---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/apiblaze/v/0.21.53"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/apiblaze/v/0.21.53.md"
package: "apiblaze"
report_status: "published"
title: "apiblaze@0.21.53 npm security report"
verdict: "clean"
version: "0.21.53"
---

# apiblaze@0.21.53 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 17 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed.

- **Verdict:** Clean
- **Product-default install policy:** Allow
- **Firewall policy:** No policy match
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** None published
- **Selected version:** 0.21.53
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Source inspection found no malicious behavior. Chat credentials are used for the package’s user-invoked chat features, while Codex configuration changes occur through CLI setup and the manifest has no install lifecycle hook.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Clean
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 92.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-16T16:21:14.213Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-16T16:24:40.226Z
- **Download time:** 1781 ms
- **Static scan time:** 3420 ms
- **AI review time:** 200811 ms
- **Total time:** 206013 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** No malicious behavior was identified. The inspected network activity serves the package’s chat and CLI functions, and the configuration write is part of an explicit setup flow.

- **Trigger:** A user submits a chat message, invokes a CLI command, or runs CLI setup.

- **Impact:** The inspected behavior does not establish credential theft, unconsented installation-time activity, or another attack.

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-16T16:24:40.226Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Chat requests use the configured runtime endpoint and caller-provided credentials. CLI setup writes an MCP entry to Codex configuration; CLI run-count requests go to APIblaze.

- **Rationale:** Source inspection found no malicious behavior. Chat credentials are used for the package’s user-invoked chat features, while Codex configuration changes occur through CLI setup and the manifest has no install lifecycle hook.

- **Network endpoints:** api.apiblaze.com/cli/hello, https://${p.mcpHost}/${p.version}/${p.environment}/runtime-chat, https://${project}.mcp.${host}/${apiVersion}/${environment}/runtime-chat

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Clean

- **Confidence:** 92.0%

- **Recommended action:** mark\_clean

- **Intent class:** Benign

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for AI clean decision:** The manifest defines only a prepublishOnly lifecycle hook, which runs the build and type check., The React widget sends a caller-provided token to a URL derived from the caller’s endpoint or project configuration, after the user submits a message., The CLI chat feature saves a user-provided model key locally and sends it with chat messages to the provisioned APIblaze runtime chat endpoint., The Codex configuration helper is reached through an explicit CLI setup flow; it writes the MCP server entry to the user’s Codex configuration., The CLI sends a run-count request to APIblaze during a CLI command, with command and run identifiers; the request can be disabled with DO\_NOT\_TRACK.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to apiblaze@0.21.53.

- Review the evidence and your use of apiblaze@0.21.53 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.53/dist/index.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L399: try {
L400: const child = (0, import_child_process.spawn)(process.execPath, ["-e", COUNT_RUN_CHILD], {
L401: detached: true,
```

### 4. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.53/dist/index.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L399: try {
L400: const child = (0, import_child_process.spawn)(process.execPath, ["-e", COUNT_RUN_CHILD], {
L401: detached: true,
...
L403: windowsHide: true,
L404: env: { ...process.env, ABZ_COUNT_URL: (opts.url ?? `${PUBLIC_API_BASE}/cli/hello`) + (opts.event ? `/${opts.event}` : ""), ABZ_COUNT_HEADERS: JSON.stringify(cliHeaders()) }
L405: });
...
L412: async function createProxyAnonymous(body) {
L413: const res = await fetch(`${PUBLIC_API_BASE}/proxy`, {
L414: method: "POST",
```

