---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/automation-tool-manager"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/automation-tool-manager/v/1.9.15.md"
package: "automation-tool-manager"
report_status: "published"
title: "automation-tool-manager@1.9.15 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "1.9.15"
---

# automation-tool-manager@1.9.15 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 17 finding(s) warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Install Hook Abuse
- **Selected version:** 1.9.15
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Installation automatically invokes a setup script that changes shell configuration and then launches a bundled Java program in the background. This is an unconsented install-time environment mutation and persistence-like behavior.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-29T04:37:08.836Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-29T04:40:08.081Z
- **Download time:** 2029 ms
- **Static scan time:** 127 ms
- **AI review time:** 177088 ms
- **Total time:** 179245 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Installation automatically invokes a setup script that changes shell configuration and then launches a bundled Java program in the background. This is an unconsented install-time environment mutation and persistence-like behavior.

- **Trigger:** An npm installation invokes the declared postinstall lifecycle hook.

- **Impact:** The install can alter the user's shell environment and leave a background Java process running without an explicit start command.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, scripts/setup.sh, jdeploy-bundle/jdeploy.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-29T04:40:08.081Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The hook runs the shell setup script; the launcher spawns Java detached with inherited environment variables and hidden windows.

- **Rationale:** Automatic lifecycle execution changes user configuration and starts a background payload without an explicit user command. The behavior warrants a warning as install-hook abuse, though the inspected source does not prove a direct malicious payload action.

- **Files touched:** scripts/postinstall.js, scripts/setup.sh, jdeploy-bundle/jdeploy.js

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 90.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The package declares automatic preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks., The postinstall hook runs the bundled shell setup script during installation., The setup script persists an environment variable to shell profiles., The launcher starts the Java payload as a detached background process with hidden windows., The setup script contains a generic download routine for setup artifacts.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to automation-tool-manager@1.9.15.

- Review the evidence and your use of automation-tool-manager@1.9.15 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/automation-tool-manager@1.9.15/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node ./scripts/postinstall.js || true
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/automation-tool-manager@1.9.15/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.preinstall = node ./scripts/check-node.js && node ./scripts/preinstall.js
```

### 3. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/automation-tool-manager@1.9.15/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node ./scripts/postinstall.js || true
```

### 4. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 5. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** jdeploy-bundle/jdeploy.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/automation-tool-manager@1.9.15/jdeploy-bundle/jdeploy.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L5: var fs = require('fs');
L6: var child_process = require('child_process');
L7: var port = "8085";
```

### 6. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 7. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 72.0%
- **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/automation-tool-manager@1.9.15/scripts/postinstall.js>)

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Cross-file remote execution chain: scripts/postinstall.js spawns jdeploy-bundle/jdeploy.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L8: 
L9: const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
L10: const fs = require('fs');
...
L13: 
L14: const scriptDir = __dirname;
L15: const setupSh = path.join(scriptDir, 'setup.sh');
...
L30: args.includes('--skip-browsers') ||
L31: process.env.AUTOMATION_SKIP_BROWSERS === '1' ||
L32: process.env.CI === 'true';
L33: 
...
L134: } else {
L135: // macOS / Linux: run setup.sh with /bin/bash
```

### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 11. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** scripts/setup.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/automation-tool-manager@1.9.15/scripts/setup.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = scripts/setup.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 48851
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 13. Medium: Ships Compressed Blob
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** jdeploy-bundle/jar-runner.jar
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/automation-tool-manager@1.9.15/jdeploy-bundle/jar-runner.jar>)

Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = jdeploy-bundle/jar-runner.jar
kind = compressed_blob
sizeBytes = 1839
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 14. High: Ships High Entropy Blob
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** jdeploy-bundle/tool-manager-1.4.6.jar
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/automation-tool-manager@1.9.15/jdeploy-bundle/tool-manager-1.4.6.jar>)

Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = jdeploy-bundle/tool-manager-1.4.6.jar
kind = high_entropy_blob
sizeBytes = 34116104
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 15. Low: Nested Archive Needs Inspection
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** jdeploy-bundle/jar-runner.jar
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/automation-tool-manager@1.9.15/jdeploy-bundle/jar-runner.jar>)

Package ships a nested archive or MCP bundle that was inventoried but not recursively analyzed.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = jdeploy-bundle/jar-runner.jar
kind = nested_archive_needs_inspection
sizeBytes = 1839
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 17. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** jdeploy-bundle/jdeploy.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/automation-tool-manager@1.9.15/jdeploy-bundle/jdeploy.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = automation-tool-manager@1.9.11
matchedIdentity = npm:YXV0b21hdGlvbi10b29sLW1hbmFnZXI:1.9.11
similarity = 0.500
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, preinstall
- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 2
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** automation-tool-manager
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.9.15
- **License:** ISC
- **Version published:** 2026-09-19T02:49:16.146Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-18T16:25:02.317Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-09-29T04:40:08.081Z
- **Known versions:** 14
- **Latest version:** 1.9.23
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Automation Agent
- **Maintainers:** rajsekhar355
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18
- **Artifact files:** 12
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 68,328,359 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/automation-tool-manager/v/1.9.15>)
