registry  /  autodev-ai  /  0.5.0

autodev-ai@0.5.0

AutoDev — Autonomous Engineering Team. DevTeam in a Box. Runs on pi.

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface is established by source inspection. The package is an autonomous developer-tool CLI with powerful user-invoked setup, update, docs, and agent-management features.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Explicit user commands such as autodev init, doctor, config, update, docs, install.sh, or uninstall.
Impact
Expected modification of AutoDev/project configuration and calls to configured provider services; no confirmed unconsented exfiltration or install-time compromise.
Mechanism
User-invoked developer automation with local config writes, package/tool installation, and provider API calls.
Rationale
The high-risk primitives are consistent with a user-invoked autonomous development CLI and installer, and no lifecycle hook or hidden import-time behavior performs credential theft, payload staging, or unconsented agent control-surface mutation. Scanner findings are mostly expected setup/update/docs features or test fixtures, so the package should not be blocked.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/cli.tsinstall.shextensions/autodev/installer/tools.tsextensions/autodev/installer/install-module.tsextensions/autodev/installer/config-module.tsextensions/autodev/installer/uninstall-module.tsextensions/autodev/docs/seeding.tsextensions/autodev/embeddings.tsextensions/autodev/installer/key-validator.tsextensions/autodev/mcp-integrations/index.tsextensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.ts~/.AutoDev/~/.pi/~/.autodev/~/.config/cortexkit/magic-context.jsonc~/.config/autodev.env~/.bashrc~/.zshrc~/.profile~/.config/fish/config.fish.autodev/docs-corpus/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/AGENTS.mdCONTEXT.md
Network endpoints10
bun.sh/installraw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.shapi.voyageai.com/v1/embeddingsollama.com/api/tagsapi.openai.com/v1/modelsapi.anthropic.com/v1/modelsgenerativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/modelsdiscord.com/api/v10/users/@meapi.context7.com/v1grep.app/api

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 88.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • scripts/cli.ts loads agent .env and exposes user-invoked update/doctor commands using execSync.
  • install.sh is a documented curl|bash bootstrap that installs Bun/autodev-ai and appends PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR to shell rc files.
  • extensions/autodev/installer/tools.ts can install system tools/package managers when invoked by install/doctor flows.
  • extensions/autodev/docs/seeding.ts fetches configured docs URLs or git repos and writes them to the docs corpus.
  • extensions/autodev/installer/uninstall-module.ts removes ~/.AutoDev, ~/.pi, ~/.autodev and project state only under explicit uninstall.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no preinstall/postinstall lifecycle scripts; bin is a CLI entrypoint only.
  • Network calls are package-aligned: LLM/key validation, embeddings, docs seeding, Context7/Grep.app tools, and npm self-update.
  • Secrets are prompted/configured locally in extensions/autodev/installer/config-module.ts and validated against their own providers, not sent to unrelated hosts.
  • Scanner secret hit in extensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.ts is test data used to verify redaction.
  • AI-agent/project control files are written during explicit autodev init/config/install actions, not unconsented install-time mutation.
  • No evidence of credential harvesting, hidden exfiltration, persistence beyond documented config, or import-time execution.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 93 file(s), 671 KB of source, external domains: api.anthropic.com, api.context7.com, api.openai.com, api.voyageai.com, bun.sh, cli.github.com, deb.nodesource.com, discord.com, generativelanguage.googleapis.com, github.com, grep.app, ollama.com, raw.githubusercontent.com

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source
extensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.tsView file
247patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 247 matchedText = github: ...34",
Critical
Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

extensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.tsView on unpkg · L247
247patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 247 matchedText = github: ...34",
Critical
Secret Pattern

GitHub personal access token in extensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.ts

extensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.tsView on unpkg · L247
246patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 246 matchedText = google: ...PQ",
High
Secret Pattern

