registry / anyray-connect / 0.11.280

anyray-connect@0.11.280

Anyray connect — points local coding tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, SDKs) at the Anyray gateway through supported configuration and enrolled personal authentication.

AI Security Review

scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Scanner exfiltration labels do not establish theft: inspected sends use the configured gateway for routing and optimization. First-party plugin installation and guarded automatic repair meet the warning policy for agent extension lifecycle risk.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Running CLI setup for an agent, followed by feature-drift repair of managed integrations.

Impact

The configured gateway participates in agent traffic and output optimization, and later repairs can change installed extension code.

Mechanism

Setup persists gateway routing and plugin configuration; validated gateway-advertised assets can replace bundled plugin files.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/index.jsconfig.tomlhooks.jsonanyray.config.tomlopenclaw.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; the entrypoint invokes the CLI with process arguments.
The CLI targets Codex configuration and enables an Anyray OpenClaw plugin with the configured gateway and personal gateway key.
OpenClaw setup can select downloaded plugin assets instead of bundled files.
Asset selection checks origin, version, signature, and checksum; feature drift can trigger later automatic repair.
The optimization hook sends tool output and session context to the configured gateway.

Evidence against

No concrete covert exfiltration or malicious install behavior was established.
Gateway credentials and output transmission align with the inspected routing and optimization implementation.
Extension updates have validation guards rather than unrestricted remote execution.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 1.24 MB of source, external domains: api.github.com, api.githubcopilot.com, app.anyray.ai, chatgpt.com, github.com, gw.acme.com, opencode.ai, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var A3=Object.defineProperty;var G=(e,t,n)=>()=>{if(n)throw n[0];try{return e&&(t=e(e=0)),t}catch(r){throw n=[r],r}};var Jh=(e,t)=>{for(var n in t)A3(e,n,{get:t[n],enumerable:!0})}... L3: `,{flag:"wx",mode:384}),await Le(l,a)}catch(d){throw await Li(l,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),await Li(e,{recursive:!0,force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),d}return async()=>{try{JSON.parse(await ... L4: `,{mode:384}),await kC(a,384);try{await Le(a,n)}catch(s){throw await Li(a,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),s}},Ze=async e=>{if(ty.getStore()===!0){await wC(e);return}let t=await vC();try{... L5: `;if(a||n.tombstoneAbsent!==!1)try{await VT(r,s)}catch(i){if(i.code!=="EEXIST")throw i}}let o=`${e}.anyray-tmp-${process.pid}-${zT

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

130} L131: `,VD=e=>new Promise((t,n)=>{let r=YQ("powershell.exe",["-NoLogo","-NoProfile","-NonInteractive","-Command",e8],{encoding:"utf8",env:rt(),windowsHide:!0,timeout:6e4,maxBuffer:131072... L132: `))}`]:[],`export ${ES}=${Ke(n)}`]},sM=(e,t,n)=>{let r=Ie({...e.metadata,tool:ac});return["export COPILOT_PROVIDER_TYPE='openai'",`export COPILOT_PROVIDER_BASE_URL=${Ke(e.openaiBas...

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L130

54`);return o.length>0?o+` L55: `:""},xf=e=>{if(e.trim().length===0)return!0;try{return Rz(e),!0}catch{return!1}}});import{randomUUID as Fz}from"node:crypto";import{chmod as Hz,mkdir as Gz,rm as Uz,writeFile as W... L56: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(` ... L60: `).trim().split(/\r?\n/).at(-1),o=/^([01])\|(-?\d+)\|(-?\d+)$/.exec(r??"");xP(o?.slice(1).map(Number))},Qz=(e,t)=>{let n=Vz(_P(Xz(),"anyray-cursor-"));try{let o=[".bail on",".timeo... L61: `);Ay("sqlite3",[e],{input:o,encoding:"utf-8",maxBuffer:YC,stdio:["pipe","ignore","pipe"]})}finally{try{jz(n,{recursive:!0,force:!0})}catch{}}},e9={kind:"sqlite3-cli",readItem:(e,t... L62: `)},Ly=e=>!e.byoUpstream&&!he(e,"anthropic"),Ny="",Po=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.byoUpstream,r=!n&&he(e,"anthropic"),o=Ie({...e.metadata,tool:e.metadata.tool??"claude-

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: var A3=Object.defineProperty;var G=(e,t,n)=>()=>{if(n)throw n[0];try{return e&&(t=e(e=0)),t}catch(r){throw n=[r],r}};var Jh=(e,t)=>{for(var n in t)A3(e,n,{get:t[n],enumerable:!0})}... `,{mode:384}),await kC(a,384);try{await Le(a,n)}catch(s){throw await Li(a,{force:!0}).catch(()=>{}),s}},Ze=async e=>{if(ty.getStore()===!0){await wC(e);return}let t=await vC();try{... `,r),s=a<0?e.length:a;if(e.slice(o,s).trim()===t)return o;r=e.indexOf(t,r+t.length)}return-1}});import{readFile as J3,writeFile as sP,access as z3}from"node:fs/promises";import{rea... `:""},xf=e=>{if(e.trim().length===0)return!0;try{return Rz(e),!0}catch{retur

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

54Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L54: `);return o.length>0?o+` L55: `:""},xf=e=>{if(e.trim().length===0)return!0;try{return Rz(e),!0}catch{return!1}}});import{randomUUID as Fz}from"node:crypto";import{chmod as Hz,mkdir as Gz,rm as Uz,writeFile as W... L56: `)?a.slice(0,-2):a.endsWith(` ... L60: `).trim().split(/\r?\n/).at(-1),o=/^([01])\|(-?\d+)\|(-?\d+)$/.exec(r??"");xP(o?.slice(1).map(Number))},Qz=(e,t)=>{let n=Vz(_P(Xz(),"anyray-cursor-"));try{let o=[".bail on",".timeo... L61: `);Ay("sqlite3",[e],{input:o,encoding:"utf-8",maxBuffer:YC,stdio:["pipe","ignore","pipe"]})}finally{try{jz(n,{recursive:!0,force:!0})}catch{}}},e9={kind:"sqlite3-cli",readItem:(e,t... L62: `)},Ly=e=>!e.byoUpstream&&!he(e,"anthropic"),Ny="",Po=(e,t={})=>{let n=e.by

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L130

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L54

Findings

1 Critical6 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShelldist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to anyray-connect@0.11.280.

See all versions of anyray-connect for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of anyray-connect@0.11.280 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-06 21:00:41.014Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.