apiblaze@0.21.41
APIblaze CLI — Chat with your APIs, Manage your API keys, users and groups with the APIblaze serverless proxy
AI Security Review
scanned 27d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe Codex configuration change is reached through a user-invoked CLI setup flow with an explicit selection and registration authorization. The manifest has no install-time configuration hook, and inspected code does not establish credential exfiltration.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes a build and typecheck prepublish hook, with no install lifecycle hook.
- The Codex configuration path uses CODEX_HOME or the user’s .codex directory, and the generated server block uses the selected MCP URL and optional API key.
- Codex installation runs through a CLI flow that authorizes client registration and then performs the setup.
- The default CLI flow asks whether to add the MCP; choosing chat here declines setup.
- The configuration writer updates config.toml with the selected server block after setup is triggered.
- No inspected source establishes covert forwarding of a separate LLM provider key or an unconsented install-time agent configuration change.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L32A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L32Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to apiblaze@0.21.41.
See all versions of apiblaze for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of apiblaze@0.21.41 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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