registry / autopilot-ai / 2.6.1
autopilot-ai@2.6.1
autopilot (formerly kimiflare): a terminal coding agent for any model with your own key: OpenRouter, Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, Bedrock, Vertex, Ollama and more. Per-turn cost, web search, GitHub, headless browser, LSP, MCP, local memory.
AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner indicators correspond to product features: configurable telemetry, a user-selected inbox lookup, and sandboxed code execution. The inspected source did not establish default malicious egress or another concrete attack.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The CLI starts when invoked; telemetry requires a configured endpoint, and inbox lookup follows selection of the inbox feature.
Impact
No unauthorized credential forwarding, install-time mutation, or other concrete attack impact was established.
Mechanism
Telemetry posts usage and tool metadata to its configured destination. Inbox lookup sends the entered handle and secret to the feedback host; Code Mode runs code in an isolated VM.
AI rationale
The scanner indicators correspond to product features: configurable telemetry, a user-selected inbox lookup, and sandboxed code execution. The inspected source did not establish default malicious egress or another concrete attack.
Network endpoints1
hello.kimiflare.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 96.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The CLI imports the main bundle; the only publish lifecycle hook runs a build, and the manifest defines no install hook.
- Telemetry requires a configured endpoint and posts usage and tool metadata to that destination; the inspected fields do not include tool output.
- The inbox feature is selected through its UI, requests a handle and secret, then sends them to the package's feedback host for inbox lookup.
- Code Mode evaluates supplied code inside an isolated VM and routes tool calls through the application executor.
- The inspected dependency manifests and entry points show build scripts and a conventional native SQLite installer, with no comparable attack behavior.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
14 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
41Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L41: function defaultLogDir() {
L42: const xdg = process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config");
L43: return join(xdg, "kimiflare", "logs");
...
L58: if (currentStream) {
L59: currentStream.end();
L60: currentStream = null;
...
L188: function setFetchForTesting(f) {
L189: fetchImpl = f ?? ((url, init) => fetch(url, init));
L190: }
...
L989: import { createSign } from "crypto";
L990: import { execFile } from "child_process";
L991: import { readFile } from "fs/promises";
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L411055const iat = Math.floor(now2 / 1e3);
L1056: const payload = enc({ iss: sa.client_email, scope: SCOPE, aud: sa.token_uri ?? "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", iat, exp: iat + 3600 });
L1057: const signature = createSign("RSA-SHA256").update(`${header}.${payload}`).sign(sa.private_key).toString("base64url");
...
L1062: const tokenUrl = creds.type === "service_account" ? creds.token_uri ?? "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token" : "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token";
L1063: const body = creds.type === "service_account" ? new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer", assertion: signJwt(creds, now2) }) : new URLSearchP...
L1064: const res = await fetchImpl2(tokenUrl, { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
Critical
Command Output Exfiltration
Findings
5 Critical8 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalDns Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShelldist/index.js
HighEval
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighRemote Agent Bridgedist/index.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/index.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to autopilot-ai@2.6.1.
See all versions of autopilot-ai for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of autopilot-ai@2.6.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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