))return!1;let a=o.slice(n.length).trimStart();return a===""||a.startsWith("#")})},Yf=(e,t)=>UC($l(e),t),Zf=e=>{let t=e.indexOf(Oo);if(...

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: var O_="http://localhost:8787",Ks="anyray-placeholder",pb=/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,T_="ark_svc_",__=/^ark_svc_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,Pe=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&pb.tes... L3: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await gb(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${kb()}`;try{await gb(o,`${JSON.stringify(t,null,2)} ... L5: `,{mode:384})}catch(c){throw await Aa(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),c}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await Ys(o,"utf-8")).nonce===s&&await Aa(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0})... L6: `,{mode:384}),await nf(r,384);try{await Ae(r,n)}catch(o){throw await Aa(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},de=async e=>{if(tl.getStore()===!0){await ef(e);return}let t=await af();try{... L7: `)},kn=(e,t={})=>{let

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

Findings

1 Critical7 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShelldist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighBase64 Obscured Urldist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to anyray-connect@0.11.198.

See all versions of anyray-connect for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of anyray-connect@0.11.198 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-04 06:07:35.804Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code