Google API key in extensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.ts

extensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.tsView on unpkg · L246
extensions/autodev/background/manager.tsView file
150L151: spawn(config: SpawnConfig): string { L152: const id = this.nextId();
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

extensions/autodev/background/manager.tsView on unpkg · L150
extensions/autodev/docs/seeding.tsView file
194const mdUrls: string[] = []; L195: let match: RegExpExecArray | null; L196: while ((match = linkRegex.exec(indexText)) !== null) {
High
Shell

Package source references shell execution.

extensions/autodev/docs/seeding.tsView on unpkg · L194
extensions/autodev/installer/uninstall-module.tsView file
181try { L182: const { execSync } = await import("node:child_process"); L183: const cmd = `npx @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent uninstall ${source}`; L184: execSync(cmd, { stdio: "pipe", timeout: 60_000, cwd: process.cwd() });
High
Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

extensions/autodev/installer/uninstall-module.tsView on unpkg · L181
23const SHELL_RC_CANDIDATES = [ L24: ".bashrc", L25: ".zshrc", ... L55: const { notify } = deps; L56: const home = process.env.HOME ?? "~"; L57: const targets = [ ... L181: try { L182: const { execSync } = await import("node:child_process"); L183: const cmd = `npx @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent uninstall ${source}`; L184: execSync(cmd, { stdio: "pipe", timeout: 60_000, cwd: process.cwd() }); L185: notify(`Uninstalled ${source}`, "info");
Medium
Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

extensions/autodev/installer/uninstall-module.tsView on unpkg · L23
extensions/autodev/embeddings.tsView file
37): Promise<Float32Array[]> { L38: const apiKey = process.env.VOYAGE_API_KEY; L39: if (!apiKey) throw new Error("VOYAGE_API_KEY not set"); ... L42: const batch = texts.slice(i, i + VOYAGE_BATCH_SIZE); L43: const res = await fetch("https://api.voyageai.com/v1/embeddings", { L44: method: "POST", ... L48: }, L49: body: JSON.stringify({ L50: model: "voyage-3", ... L55: if (!res.ok) { L56: throw new Error(`VoyageAI embeddings failed: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`); L57: }
High
Credential Exfiltration

Source combines credential-like environment material and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

extensions/autodev/embeddings.tsView on unpkg · L37
extensions/autodev/installer/tools.tsView file
1import { execSync, type ExecSyncOptions } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { platform } from "node:os"; ... L59: function isNonInteractive(): boolean { L60: if (process.env.CI === "true" || process.env.CI === "1") return true; L61: if (process.stdout != null && process.stdout.isTTY === false) return true; L62: if (process.argv.includes("--yes") || process.argv.includes("-y")) return true; ... L65: L66: const HOMEBREW_BOOTSTRAP_URL = "https://raw.githubusercontent.[redacted].sh"; L67: ... L108: notify(`Installing Homebrew from ${HOMEBREW_BOOTSTRAP_URL}...`, "info"); L109: exec(`bash -c 'NONINTERACTIVE=1 /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL ${HOMEBREW_BOOTSTRAP_URL})"`, { L110: stdio: "inherit",
Critical
Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

extensions/autodev/installer/tools.tsView on unpkg · L1
install.shView file
path = install.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 2692 magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

install.shView on unpkg

Findings

3 Critical5 High5 Medium4 Low
CriticalCritical Secretextensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.ts
CriticalDownload Executeextensions/autodev/installer/tools.ts
CriticalSecret Patternextensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.ts
HighChild Processextensions/autodev/background/manager.ts
HighShellextensions/autodev/docs/seeding.ts
HighCredential Exfiltrationextensions/autodev/embeddings.ts
HighRuntime Package Installextensions/autodev/installer/uninstall-module.ts
HighSecret Patternextensions/autodev/debug/__tests__/debug.test.ts
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistenceextensions/autodev/installer/uninstall-module.ts
MediumShips Build Helperinstall.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings