registry / anyray-connect / 0.11.215

anyray-connect@0.11.215

Anyray connect — points local coding tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, SDKs) at the Anyray gateway through supported configuration and enrolled personal authentication.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No concrete malicious install hook, credential theft, or unrelated data exfiltration was found. The remote policy-to-agent configuration path remains a guarded but high-impact capability that warrants a warning.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

User runs anyray-connect and confirms configuration, or supplies --yes.

Impact

A trusted or compromised configured gateway can influence agent instructions and MCP connectivity on the user's machine.

Mechanism

Authenticated remote policy retrieval followed by local agent configuration and skill writes.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsondist/index.jsSKILL.md~/.codex/config.toml

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The command fetches a team policy from the configured gateway using a personal client key.
Gateway-supplied policy content is written into agent SKILL.md files and can also configure organisation MCP entries.
The package is a CLI that persistently redirects supported coding tools through a gateway.

Evidence against

package.json has no npm preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
Configuration changes require an interactive confirmation or an explicit --yes option.
The inspected network and configuration behaviour matches the package's stated gateway-connection purpose; no secret harvesting or unrelated exfiltration was confirmed.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var VL=Object.defineProperty;var G=(e,t,n)=>()=>{if(n)throw n[0];try{return e&&(t=e(e=0)),t}catch(r){throw n=[r],r}};var KA=(e,t)=>{for(var n in t)VL(e,n,{get:t[n],enumerable:!0})}... L3: `,{mode:384})}catch(c){throw await Ms(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),c}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await Mc(o,"utf-8")).nonce===s&&await Ms(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0})... L4: `,{mode:384}),await Vh(r,384);try{await Se(r,n)}catch(o){throw await Ms(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},ke=async e=>{if(su.getStore()===!0){await Hh(e);return}let t=await jh();try{... L5: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await sv(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${pv

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

49`),!0):!1}});var gn,_u=G(()=>{"use strict";gn=e=>{if(e.length<=4)return"\u2026";let t=/^([a-z0-9]{2,6}_)/i.exec(e)?.[1]??"";return e.length>t.length+4?`${t}\u2026${e.slice(-4)}`:`\... L50: `)):w&&g&&await yy(d,{force:!0}),await Ou(n,p)}catch(b){try{y!==void 0&&g?await Ee(d,y):g&&await yy(d,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("shell environment update failed and credent... L51: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(`

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

78`).map(rH).join(" + [Environment]::NewLine + "),aH=(e={})=>{let t={...nH,...e},n=()=>t.platform()==="win32",r=async()=>{let i=(await Uc(Rt(),Cr))?.find(c=>c.startsWith("export COPI... L79: `)):O&&Q&&await fl(S,{force:!0}),await Ou(c,U,Cr)}catch(fe){try{W!==void 0&&Q?await Ee(S,W):Q&&await fl(S,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("Copilot CLI environment update failed a... L80: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L78

36`:o?`${o} L37: `:"";return{text:a,outcome:a===e?"unchanged":"changed"}}});var ae,ye,Bo,$e=G(()=>{"use strict";ae=(e,t)=>e.authMode==="subscription"?!0:e.authMode==="placeholder"?!1:e.seat?.[t]??!... L38: `;)c-=1;if(s===-1){let d=new Set(n.map(h=>h.trim())),u=e.slice(c).split(` ... L49: `),!0):!1}});var gn,_u=G(()=>{"use strict";gn=e=>{if(e.length<=4)return"\u2026";let t=/^([a-z0-9]{2,6}_)/i.exec(e)?.[1]??"";return e.length>t.length+4?`${t}\u2026${e.slice(-4)}`:`\... L50: `)):w&&g&&await yy(d,{force:!0}),await Ou(n,p)}catch(b){try{y!==void 0&&g?await Ee(d,y):g&&await yy(d,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("shell environment update failed and credent... L51: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(`

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L36

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: var VL=Object.defineProperty;var G=(e,t,n)=>()=>{if(n)throw n[0];try{return e&&(t=e(e=0)),t}catch(r){throw n=[r],r}};var KA=(e,t)=>{for(var n in t)VL(e,n,{get:t[n],enumerable:!0})}... `,{mode:384}),await Vh(r,384);try{await Se(r,n)}catch(o){throw await Ms(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},ke=async e=>{if(su.getStore()===!0){await Hh(e);return}let t=await jh();try{... `:""},Pv=e=>{if(e.trim().length===0)return!0;try{return A$(e),!0}catch{return!1}}});import{randomUUID as P$}from"node:crypto";import{chmod as _$,mkdir as T$,rm as N$,writeFile as B... `:"";return{text:a,outcome:a===e?"unchanged":"changed"}}});var ae,ye,Bo,$e=G

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

61`;)r+=1;r-=1;continue}if(o==="/"&&e[r+1]==="*"){let a=e.indexOf("*/",r+2);r=a===-1?e.length:a+1,t+=" ";continue}t+=o}return t},FG=e=>{let t="",n=!1;for(let r=0;r<e.length;r+=1){let... L62: `,r=n.trim()?Qt(n):{};if(!Xu(r))throw new Error(`${e} is not a JSON object`);return{data:r,raw:n,existed:t}},JI=(e,t,n=[])=>{if(Xu(e)&&Xu(t)){let r=[];for(let o of new Set([...Obje... L63: `);let a={insertSpaces:!0,tabSize:2,eol:t.raw.includes(`\r ... L71: `:` L72: ${a}${s},`,d=`${i}${l}${c}`;try{let u=Qt(d);if(!zI(u))return{ok:!1,reason:"unsupported"};for(let[p,f]of Object.entries(r))if(JSON.stringify(u[p])!==JSON.stringify(f))return{ok:!1,r... L73: `,{mode:384}),await Se(a,o)}catch{}finally{await gS(a,{force:!0})}},OW=async(e,t)=>{await Qu(zy(e,t)).catch(()=>{})},SS=async(e,t,n,r={},o={mode:"copil

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L61

61Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L61: `;)r+=1;r-=1;continue}if(o==="/"&&e[r+1]==="*"){let a=e.indexOf("*/",r+2);r=a===-1?e.length:a+1,t+=" ";continue}t+=o}return t},FG=e=>{let t="",n=!1;for(let r=0;r<e.length;r+=1){let... L62: `,r=n.trim()?Qt(n):{};if(!Xu(r))throw new Error(`${e} is not a JSON object`);return{data:r,raw:n,existed:t}},JI=(e,t,n=[])=>{if(Xu(e)&&Xu(t)){let r=[];for(let o of new Set([...Obje... L63: `);let a={insertSpaces:!0,tabSize:2,eol:t.raw.includes(`\r ... L71: `:` L72: ${a}${s},`,d=`${i}${l}${c}`;try{let u=Qt(d);if(!zI(u))return{ok:!1,reason:"unsupported"};for(let[p,f]of Object.entries(r))if(JSON.stringify(u[p])!==JSON.stringify(f))return{ok:!1,r... L73: `,{mode:384}),await Se(a,o)}catch{}finally{await gS(a,{force:!0})}}

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L61

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

Findings

1 Critical6 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShelldist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to anyray-connect@0.11.215.

See all versions of anyray-connect for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of anyray-connect@0.11.215 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-08 12:49:50.582Z (UTC).

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