registry / AI-agent capability abuse / anyray-connect / 0.11.267

anyray-connect@0.11.267

Anyray connect — points local coding tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, SDKs) at the Anyray gateway through supported configuration and enrolled personal authentication.

AI Security Review

scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected source establishes consent-gated agent configuration changes with lasting routing and tool approval effects. Under the explicit-command agent policy, this warrants a warning rather than a malicious publication block.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Running the configuration CLI and accepting its prompt or supplying --yes.

Impact

Future agent requests can use the configured gateway, and Anyray tools can run with saved approvals. Enrollment can also enable recurring background refresh.

Mechanism

Writes agent configuration and hooks, registers preapproved MCP tools, and persists preferences that can enable later automatic key refresh.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/index.jsconfig.tomlhooks.jsonanyray.config.toml

Network endpoints1

chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json exposes dist/index.js as both the CLI and main entrypoint.
Configuration requires interactive confirmation or --yes; noninteractive runs without consent are refused.
The Codex adapter writes routing configuration and Anyray hooks.
Generated Codex configuration preapproves Anyray MCP tools.
The enrolled profile saves automatic refresh preferences and can install a recurring gateway key refresh schedule.

Evidence against

No preinstall, install, or postinstall hook or runtime self-dependency appears in package.json.
The Codex adapter backs up existing configuration and refuses to overwrite foreign provider entries.
No concrete covert exfiltration or malicious install chain was established.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 1.14 MB of source, external domains: api.github.com, api.githubcopilot.com, app.anyray.ai, chatgpt.com, github.com, gw.acme.com, opencode.ai, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var DZ=Object.defineProperty;var $=(e,t,n)=>()=>{if(n)throw n[0];try{return e&&(t=e(e=0)),t}catch(r){throw n=[r],r}};var pk=(e,t)=>{for(var n in t)DZ(e,n,{get:t[n],enumerable:!0})}... L3: `,{flag:"wx",mode:384}),await Re(l,a)}catch(d){throw await ei(l,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),await ei(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),d}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await ... L4: `,{mode:384}),await wk(a,384);try{await Re(a,n)}catch(s){throw await ei(a,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),s}},Fe=async e=>{if(Pm.getStore()===!0){await yk(e);return}let t=await Ck();try{... L5: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await KR(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${zR

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

56`)},fo=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&ue(e,"anthropic"),o=ke({...e.metadata,tool:e.metadata.tool??"claude-code"}),a=t.includeClientKey!==!1,s=t.includeAuthToken!==!1,{context... L57: `)):g&&b&&await ah(d,{force:!0}),await Gm(n,f)}catch(k){try{y!==void 0&&b?await Se(d,y):b&&await ah(d,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("shell environment update failed and credent... L58: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(`

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L56

126} L127: `,LP=e=>new Promise((t,n)=>{let r=Z3("powershell.exe",["-NoLogo","-NoProfile","-NonInteractive","-Command",q3],{encoding:"utf8",env:Et(),windowsHide:!0,timeout:6e4,maxBuffer:131072... L128: `))}`]:[],`export ${bA}=${Be(n)}`]},XP=(e,t,n)=>{let r=ke({...e.metadata,tool:vi});return["export COPILOT_PROVIDER_TYPE='openai'",`export COPILOT_PROVIDER_BASE_URL=${Be(e.openaiBas...

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L126

54`);return o.length>0?o+` L55: `:""},ku=e=>{if(e.trim().length===0)return!0;try{return Gj(e),!0}catch{return!1}}});import{randomUUID as zj}from"node:crypto";import{chmod as qj,mkdir as Qj,rm as eY,writeFile as t... L56: `)},fo=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&ue(e,"anthropic"),o=ke({...e.metadata,tool:e.metadata.tool??"claude-code"}),a=t.includeClientKey!==!1,s=t.includeAuthToken!==!1,{context... L57: `)):g&&b&&await ah(d,{force:!0}),await Gm(n,f)}catch(k){try{y!==void 0&&b?await Se(d,y):b&&await ah(d,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("shell environment update failed and credent... L58: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(`

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: var DZ=Object.defineProperty;var $=(e,t,n)=>()=>{if(n)throw n[0];try{return e&&(t=e(e=0)),t}catch(r){throw n=[r],r}};var pk=(e,t)=>{for(var n in t)DZ(e,n,{get:t[n],enumerable:!0})}... `,{mode:384}),await wk(a,384);try{await Re(a,n)}catch(s){throw await ei(a,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),s}},Fe=async e=>{if(Pm.getStore()===!0){await yk(e);return}let t=await Ck();try{... `,r),s=a<0?e.length:a;if(e.slice(o,s).trim()===t)return o;r=e.indexOf(t,r+t.length)}return-1}});import{readFile as dj,writeFile as s_,access as uj}from"node:fs/promises";import{rea... `:""},ku=e=>{if(e.trim().length===0)return!0;try{return Gj(e),!0}catch{retur

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

54Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L54: `);return o.length>0?o+` L55: `:""},ku=e=>{if(e.trim().length===0)return!0;try{return Gj(e),!0}catch{return!1}}});import{randomUUID as zj}from"node:crypto";import{chmod as qj,mkdir as Qj,rm as eY,writeFile as t... L56: `)},fo=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&ue(e,"anthropic"),o=ke({...e.metadata,tool:e.metadata.tool??"claude-code"}),a=t.includeClientKey!==!1,s=t.includeAuthToken!==!1,{context... L57: `)):g&&b&&await ah(d,{force:!0}),await Gm(n,f)}catch(k){try{y!==void 0&&b?await Se(d,y):b&&await ah(d,{force:!0})}catch{throw new Error("shell environment update failed and credent... L58: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(` ... L63: `);dh("sqlite3",[e],{input:o,encoding:"utf-8",maxBuffer:lC,stdio:["pipe","i

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L56

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L126

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

Findings

1 Critical6 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShelldist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to anyray-connect@0.11.267.

See all versions of anyray-connect for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of anyray-connect@0.11.267 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-30 22:46:47.493Z (UTC).

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