registry / autopilot-ai / 2.7.2
autopilot-ai@2.7.2
autopilot (formerly kimiflare): a terminal coding agent for any model with your own key: OpenRouter, Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, Bedrock, Vertex, Ollama and more. Per-turn cost, web search, GitHub, headless browser, LSP, MCP, local memory.
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is a terminal coding agent whose CLI, provider integrations, and command capabilities align with its stated purpose. The inspected evidence does not confirm the scanner’s claims of credential theft, DNS exfiltration, or concealed remote execution.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The CLI runs when invoked; library code runs when imported or called by a consumer.
Impact
No unauthorized credential transfer, harmful automatic action, or concealed remote execution was established.
Mechanism
The inspected code configures named AI providers and enables telemetry only when an endpoint is supplied.
AI rationale
The package is a terminal coding agent whose CLI, provider integrations, and command capabilities align with its stated purpose. The inspected evidence does not confirm the scanner’s claims of credential theft, DNS exfiltration, or concealed remote execution.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 85.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest exposes a CLI and library entry points and has no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook; its only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly, which builds the package.
- The CLI entry imports dist/index.js, where the main routine starts the application and initializes telemetry.
- Telemetry has no default endpoint: it remains disabled unless KIMIFLARE_OTEL_ENDPOINT or an explicit endpoint is provided.
- The Vercel AI Gateway URL appears as one provider configuration alongside its required AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY and Vercel key setup URL.
Evidence against
- The bundle includes command execution, environment access, DNS resolution, and dynamic evaluation, but the inspected examples fit application features such as Git operations, network safety checks, and an isolated user-code sandbox.
- The scanner reports credential exfiltration and remote execution, but the inspected provider and telemetry excerpts do not substantiate those claims.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequire
Source & flagged code
14 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
41Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L41: function defaultLogDir() {
L42: const xdg = process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config");
L43: return join(xdg, "kimiflare", "logs");
...
L58: if (currentStream) {
L59: currentStream.end();
L60: currentStream = null;
...
L188: function setFetchForTesting(f) {
L189: fetchImpl = f ?? ((url, init) => fetch(url, init));
L190: }
...
L989: import { createSign } from "crypto";
L990: import { execFile } from "child_process";
L991: import { readFile } from "fs/promises";
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L411055const iat = Math.floor(now2 / 1e3);
L1056: const payload = enc({ iss: sa.client_email, scope: SCOPE, aud: sa.token_uri ?? "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", iat, exp: iat + 3600 });
L1057: const signature = createSign("RSA-SHA256").update(`${header}.${payload}`).sign(sa.private_key).toString("base64url");
...
L1062: const tokenUrl = creds.type === "service_account" ? creds.token_uri ?? "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token" : "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token";
L1063: const body = creds.type === "service_account" ? new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer", assertion: signJwt(creds, now2) }) : new URLSearchP...
L1064: const res = await fetchImpl2(tokenUrl, { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
Critical
Command Output Exfiltration
Findings
5 Critical8 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalDns Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShelldist/index.js
HighEval
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighRemote Agent Bridgedist/index.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/index.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to autopilot-ai@2.7.2.
See all versions of autopilot-ai for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of autopilot-ai@2.7.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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