api-anthropic@1.0.1
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source implements persistent agent configuration changes through an explicit CLI command, which falls under the warning policy for user-command agent mutation. No concrete malicious chain or unconsented install-time behavior was identified.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes bin.js as an explicit CLI and defines no install lifecycle hooks.
- bin.js selects a key from command arguments or ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN and a gateway from ANTHROPIC_GATEWAY_URL or https://api-anthropic.help.
- bin.js reads the user's .claude/settings.json and replaces its authentication and gateway environment settings.
- bin.js saves the configuration persistently and normally launches Claude Code using it.
- Configuration requires invoking the CLI with a key; npm installation alone does not activate it.
- Platform checks select Windows command variants; they do not conceal execution from analysis.
- No direct network request, secret-file harvesting, obfuscated payload, or runtime self-dependency appears in the inspected entrypoint.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedSource gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.
bin.jsView on unpkg · L15Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to api-anthropic@1.0.1.
See all versions of api-anthropic for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of api-anthropic@1.0.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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