--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/arcroom/v/0.1.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/arcroom/v/0.1.0.md" package: "arcroom" report_status: "published" title: "arcroom@0.1.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.1.0" --- # arcroom@0.1.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 12 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Telemetry warning (can be blocked) - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Telemetry - **Selected version:** 0.1.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Runtime hooks send the machine hostname to ArcRoom's API, but the README's detailed upload disclosure does not mention it. The service destination and team-tracking purpose are consistent with the package, so this is an undisclosed telemetry concern rather than clear malicious behavior. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 84.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-30T08:51:54.108Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-30T08:53:09.171Z - **Download time:** 251 ms - **Static scan time:** 282 ms - **AI review time:** 74529 ms - **Total time:** 75063 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Runtime events include a machine hostname that is not listed in the package's upload disclosure; no clear attack was identified. - **Trigger:** After \`arcroom init\` configures agent hooks, an agent session invokes a hook that records events. - **Impact:** The service receives a device identifier alongside disclosed activity metadata; this may be intended for team attribution, but the hostname is not disclosed. - **Evidence paths:** dist/events.js, dist/hook.js, dist/daemon.js, dist/home.js, dist/init.js, README.md - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-30T08:53:09.171Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Events include the hostname and working directory, are queued locally, and are uploaded by the background daemon to ArcRoom's API. - **Rationale:** Runtime hooks send the machine hostname to ArcRoom's API, but the README's detailed upload disclosure does not mention it. The service destination and team-tracking purpose are consistent with the package, so this is an undisclosed telemetry concern rather than clear malicious behavior. - **Files touched:** ~/.arcroom/spool.jsonl, ~/.arcroom/config.json, .claude/settings.local.json - **Network endpoints:** https://api.arcroomai.com ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Unknown - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** Each runtime event includes the machine hostname and working directory., The hook queues events containing those fields, and the daemon uploads event batches., The default upload endpoint is api.arcroomai.com., The README discloses several categories of uploaded activity data but does not mention the machine hostname., The runtime collection is activated by the agent hooks configured by \`arcroom init\`. - **Evidence against:** The hostname is sent to ArcRoom's own API, and identifying machines may support the package's shared team run tracking., The README describes uploads of prompts, paths, commands, and other activity data, and provides an \`arcroom off\` command., The only lifecycle script is \`prepublishOnly\`, which runs the build and tests. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to arcroom@0.1.0. - Review the evidence and your use of arcroom@0.1.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/fresh.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L53: const r = git(['ls-files', '--cached', '--others', '--exclude-standard'], { cwd, timeout: 1500 }); L54: files = r.status === 0 ? (r.stdout ?? '').split('\n').filter(Boolean).slice(0, MAX_SCAN) : []; L55: return files; ``` ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. High: Host Fingerprint Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/home.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source collects local host identity data and sends it to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L11: const rel = custom && isAbsolute(custom) ? relative(cwd, custom) : ''; L12: return custom && isAbsolute(custom) && (rel.startsWith('..') || isAbsolute(rel)) ? custom : join(homedir(), '.arcroom'); L13: } L14: export const ARCROOM_HOME = homeFrom(process.env.ARCROOM_HOME, process.cwd()); L15: // Repos where this person switched ArcRoom off (arcroom off): no tracing, no lookups, nothing leaves the laptop (I6). ... L19: try { L20: return JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, 'utf8')); L21: } ... L35: } L36: // ArcRoom API (the Oracle server behind Caddy). A local API: arcroom init --url http://localhost:8787 L37: export const DEFAULT_URL = 'https://api.arcroomai.com'; ... L59: headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${cfg.apiKey}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }, ``` ### 8. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/init.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. const mcpfile = join(process.cwd(), '.mcp.json'); const mcpconfig = existssync(mcpfile) ? json.parse(readfilesync(mcpfile, 'utf8')) : {}; const local = addlocalmcp(entry); if (local) { if (string(mcpconfig.mcpservers?.arcroom?.args?.[0] ?? '').replaceall('\\', '/').includes(mark)) { delete mcpconfig.mcpservers.arcroom; writefilesync(mcpfile, json.stringify(mcpconfig, null, 2) + '\n'); } } else { mcpconfig.mcpservers = { ...mcpconfig.mcpservers, arcroom: { command: node, args: [entry, 'mcp'] } }; writefilesync ``` ### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 10. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 11. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/events.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Each runtime event includes the machine hostname and working directory. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript export function toArcroomEvent(raw, at = new Date()) { const base = { v: 1, at: at.toISOString(), session: String(raw.session_id ?? 'unknown'), machine: hostname(), cwd: raw.cwd, }; switch ``` ### 12. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/hook.js - **Public source:** [View source]() The hook queues events containing those fields, and the daemon uploads event batches. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript const queue = (e) => appendFileSync(spool, JSON.stringify(redact(e)) + '\n', { mode: 0o600 }); const emit = (type, data) => queue({ ...toArcroomEvent(raw), type, data }); const injected ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** arcroom - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.1.0 - **License:** Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-10-30T08:48:56.447Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-10-30T08:47:05.799Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-02T11:03:17.302Z - **Known versions:** 6 - **Latest version:** 0.0.5-beta - **Appeal under review:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()