apiblaze@0.21.17
APIblaze CLI — Chat with your APIs, Manage your API keys, users and groups with the APIblaze serverless proxy
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiAgent configuration is a first-party, user-invoked capability with a confirm prompt or an explicit flag, and install hooks are absent. That is a guarded agent-config write, so it is a warning rather than a publish block or an unmarked clean package.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
User runs apiblaze create (confirm), apichat --install-mcp, or skill --install.
Impact
The chosen agent gains an APIblaze MCP endpoint or a project skill. Foreign MCP entries with the same name are refused. No install-time hijack.
Mechanism
spawnSync invokes the claude CLI mcp add/remove, or the tool rewrites the named block in ~/.codex/config.toml, or writes SKILL.md under the project .claude/skills directory.
AI rationale
Agent configuration is a first-party, user-invoked capability with a confirm prompt or an explicit flag, and install hooks are absent. That is a guarded agent-config write, so it is a warning rather than a publish block or an unmarked clean package.
Evidence
dist/index.js.codex/config.toml.claude/skills/ship-safely/SKILL.md
Network endpoints1
mcp.apiblaze.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 82.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- User-run CLI calls claude mcp add or remove and writes ~/.codex/config.toml for an APIblaze MCP entry.
- Interactive create asks before connecting Claude or Codex; --install-mcp is an explicit flag.
- skill --install writes .claude/skills under the current project only when --install is passed.
- package.json has build and prepublishOnly scripts and no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
Evidence against
- Existing Claude or Codex MCP entries that are not APIblaze proxies are left untouched.
- Network defaults stay on apiblaze.com product hosts.
- No eval, self-dependency, or install-time agent config write.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
77const raw = fs.readFileSync(CREDENTIALS_PATH, "utf-8");
L78: return JSON.parse(raw);
L79: } catch {
...
L83: function getAccessToken() {
L84: const fromEnv = process.env.APIBLAZE_TOKEN;
L85: if (fromEnv && fromEnv.trim()) return fromEnv.trim();
...
L104: path = __toESM(require("path"));
L105: APIBLAZE_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), ".apiblaze");
L106: CREDENTIALS_PATH = path.join(APIBLAZE_DIR, "credentials.json");
...
L116: agentCall: () => agentCall,
L117: bothDoorsBody: () => bothDoorsBody,
L118: checkProxyName: () => checkProxyName,
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L7777Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js
L77: const raw = fs.readFileSync(CREDENTIALS_PATH, "utf-8");
L78: return JSON.parse(raw);
L79: } catch {
...
L83: function getAccessToken() {
L84: const fromEnv = process.env.APIBLAZE_TOKEN;
L85: if (fromEnv && fromEnv.trim()) return fromEnv.trim();
...
L104: path = __toESM(require("path"));
L105: APIBLAZE_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), ".apiblaze");
L106: CREDENTIALS_PATH = path.join(APIBLAZE_DIR, "credentials.json");
...
L116: agentCall: () => agentCall,
L117: bothDoorsBody: () => bothDoorsBody,
L118: checkProxyName: () => checkProxyName,
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L77Findings
3 Critical6 High3 Medium5 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to apiblaze@0.21.17.
See all versions of apiblaze for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of apiblaze@0.21.17 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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