awaitly-analyze@7.0.1

No concrete indicators of installer-side harm were identified in this package version. No lifecycle hooks fetching remote payloads, no credential-path reads, no hardcoded attacker endpoints, and no obfuscated execution patterns were captured. Coverage of the tarball was partial, so a human reviewer should confirm the package's lifecycle scripts and main module behavior before a final disposition. ## Source: ghsa-malware (b77cddba130960f19c0c0b71b952811cc8dabd41e848d5305497cd16757ba2e3) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: google-open-source-security (a6c7977dbc054cdb7fe56da0d2fbd26e2a6fed695deb4263ccbf4adfedd86acb) The Miasma malware is a self-propagating worm that spreads across the npm registry by abusing weaponized `binding.gyp` files to achieve execution during package installation, bypassing security tools that only inspect package lifecycle scripts. Upon execution, the malware attempts to exfiltrate credentials and OIDC tokens for various cloud and registry services, and propagates by compromising other packages managed by the stolen accounts or committing backdoor files to GitHub repositories.