autotel-terminal@23.0.1

The package's bundled CLI files (dist/cli.cjs and dist/cli.js) contain co-occurring tokens 'ping' and 'POST' that triggered a network/command exfiltration pattern match. These tokens are commonly produced by minified/bundled CLI tooling that includes both shell-spawn helpers and HTTP request helpers, and keyword proximity in a single bundled file is the weakest evidence shape. No traced-code evidence corroborates that these tokens are wired together into an exfiltration path, no install-time lifecycle hook is documented, and no attacker-controlled destination has been identified in the cited evidence. Routing to human review so a reviewer can de-bundle the relevant spans of dist/cli.cjs around line 3260 and dist/cli.js around line 3253 to confirm whether the 'ping' and 'POST' tokens correspond to a benign CLI feature (e.g. health-check + telemetry/upload) or a real exfiltration sink. ## Source: ghsa-malware (eecd710c08cdc339632aae89ee93e200267cea1c34d6b429ca9202265480842f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: google-open-source-security (a6c7977dbc054cdb7fe56da0d2fbd26e2a6fed695deb4263ccbf4adfedd86acb) The Miasma malware is a self-propagating worm that spreads across the npm registry by abusing weaponized `binding.gyp` files to achieve execution during package installation, bypassing security tools that only inspect package lifecycle scripts. Upon execution, the malware attempts to exfiltrate credentials and OIDC tokens for various cloud and registry services, and propagates by compromising other packages managed by the stolen accounts or committing backdoor files to GitHub repositories.