registry / AI-agent capability abuse / anyray-connect / 0.11.199

anyray-connect@0.11.199

Anyray connect — points local coding tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, SDKs) at the Anyray gateway through supported configuration and enrolled personal authentication.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No concrete automatic install-time malware behavior was found. The explicit CLI nevertheless has substantial AI-agent configuration and reporting capability, so it should be warned rather than silently published.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The user runs anyray-connect and confirms or passes --yes.

Impact

Configured tools may route requests and hook-related data through the selected gateway; organization content can affect local agent behavior.

Mechanism

AI-tool configuration mutation and gateway reporting.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsondist/index.js~/.anyray

Network endpoints2

${e.origin}/connect/hook-savingsapp.anyray.ai

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package exposes an executable CLI that configures local coding tools.
When invoked, it posts hook-savings data including a source field to the configured gateway.
Its apply path seeds team content after enrollment, creating an agent-content control surface.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
Configuration changes require running the CLI and it refuses a non-interactive apply without --yes.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 839 KB of source, external domains: api.github.com, api.githubcopilot.com, app.anyray.ai, github.com, gw.acme.com, opencode.ai, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var PT="http://localhost:8787",js="anyray-placeholder",mb=/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,DT="ark_svc_",LT=/^ark_svc_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,Pe=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&mb.tes... L3: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await bb(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${Sb()}`;try{await bb(o,`${JSON.stringify(t,null,2)} ... L5: `,{mode:384})}catch(c){throw await ka(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),c}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await Js(o,"utf-8")).nonce===s&&await ka(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0})... L6: `,{mode:384}),await af(r,384);try{await Ae(r,n)}catch(o){throw await ka(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},de=async e=>{if(rl.getStore

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

111`).map(pB).join(" + [Environment]::NewLine + "),mB=(e={})=>{let t={...uB,...e},n=()=>t.platform()==="win32",r=async()=>{let i=(await fi(At(),Nn))?.find(c=>c.startsWith("export COPI... L112: `)):K&&ee&&await Ni(P,{force:!0}),await jl(c,V,Nn)}catch(we){try{X!==void 0&&ee?await ke(P,X):ee&&await Ni(P,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("Copilot CLI environment update faile... L113: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L111

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: var PT="http://localhost:8787",js="anyray-placeholder",mb=/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,DT="ark_svc_",LT=/^ark_svc_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,Pe=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&mb.tes... `),await Ae(o,e),await KT(e,384),await ZT(e)}finally{await on(o,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{})}},Eb=1,Cb=3e4,JT=5e3,XT=/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/,xb=e=>`${e}.pending`,zT=e=>`${e}.lock`,Jp=e=>{if(... `)},kn=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&ae(e,"anthropic"),o=be({...e.metadata,tool:e.metadata.tool??"claude-code"}),a=t.includeClientKey!==!1,s=t.includeAuthToken!==!1,{context... `:"";return{text:a,outcome:a===e?"unchanged":"changed"}};var Qn=()=>Sl(vl(),

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

49WantedBy=timers.target L50: `,SD=(e=Tl())=>[e.command,...e.args].map(t=>/\s/.test(t)?`"${t}"`:t).join(" "),oi=e=>["Auto-refresh scheduling is not wired for this OS. To keep your gateway","key from expiring mi... L51: ${t.stderr??""}`}},DD=async e=>{try{return(await RD(e)).isDirectory()}catch{return!1}},LD=e=>{if(/^Signature=adhoc$/m.test(e))return;let n=/^TeamIdentifier=(.+)$/m.exec(e)?.[1]?.tr... L52: `),o=_o(r),a=1;for(;a<r.length;){let s=o[a];if(s.kind==="table"||s.kind==="key"&&!KD(r[a],s.key))break;a+=1}for(;a>1&&r[a-1].trim()==="";)a-=1;return`${n.replace(/\n+$/,`

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

49Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L49: WantedBy=timers.target L50: `,SD=(e=Tl())=>[e.command,...e.args].map(t=>/\s/.test(t)?`"${t}"`:t).join(" "),oi=e=>["Auto-refresh scheduling is not wired for this OS. To keep your gateway","key from expiring mi... L51: ${t.stderr??""}`}},DD=async e=>{try{return(await RD(e)).isDirectory()}catch{return!1}},LD=e=>{if(/^Signature=adhoc$/m.test(e))return;let n=/^TeamIdentifier=(.+)$/m.exec(e)?.[1]?.tr... L52: `),o=_o(r),a=1;for(;a<r.length;){let s=o[a];if(s.kind==="table"||s.kind==="key"&&!KD(r[a],s.key))break;a+=1}for(;a>1&&r[a-1].trim()==="";)a-=1;return`${n.replace(/\n+$/,`

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: var PT="http://localhost:8787",js="anyray-placeholder",mb=/^ark_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,DT="ark_svc_",LT=/^ark_svc_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,512}$/,Pe=e=>{let t=e?.trim();return!!(t&&mb.tes... L3: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await bb(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${Sb()}`;try{await bb(o,`${JSON.stringify(t,null,2)} ... L5: `,{mode:384})}catch(c){throw await ka(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),c}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await Js(o,"utf-8")).nonce===s&&await ka(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0})... L6: `,{mode:384}),await af(r,384);try{await Ae(r,n)}catch(o){throw await ka(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},de=async e=>{if(rl.getStore()===!0){await rf(e);return}let t=await lf();try{... L7: `)},kn=(e,t={})=>{let

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L111

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

Findings

1 Critical7 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShelldist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighBase64 Obscured Urldist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to anyray-connect@0.11.199.

See all versions of anyray-connect for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of anyray-connect@0.11.199 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-05 03:46:53.390Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.