---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/apiblaze/v/0.21.19"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/apiblaze/v/0.21.19.md"
package: "apiblaze"
report_status: "published"
title: "apiblaze@0.21.19 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.21.19"
---

# apiblaze@0.21.19 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse
- **Selected version:** 0.21.19
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The source establishes explicit agent configuration behavior but no automatic package-install mutation or concrete malicious payload. Treat this as a guarded AI-agent capability risk.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 88.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-28T10:51:44.659Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-28T10:53:34.050Z
- **Download time:** 511 ms
- **Static scan time:** 2294 ms
- **AI review time:** 106585 ms
- **Total time:** 109391 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** No confirmed covert attack was identified. The CLI can modify Codex MCP configuration when a user requests external-agent installation.

- **Trigger:** A user invokes apichat with --install-mcp codex or accepts the interactive offer.

- **Impact:** This grants a configured APIblaze MCP endpoint to Codex; it is an explicit agent-configuration capability rather than an install-time action.

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-28T10:53:34.050Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The CLI writes an APIblaze MCP server block into the Codex configuration file.

- **Rationale:** The source establishes explicit agent configuration behavior but no automatic package-install mutation or concrete malicious payload. Treat this as a guarded AI-agent capability risk.

- **Files touched:** .codex/config.toml

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 88.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for warning:** The package metadata exposes a CLI and has only a prepublish build hook, not an install lifecycle hook., The apichat command offers an explicit --install-mcp option to connect a proxy to Codex or Claude., The Codex setup function rewrites an MCP server block in the user's Codex configuration.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to apiblaze@0.21.19.

- Review the evidence and your use of apiblaze@0.21.19 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.19/dist/index.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1578: function openBrowser(url) {
L1579: const { exec } = require("child_process");
L1580: const cmd = process.platform === "darwin" ? `open "${url}"` : process.platform === "win32" ? `start "" "${url}"` : `xdg-open "${url}"`;
```

### 4. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.19/dist/index.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1566: var import_chalk3 = __toESM(require("chalk"));
L1567: var TERMS_URL = "https://apiblaze.com/terms";
L1568: var PRIVACY_URL = "https://apiblaze.com/privacy";
...
L1576: // src/commands/login.ts
L1577: var DASHBOARD_BASE3 = process.env.APIBLAZE_DASHBOARD_BASE || "https://dashboard.apiblaze.com";
L1578: function openBrowser(url) {
L1579: const { exec } = require("child_process");
L1580: const cmd = process.platform === "darwin" ? `open "${url}"` : process.platform === "win32" ? `start "" "${url}"` : `xdg-open "${url}"`;
```

### 9. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.19/dist/index.js>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L78: const raw = fs2.readFileSync(CREDENTIALS_PATH, "utf-8");
L79: return JSON.parse(raw);
L80: } catch {
...
L84: function getAccessToken() {
L85: const fromEnv = process.env.APIBLAZE_TOKEN;
L86: if (fromEnv && fromEnv.trim()) return fromEnv.trim();
...
L105: path2 = __toESM(require("path"));
L106: APIBLAZE_DIR = path2.join(os2.homedir(), ".apiblaze");
L107: CREDENTIALS_PATH = path2.join(APIBLAZE_DIR, "credentials.json");
...
L124: agentCall: () => agentCall,
L125: bothDoorsBody: () => bothDoorsBody,
L126: checkProxyName: () => checkProxyName,
```

### 10. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.19/dist/index.js>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
fs2.writeFileSync(CREDENTIALS_PATH, JSON.stringify(creds, null, 2), "utf-8");
...auth?.apiKey ? { "X-API-Key": auth.apiKey } : { Authorization: `Bearer ${getAccessToken()}` },
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
fs3.writeFileSync(FILE, JSON.stringify(merged, null, 2), { mode: 384 });
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
openRegistrationAuthorization: () => openRegistrationAuthorization,
async function openRegistrationAuthorization(teamId, tenant2, seconds) {
summary: `Cancel the OAuth registration authorization on ${tenant2}`
```

### 11. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.19/dist/index.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L78: const raw = fs2.readFileSync(CREDENTIALS_PATH, "utf-8");
L79: return JSON.parse(raw);
L80: } catch {
...
L84: function getAccessToken() {
L85: const fromEnv = process.env.APIBLAZE_TOKEN;
L86: if (fromEnv && fromEnv.trim()) return fromEnv.trim();
...
L105: path2 = __toESM(require("path"));
L106: APIBLAZE_DIR = path2.join(os2.homedir(), ".apiblaze");
L107: CREDENTIALS_PATH = path2.join(APIBLAZE_DIR, "credentials.json");
...
L124: agentCall: () => agentCall,
L125: bothDoorsBody: () => bothDoorsBody,
L126: checkProxyName: () => checkProxyName,
```

### 12. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.19/dist/index.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js
L78: const raw = fs2.readFileSync(CREDENTIALS_PATH, "utf-8");
L79: return JSON.parse(raw);
L80: } catch {
...
L84: function getAccessToken() {
L85: const fromEnv = process.env.APIBLAZE_TOKEN;
L86: if (fromEnv && fromEnv.trim()) return fromEnv.trim();
...
L105: path2 = __toESM(require("path"));
L106: APIBLAZE_DIR = path2.join(os2.homedir(), ".apiblaze");
L107: CREDENTIALS_PATH = path2.join(APIBLAZE_DIR, "credentials.json");
...
L124: agentCall: () => agentCall,
L125: bothDoorsBody: () => bothDoorsBody,
L126: checkProxyName: () => checkProxyName,
```

### 13. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.19/dist/index.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js
L78: const raw = fs2.readFileSync(CREDENTIALS_PATH, "utf-8");
L79: return JSON.parse(raw);
L80: } catch {
...
L84: function getAccessToken() {
L85: const fromEnv = process.env.APIBLAZE_TOKEN;
L86: if (fromEnv && fromEnv.trim()) return fromEnv.trim();
...
L105: path2 = __toESM(require("path"));
L106: APIBLAZE_DIR = path2.join(os2.homedir(), ".apiblaze");
L107: CREDENTIALS_PATH = path2.join(APIBLAZE_DIR, "credentials.json");
...
L124: agentCall: () => agentCall,
L125: bothDoorsBody: () => bothDoorsBody,
L126: checkProxyName: () => checkProxyName,
```

### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 15. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 17. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.19/dist/index.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = apiblaze@0.21.18
matchedIdentity = npm:YXBpYmxhemU:0.21.18
similarity = 0.923
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 6
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 1
- **Development dependencies:** 6
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 7

### Published dependency entries
- chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- commander ^11.1.0 (Dependency)
- inquirer ^8.2.6 (Dependency)
- ora ^5.4.1 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.17.0 (Dependency)
- yaml ^2.9.0 (Dependency)
- react \>=17 (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** apiblaze
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.21.19
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-28T10:50:59.722Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-06-30T22:55:19.471Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T07:16:37.243Z
- **Known versions:** 72
- **Latest version:** 0.21.69
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** APIblaze CLI — Chat with your APIs, Manage your API keys, users and groups with the APIblaze serverless proxy
- **Author:** APIblaze
- **Maintainers:** julien\_apiblaze
- **Keywords:** apiblaze, dev-tunnel, cloudflared, api, proxy, sidecar, nextjs, egress
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 15
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,095,205 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/apiblaze/v/0.21.19>)