registry / autopilot-ai / 1.29.0
autopilot-ai@1.29.0
⚠ Under reviewautopilot (formerly kimiflare): a terminal coding agent for any model with your own key: OpenRouter, Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, Bedrock, Vertex, Ollama and more. Per-turn cost, web search, GitHub, headless browser, LSP, MCP, local memory.
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected source supports ordinary CLI, isolated evaluation, and user-entered feedback inbox behavior, with no confirmed attack chain. Important flagged runtime paths remain unresolved, so this review cannot support a clean verdict.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
The CLI runs when invoked; the inspected inbox request follows user entry of inbox details.
Impact
The inspected excerpts do not establish credential theft, remote code execution, or unconsented installation mutation.
Mechanism
The available source shows an isolated code runner and an inbox lookup to the package feedback service. Remaining runtime behavior is unresolved.
AI rationale
The inspected source supports ordinary CLI, isolated evaluation, and user-entered feedback inbox behavior, with no confirmed attack chain. Important flagged runtime paths remain unresolved, so this review cannot support a clean verdict.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Manual Review at 76.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.
AI review observations
- package.json exposes a CLI and SDK and has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The flagged evaluator creates an isolated VM with a memory limit and exposes configured tools through a bridge.
- The inbox feature sends user-entered details to the package’s feedback service; the inspected caller presents it as an inbox lookup.
- The inspected native dependency install script runs prebuild-install or node-gyp, and the package’s static analysis reports unresolved coverage gaps.
Evidence against
- The inspected manifest lifecycle scripts are prepack and prepublishOnly; the CLI entrypoint imports the runtime bundle.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
20 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
41Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L41: function defaultLogDir() {
L42: const xdg = process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config");
L43: return join(xdg, "kimiflare", "logs");
...
L58: if (currentStream) {
L59: currentStream.end();
L60: currentStream = null;
...
L188: function setFetchForTesting(f) {
L189: fetchImpl = f ?? ((url, init) => fetch(url, init));
L190: }
...
L989: import { createSign } from "crypto";
L990: import { execFile } from "child_process";
L991: import { readFile } from "fs/promises";
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L411055const iat = Math.floor(now2 / 1e3);
L1056: const payload = enc({ iss: sa.client_email, scope: SCOPE, aud: sa.token_uri ?? "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", iat, exp: iat + 3600 });
L1057: const signature = createSign("RSA-SHA256").update(`${header}.${payload}`).sign(sa.private_key).toString("base64url");
...
L1062: const tokenUrl = creds.type === "service_account" ? creds.token_uri ?? "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token" : "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token";
L1063: const body = creds.type === "service_account" ? new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer", assertion: signJwt(creds, now2) }) : new URLSearchP...
L1064: const res = await fetchImpl2(tokenUrl, { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
Critical
Command Output Exfiltration
Findings
6 Critical11 High5 Medium6 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalDns Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShelldist/index.js
HighEvalnode_modules/ajv/dist/compile/jtd/serialize.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighCloud Metadata Access
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to autopilot-ai@1.29.0.
See all versions of autopilot-ai for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of autopilot-ai@1.29.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.