### 9. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.53/dist/index.js>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L32: 
L33: // package.json
L34: var version;
...
L93: function cacheFile() {
L94: return import_path.default.join(import_os.default.homedir(), ".apiblaze", "cli-policy.json");
L95: }
...
L104: for (const name of CONTROL_PLANE_ENV) {
L105: const v = process.env[name];
L106: try {
...
L154: const base2 = globalThis.fetch.bind(globalThis);
L155: globalThis.fetch = (async (input, init) => {
L156: const url = typeof input === "string" ? input : input instanceof URL ? input.href : input.url;
```

### 10. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.53/dist/index.js>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
import_fs.default.writeFileSync(cacheFile(), JSON.stringify({ at: Date.now(), policy, beta }));
fs2.writeFileSync(CREDENTIALS_PATH, JSON.stringify(creds, null, 2), "utf-8");
...auth?.apiKey ? { "X-API-Key": auth.apiKey } : { Authorization: `Bearer ${getAccessToken()}` },
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
fs3.writeFileSync(FILE, JSON.stringify(merged, null, 2), { mode: 384 });
const spinner = (0, import_ora.default)("Waiting for authorization in browser...").start();
if (body.error === "authorization_pending") {
if (lower === "authorization" || lower === "proxy-authorizatio
```

### 11. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.53/dist/index.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L32: 
L33: // package.json
L34: var version;
...
L93: function cacheFile() {
L94: return import_path.default.join(import_os.default.homedir(), ".apiblaze", "cli-policy.json");
L95: }
...
L104: for (const name of CONTROL_PLANE_ENV) {
L105: const v = process.env[name];
L106: try {
...
L154: const base2 = globalThis.fetch.bind(globalThis);
L155: globalThis.fetch = (async (input, init) => {
L156: const url = typeof input === "string" ? input : input instanceof URL ? input.href : input.url;
```

### 12. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 72.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.53/dist/index.js>)

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/index.js spawns dist/browser/widgets.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L32: 
L33: // package.json
L34: var version;
...
L93: function cacheFile() {
L94: return import_path.default.join(import_os.default.homedir(), ".apiblaze", "cli-policy.json");
L95: }
...
L104: for (const name of CONTROL_PLANE_ENV) {
L105: const v = process.env[name];
L106: try {
...
L154: const base2 = globalThis.fetch.bind(globalThis);
L155: globalThis.fetch = (async (input, init) => {
L156: const url = typeof input === "string" ? input : input instanceof URL ? input.href : input.url;
```

### 13. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.53/dist/index.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js
L32: 
L33: // package.json
L34: var version;
...
L93: function cacheFile() {
L94: return import_path.default.join(import_os.default.homedir(), ".apiblaze", "cli-policy.json");
L95: }
...
L104: for (const name of CONTROL_PLANE_ENV) {
L105: const v = process.env[name];
L106: try {
...
L154: const base2 = globalThis.fetch.bind(globalThis);
L155: globalThis.fetch = (async (input, init) => {
L156: const url = typeof input === "string" ? input : input instanceof URL ? input.href : input.url;
```

### 14. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/apiblaze@0.21.53/dist/index.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js
L32: 
L33: // package.json
L34: var version;
...
L93: function cacheFile() {
L94: return import_path.default.join(import_os.default.homedir(), ".apiblaze", "cli-policy.json");
L95: }
...
L104: for (const name of CONTROL_PLANE_ENV) {
L105: const v = process.env[name];
L106: try {
...
L154: const base2 = globalThis.fetch.bind(globalThis);
L155: globalThis.fetch = (async (input, init) => {
L156: const url = typeof input === "string" ? input : input instanceof URL ? input.href : input.url;
```

### 15. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 16. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 17. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 6
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 1
- **Development dependencies:** 9
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 7

### Published dependency entries
- chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- commander ^11.1.0 (Dependency)
- inquirer ^8.2.6 (Dependency)
- ora ^5.4.1 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.17.0 (Dependency)
- yaml ^2.9.0 (Dependency)
- react \>=17 (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** apiblaze
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.21.53
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-10-16T16:17:02.284Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-06-30T22:55:19.471Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T07:16:37.243Z
- **Known versions:** 72
- **Latest version:** 0.21.69
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** APIblaze CLI — Chat with your APIs, Manage your API keys, users and groups with the APIblaze serverless proxy
- **Author:** APIblaze
- **Maintainers:** julien\_apiblaze
- **Keywords:** apiblaze, dev-tunnel, cloudflared, api, proxy, sidecar, nextjs, egress
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 16
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,520,456 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/apiblaze/v/0.21.53>)