registry / anyray-connect / 0.11.263

anyray-connect@0.11.263

Anyray connect — points local coding tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, SDKs) at the Anyray gateway through supported configuration and enrolled personal authentication.

AI Security Review

scanned 23d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source shows first-party agent extension setup with persistent configuration and later update capability, which the supplied policy classifies as warning-worthy. No registry install hook or concrete malicious chain supports blocking.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Running the configuration CLI; later refreshes and updates use saved management choices and runtime policy.

Impact

Changes future agent routing and available capabilities; later updates can change the installed integration without repeating initial selection. No covert theft or install-time hijack was established.

Mechanism

Writes agent configuration, enables a package-owned plugin, pre-approves retrieval tools, and permits managed runtime updates by default.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/index.jsconfig.tomlhooks.jsonopenclaw.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 89.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json points the CLI and main entrypoint to dist/index.js; no registry install hooks or runtime self-dependency were found.
The Codex adapter targets config.toml and hooks.json under the Codex home directory.
The adapter writes routing configuration, pre-approves Anyray retrieval tools, and installs a PreToolUse hook.
The OpenClaw adapter enables an Anyray plugin configured with the selected gateway and gateway key.
Tool selection guards hold billing or management changes unless explicitly selected or previously managed; successful configurations become saved managed-tool choices.
Managed runtime updates default to enabled, subject to fleet policy, allowing later extension changes.

Evidence against

Configuration changes occur through CLI execution rather than npm install hooks.
The Codex adapter backs up configuration, refuses foreign provider ownership conflicts, and supports reversal.
No concrete covert credential export or malicious payload execution was established.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcess

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var mV=Object.defineProperty;var $=(e,t,n)=>()=>{if(n)throw n[0];try{return e&&(t=e(e=0)),t}catch(r){throw n=[r],r}};var Ob=(e,t)=>{for(var n in t)mV(e,n,{get:t[n],enumerable:!0})}... L3: `,{flag:"wx",mode:384}),await Te(l,a)}catch(d){throw await Ys(l,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),await Ys(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),d}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await ... L4: `,{mode:384}),await Bb(r,384);try{await Te(r,n)}catch(o){throw await Ys(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},Me=async e=>{if(cm.getStore()===!0){await Lb(e);return}let t=await Fb();try{... L5: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await x0(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${N0

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

56`)},so=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&le(e,"anthropic"),o=be({...e.metadata,tool:e.metadata.tool??"claude-code"}),a=t.includeClientKey!==!1,s=t.includeAuthToken!==!1,{context... L57: `)):w&&y&&await kk(d,{force:!0}),await Tm(n,p)}catch(b){try{g!==void 0&&y?await Ae(d,g):y&&await kk(d,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("shell environment update failed and credent... L58: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(`

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L56

119} L120: `,ZO=e=>new Promise((t,n)=>{let r=ZX("powershell.exe",["-NoLogo","-NoProfile","-NonInteractive","-Command",qX],{encoding:"utf8",env:At(),windowsHide:!0,timeout:6e4,maxBuffer:131072... L121: `))}`]:[],`export ${kC}=${Ue(n)}`]},iT=(e,t,n)=>{let r=be({...e.metadata,tool:yi});return["export COPILOT_PROVIDER_TYPE='openai'",`export COPILOT_PROVIDER_BASE_URL=${Ue(e.openaiBas...

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L119

41`);return o.length>0?o+` L42: `:""},eu=e=>{if(e.trim().length===0)return!0;try{return rK(e),!0}catch{return!1}}});import{randomUUID as fK}from"node:crypto";import{chmod as mK,mkdir as hK,rm as yK,writeFile as g... L43: `;)c-=1;if(s===-1){let u=new Set(n.map(w=>w.trim())),p=e.slice(c).split(` ... L56: `)},so=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&le(e,"anthropic"),o=be({...e.metadata,tool:e.metadata.tool??"claude-code"}),a=t.includeClientKey!==!1,s=t.includeAuthToken!==!1,{context... L57: `)):w&&y&&await kk(d,{force:!0}),await Tm(n,p)}catch(b){try{g!==void 0&&y?await Ae(d,g):y&&await kk(d,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("shell environment update failed and credent... L58: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(`

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L41

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: var mV=Object.defineProperty;var $=(e,t,n)=>()=>{if(n)throw n[0];try{return e&&(t=e(e=0)),t}catch(r){throw n=[r],r}};var Ob=(e,t)=>{for(var n in t)mV(e,n,{get:t[n],enumerable:!0})}... `,{mode:384}),await Bb(r,384);try{await Te(r,n)}catch(o){throw await Ys(r,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),o}},Me=async e=>{if(cm.getStore()===!0){await Lb(e);return}let t=await Fb();try{... `:""},eu=e=>{if(e.trim().length===0)return!0;try{return rK(e),!0}catch{return!1}}});import{randomUUID as fK}from"node:crypto";import{chmod as mK,mkdir as hK,rm as yK,writeFile as g... `)},so=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&le(e,"anthropic"),o=be({...e.met

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

68`;)r+=1;r-=1;continue}if(o==="/"&&e[r+1]==="*"){let a=e.indexOf("*/",r+2);r=a===-1?e.length:a+1,t+=" ";continue}t+=o}return t},$j=e=>{let t="",n=!1;for(let r=0;r<e.length;r+=1){let... L69: `,r=n.trim()?Tn(n):{};if(!Qm(r))throw new Error(`${e} is not a JSON object`);return{data:r,raw:n,existed:t}},T_=(e,t,n=[])=>{if(Qm(e)&&Qm(t)){let r=[];for(let o of new Set([...Obje... L70: `);let a={insertSpaces:!0,tabSize:2,eol:t.raw.includes(`\r ... L78: `:` L79: ${a}${s},`,d=`${i}${l}${c}`;try{let u=Tn(d);if(!P_(u))return{ok:!1,reason:"unsupported"};for(let[p,f]of Object.entries(r))if(JSON.stringify(u[p])!==JSON.stringify(f))return{ok:!1,r... L80: `,{mode:384}),await Te(a,o)}catch{}finally{await eO(a,{force:!0})}},WY=async(e,t)=>{await qk(tC(e,t)).catch(()=>{})},dO=async(e,t,n,r={},o={mode:"copil

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L68

68Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L68: `;)r+=1;r-=1;continue}if(o==="/"&&e[r+1]==="*"){let a=e.indexOf("*/",r+2);r=a===-1?e.length:a+1,t+=" ";continue}t+=o}return t},$j=e=>{let t="",n=!1;for(let r=0;r<e.length;r+=1){let... L69: `,r=n.trim()?Tn(n):{};if(!Qm(r))throw new Error(`${e} is not a JSON object`);return{data:r,raw:n,existed:t}},T_=(e,t,n=[])=>{if(Qm(e)&&Qm(t)){let r=[];for(let o of new Set([...Obje... L70: `);let a={insertSpaces:!0,tabSize:2,eol:t.raw.includes(`\r ... L78: `:` L79: ${a}${s},`,d=`${i}${l}${c}`;try{let u=Tn(d);if(!P_(u))return{ok:!1,reason:"unsupported"};for(let[p,f]of Object.entries(r))if(JSON.stringify(u[p])!==JSON.stringify(f))return{ok:!1,r... L80: `,{mode:384}),await Te(a,o)}catch{}finally{await eO(a,{force:!0})}}

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L68

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L56

Findings

1 Critical6 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShelldist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to anyray-connect@0.11.263.

See all versions of anyray-connect for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of anyray-connect@0.11.263 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-30 04:41:27.649Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.